Reports

Data → Insights → Action: August in Focus

August 2024 was a strong reminder of the importance of turning accurate maritime detection into data-based decision-making. Accurate detection results in data-based decision-making that minimizes risk, increases operational efficiency, and makes it significantly easier to facilitate global trade. 

The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new sanctions on August 15 against seven liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tankers. But Windward’s platform alerted about these problematic vessels considerably earlier, so organizations could safeguard their business before sanctions hit. OFAC then targeted the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) “shadow fleet” later in August, as detailed in this report. 

Windward’s platform also detected what first appeared to the human eye to be a huge spike in slow-speed activities off Sudan’s coast. Our customers learned that what appeared to be loitering was something else entirely, giving them the actual picture and supporting their decision-making processes. 

Also in August, we saw U.S. East Coast port and Canadian railroad strikes reshuffling port congestion. And Thailand rolled back illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing regulations.

Houthi and Hezbollah Trade Networks Targeted by Sanctions

OFAC announced new sanctions on August 15 against seven LPG tankers and their owners for alleged linkage to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-related Yemeni individual who was running trade networks for the Houthi rebels and Hezbollah terror group.

The sanctioned vessels are the Victoria (IMO: 9113379), Raha Gas (IMO: 8818219), Parvati (IMO: 8519966), LPG OM (IMO: 9160475), Lady Liberty (IMO: 9005065), Fengshun (IMO: 9007386), and Divine Power (IMO: 9171357).

An examination of the aforementioned vessels can help us better understand what to look out for when attempting to detect deceptive shipping practices (DSPs):

  • All seven vessels sail under flags of convenience, mostly under the flag of Palau (43%) and São Tomé and Príncipe (29%)
  • All of the vessels are relatively old – built between 1987-2000 – usually an indicator of illicit activity (bad actors don’t want to risk losing newer, more expensive vessels)
  • Most of the vessels are owned by Hong Kong and Marshall Islands-based companies
  • Four out of the seven vessels have the same registered owner company, Kai Heng Global Energy Limited, which was sanctioned due to its connection to the IRGC
  • Most of these vessels operated between East Asia and the Arabian Gulf in the past, but recently shifted their routes to the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden (see the next section), in alignment with an ownership change
  • Most of the vessels in question do not have a P&I insurer, which is considered a risk indicator

Ship-to-Ship Meetings and Location (GNSS) Manipulations 

OFAC flagged the seven vessels for their ownership connections to sanctioned regimes, but the Windward Maritime AI™ platform flagged six of them as high risk beginning in September 2022 (but mostly since March 2023). 

This was largely due to the ships’ illicit behavior and engagement in DSPs, such as ship-to-ship (STS) meetings with other sanctioned and high risk vessels, and location (GNSS) manipulation. 

Windward data shows that the majority of location (GNSS) manipulations by the vessels were executed in May 2024 within the Arabian Gulf – starting in the United Arab Emirates’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ).  

For these seven sanctioned vessels, predictive intelligence and analytics were critical for two reasons: 

  1. Windward users received alerts about problematic vessels significantly  earlier than OFAC announcements, so they could safeguard their trading and shipping business before sanctions hit. 86% of sanctioned vessels are flagged as high risk by our platform during the year prior to their sanctioning.
  2. The sanctions announcement did not mention the ship-to-ship meetings or location (GNSS) manipulation, leaving organizations in the maritime ecosystem with only a partial picture.

See the last section of this Global Trade Report for information on how OFAC has also targeted the Russian LNG “shadow fleet.”

GPS Jamming off Sudan’s Coast

Windward’s Early Detection Model – which provides near real-time alerts on anomalies and trend shifts, either globally or within predefined areas – flagged a major increase in slow-speed activity off the coast of Sudan during the week starting on August 18. There was a 270% rise there, compared to the weekly average in 2024.

Graph
 Image 1: the anomaly flagged by Windward’s Early Detection Model during the week of August 18, 2024.

Public sources have reported a growing increase in military collaboration between Iran and Sudan over the past few months, with Iranian forces training the Sudanese army and hoping to build a naval base. Given these geopolitical circumstances, Windward’s analysts launched an investigation into the anomaly using Windward’s platform.

An examination of the area revealed that the increase was not rooted in the actual presence of vessels in the area, but rather in human intervention from third–party radio frequency (RF) interference (or “GPS jamming”) – probably originating from a station on the coast. 

A normal distribution of vessels engaged in slow-speed activities in the area usually appears more sporadically and randomly (see image 2 below). But all vessels that were flagged for slow-speed activities in the area since August 11, 2024, were condensed into three main areas, displaying uncharacteristic and artificial patterns, which were clearly computer-generated (please refer to image 3).

Vessels
Image 2: How a normal distribution of vessels would appear
Slow speed
Image 3: The computer-generated slow-speed activities

Windward’s analysts used a satellite imagery overlay to verify the absence of actual vessels in the area. The satellite images confirm that no vessels were actually in the area where GPS jamming is suspected, strengthening the suspicion of human intervention.

Satellite
Image 4: one of the jamming locations off the coast of Sudan, overlayed with a satellite image, showing that no vessels in the area engaged in slow-speed activities. Image source: Planet Labs.

Another indication of jamming in the area can be seen below in image 5. We see a vessel seemingly transmitting its AIS and sailing in a normal pattern – until it reaches the “jammed” area. At this point, the vessel gets “thrown” into the jamming points. As soon as the vessel sails out of range, its transmission returns to normal.

Map 1
Image 5: a vessel travels normally, is “thrown” into jamming points, and then resumes normal sailing.

Because the interference seems to affect every vessel entering the area, this is likely not an attempt to conceal a single vessel, but rather an effort aimed at something more strategic.

To find out what Windward’s Sequence Search capability uncovered on this topic, read the full report on this subject.

An East Coast Strike in the U.S. Reshuffles Port Congestion

The potential strike by the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) is generating significant uncertainty across U.S. East Coast ports, threatening to further strain already stressed supply chains. With a strike looming as early as October, logistics service providers are increasingly shifting their focus to the West Coast to mitigate potential disruptions.

The strike was highlighted as a potential black swan event earlier this year in the article – The Black Swan Era: Navigating Four Disruptive Events During 2024-2025. 

This shift is evident via two key indicators:

  1. Rising transpacific shipping rates: shipping rates from East Asia to the U.S. West Coast have started to rise according to Windward Port Insights, based on Freightos’ data. It cost $7,115 to ship a container on August 23, an increase of $700 from the start of the month. Meanwhile, rates from the U.S. West Coast to East Asia have remained stable, hovering around $300 per container.
  2. Increased activity at West Coast ports: the Port of Long Beach recorded a 33% rise in port calls in July compared to June, according to the Windward Port Insights. 

Additionally, reports show that the Port of Long Beach saw a 53% year-over-year increase in July, handling 882,000 TEUs, breaking its previous import volume record for July. The Port of Los Angeles processed 940,000 TEUs in July, marking a 37% increase from the previous year and its busiest month since May 2021, during the height of the pandemic’s supply chain challenges.

Image 6: increased activity at West Coast ports. 

For more information, read our Port Insights report.

The Canadian Railroad Strike and its Impact on Supply Chain

Canada’s two major freight railroads, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Kansas City Southern, shut down their operations due to labor strife. This is the first time both railroads shut down simultaneously. Public sources suggested that the shutdown is estimated to affect around $1 billion worth of goods daily and the disruption could potentially have a recessionary impact on North America’s economy.

The strike ended on August 26, but it might still have an impact on the supply chain. Four strike days could lead to congestion and terminals filling up at ports such as Vancouver, considered one of Canada’s major ports.

Insights from Windward’s Ocean Freight Visibility solution show an increase in significant delays (+six days) at the port of Vancouver for shipments with initial carrier ETAs between August 22-September 2, 2024. August 30 and September 23 exhibit the largest number of delayed shipments, with most shipments showing over 12 days of delay. Heavier than usual congestion might be exhibited in Vancouver during the first two weeks of September 2024, based on Maritime AI™ Predictive ETAs.

Graph 2
Image 7: shipments headed towards Vancouver between August 22-September 2, 2024 (based on initial carrier ETA) and expected delays).

Shipments that exhibited significant delays based on Maritime AI™ Predictive ETAs are also dependent on the Canadian railroad in several cases. These shipments have a post-port of destination (PoD) segment via land route.

Map 2
Image 8: example of a shipment that is delayed at the port of Vancouver by seven days and has a post-PoD destination via land route.

The United States has expressed concern over the potential disruption of agricultural exports and other goods, as Canada has a significant agricultural sector that may have been impacted by the strike.

This situation highlights the critical importance of rail in maintaining stability within the supply chain.Windward’s Ocean Freight Visibility (OFV) sends alerts for events such as strikes that could lead to congestion and further delays.

Thailand Rolls Back Fishing Regulations…Due to Detection Difficulties

Thailand is rolling back some of its fishing regulations after nearly a decade. These stricter regulations were initially put in place to address issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which led to a “yellow card” warning from the European Union in 2015. This warning threatened to ban Thai seafood exports to the EU, a significant market for the country.

Rolling back these regulations will mean reduced penalties on IUU fishing and relaxed rules on vessel monitoring. Labor protections – aimed at ensuring the safety of mostly migrant workers at sea – could also be rolled back.

These regulations were a double-edged sword for the Thai fishing industry. On the one hand, they created additional logistical and operational burdens.  On the other hand, they attempted to curtail IUU fishing in Thailand’s territorial waters, which poses a serious risk to the local fishing sector.

Reduced monitoring, enforcement, and penalties could mean an increase in IUU fishing activities. While the rollback may provide short-term economic relief for the local fishing industry, it risks undermining international efforts to combat IUU fishing, especially if other countries follow suit. So why did this happen?

Fishing regulations place a burden on both government agencies tasked with monitoring and enforcing them, but are also shouldered by local fishers, especially the smaller ones, who are required to prove compliance and adjust their operations. 

Technology can help ease the burden on both parties by automatically tracking and then sending alerts regarding targets at a higher risk of IUU fishing. No human intervention required, but rather timely alerts from an AI system analyzing behavioral indicators.

OFAC Continues to Target the Russian LNG “Shadow Fleet”

OFAC published new sanctions on August 23 against 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and third-party countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East – whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions. The new sanctions included  seven  LNG tankers believed to be operating in the sanctioned Arctic LNG2 project.

The sanctioned vessels are: Asya Energy (IMO: 9216298), Everest Energy (IMO: 9243148), Pioneer (IMO: 9256602), North Air (IMO: 9953509), North Mountain (IMO: 9953511), North Sky (IMO: 9953523), and North Way (IMO: 9953535).

A quick examination of these vessels:

  • Most vessels were built between 2002-2005, and are between 277-293 meters in length, considered larger LNG tankers.
  • Windward data shows that all vessels sail under flags of convenience, often associated with possible illicit activity.
  • Windward’s ownership data shows that all vessels are owned by companies based in the UAE since April-May 2024, around the time they started to operate in the  North Sea and Barents Sea.
  • Our platform found that in June-August, all vessels had their first visit to the North Sea and Barents Sea. First-time visits can be an indication of a change in behavior and a change in area of operation.

LNG “Shadow Fleet” Patterns of Operations

The recently sanctioned Pioneer, Asya Energy, and Everest Energy spoofed their location (location {GNSS} manipulation) in the Barents Sea in August 2024, and arrived at the Arctic LNG2 Project in Russia, located at the port of Utrenniy. 

Those vessels used the manipulations to hide their arrivals to the LNG project. But optical satellite imagery shows that a 277-meter, green-decked vessel, similar in size and appearance to the Everest Energy, was docked at Utrenniy despite not transmitting its AIS signal on August 25, 2024.

Satellite 2
Image 9: a candidate vessel for the Everest Energy docked at Utrenniy (LNG2 project) while not transmitting  its AIS signal, August 25, 2024.

Windward Sequence Search helped reverse-engineer the operational pattern exhibited by the three manipulating vessels – a first-time visit to the Barents Sea, followed by  a slow speed activity, which was later flagged as a location (GNSS) manipulation. In the last year, three vessels followed that pattern and all occurred in the month of August.

Barents Sea
Image 10: an example of the LNG sequence exhibited by the recently sanctioned vessels conducting first time visits in the Barents Sea and then slow speed activities there.

The other four vessels that were sanctioned followed a different pattern of operation. They engaged in an area visit in Norway and Svalbard’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and then (in a period of less than seven days) had a port call in Sabetta or Utrenniy. Windward’s platform highlights that 26 vessels followed this pattern of operation during the past year. All are flagged as risky in the Windward system.

LNG
Image 11: an example of the LNG sequence exhibited by the recently sanctioned vessels conducting an area visit in Norway and Svalbard, and then a port call in Sabetta, Russia.

Want to Go from Detection to Decision?