Shadow Fleet, Shady DPRK Activity, & Spotlighting the Typhoon – Trade Roundup

How many port calls were executed from January 2022-September 14, 2024 by the 10 vessels sanctioned as part of Russia’s shadow fleet? And where did these calls occur? 

Why was there a 300% increase in the number of North Korean-flagged vessels that called port in Chongjin, after making a port call in Nampo? 

And how is Typhoon Bebinca affecting the supply chain? This week’s Global Trade Roundup has the answers you need to shine a spotlight on the shadows…

Russian Shadow Fleet Vessels Get Sanctioned 

• Sanctions against 10 tankers operating as part of Russia’s shadow fleet were announced by the UK on September 11, 2024. Some of these vessels have traded Russian oil – overall, Russian oil has generated more than $5 billion dollars since January 2022. The UK sanctioned a total of 25 shadow fleet vessels as part of the UK’s “call for action” against Russia.
• The 10 vessels:
  • Nikolay Zuyev (IMO: 9610781) 
  • NS Clipper (IMO: 9341081) 
  • NS Corona (IMO: 9341079) 
  • Zaliv Aniva (IMO: 9418494) 
  • Olympiysky Prospect (IMO: 9511387) 
  • Leonid Loza (IMO: 9412347) 
  • NS Asia (IMO: 9413561) 
  • SCF Baltica (IMO: 9305568) 
  • Vladimir Tikhonov (IMO: 9311622) 
  • SCF Vankor (IMO: 9316127)  
• Windward’s Maritime AI™ platform shows that seven of the above vessels are crude oil tankers, two are chemical tankers, and one is an oil products tanker. Additionally, eight out of the ten vessels sail under the flag of Gabon, which has been previously associated with Russian-sanctioned vessels owned by Sovcomflot. One other vessel is sailing under the flag of Liberia, a flag of convenience, and another vessel is sailing under the flag of Russia.
• All vessels were flagged as risky due to their Russian affiliation, prior to being sanctioned, based on Windward’s compliance risk capabilities. The majority were flagged as early as March 1, 2022. Vessels were flagged due to their ownership, port calls in Russia, ship-to-ship (STS) operations with Russian vessels, and dark activities in Russia.
• When examining their behavioral patterns, Windward’s insights show the following key points:
  • The 10 vessels executed a total of 525 port calls from January 2022-September 14, 2024: 48% in Russia, 28% in China, and 8% in India. This matches the data trends regarding the Russian oil supply chain to India and China.
  • The vessels conducted a total of 88 dark activities in the same time period: 51% in Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 29% in the Russia-Japan conflict zone near the Pacific, and 13% in Turkey’s EEZ.
• There have been multiple sanctions announcements against Russian-related vessels in previous weeks. Windward’s risk assessment model flagged the vessels before they were sanctioned, highlighting the advantages to be gained by not waiting for official announcements. 

North Korea Trading with Russia – the Nampo-Chongjin Weapons Supply Line

• Based on a quote from the Ukrainian military intelligence chief, public sources recently reported that he Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been increasingly selling arms to the Russian Federation. This is mainly munitions and artillery shells for Russian war efforts in Ukraine. 
• The majority of weapon manufacture facilities are reportedly located near Pyongyang, North Korea. But existing data does not show that Russian vessels arrived in areas near Pyongyang for freight shipments. Satellite images in March, 2024 showed increased Russian presence in the port of Chongjin. This port is located in the western Korea Bay neighboring Russia and was chosen as an offloading location for Russian oil traded for North Korean arms.
• There is a railway connecting Pyongyang and Chongjin that operates year-round, according to reports based on information from UN personnel. But North Korean infrastructure is considered slow and unreliable, with trains moving at top speeds of only 50 km per hour due to aging infrastructure. As a result, moving freight in North Korea heavily relies upon vessels, which are more effective than land vehicles.
• Windward Maritime AI™ platform’s Sequence Search capability shows that between August-September 2024 (which obviously hasn’t ended yet), there was a 300% increase in the number of North Korean-flagged vessels that called port in Chongjin after making a port call in Nampo. Nampo is the closest major port to Pyongyang and it has been previously associated with arms smuggling by the UN Panel of Experts on the DPRK. Due to harsh regulation on the North Korean side, only North Korean-owned vessels can enter the Taen checkpoint entrance leading to the port of Nampo, so they are the only vessels that can enter the port of Nampo.
• Windward data shows that this trend is new and started in November 2023, without any sign of similar patterns seen before that date.

Port calls conducted by North Korea- flagged cargo vessels after conducting a port call in Nampo. September 2023-2024.

Windward’s Sequence Search user interface.

A North Korean-flagged cargo vessel made a port call in Chongjin after making a port call in Nampo between August-September 2024 (example of a sequence).

Based on the data, all six vessels showing the same pattern are small/medium-sized cargo vessels, most of which have been operating exclusively within the North Korean EEZ. But some of the vessels are linked to UN-sanctioned companies and pose a risk. Windward’s MAI Expert™, the industry’s first maritime Gen AI agent, highlights this potential risk and shows that these vessels pose potential risk for smuggling and illicit activities.

MAI Expert™ explains the potential risk of a North Korean vessel exhibiting the Nampo-Chongjin pattern.

North Korea is increasing its munition production and its proliferation program, according to recent public reports, as well as aiding Russia with its arms trade. Using Windward’s capabilities can help you better understand the impact of geopolitical events on the maritime domain, and the possible risk of arms smuggling in war-risk areas.

Typhoon Bebinca and its Supply Chain Impact

• On Saturday, September 14, Chinese authorities reported the formation of the 13th typhoon to hit China in 2024. Typhoon Bebinca formed over the Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and is considered the strongest typhoon to hit Shanghai since 1949. Flights, railways, and highways were shut down, and authorities published coastal flood and heavy rain warnings.
• Additionally, Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan port administrations announced that container loading and unloading operations will be suspended from September 15, 8:00.
• The Windward Maritime AI™ platform shows that between September 13-14, 2024, there was an 86% decrease in port calls to Ningbo-Zhoushan  by container vessels, with no port calls registered on September 15. There was a 56% decrease in port calls in Shanghai between September 13-14, and another 95% decrease in port calls from the 14-15.

Daily calls at the ports of Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan by container vessels, September 1-15, 2024.

Windward’s data shows that between September 14-15, there was a sharp 88% spike in route deviations conducted in China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by container vessels. Data shows that the majority of container vessels deviated from their route near Shanghai on September 15. Combining the decrease in the number of port calls in addition to the increase in route deviations during the same period, it is likely that container vessels are avoiding Shanghai and Ningbo-Zhoushan due to the suspension of the ports’ operations.

Route deviations by container vessels in the Chinese EEZ, September 1-15, 2024.

Map showing the clustering of route deviations by container vessels in the Chinese EEZ, September 15, 2024.

Example of a vessel that was headed towards Shanghai, but that deviated on September 15, likely to avoid the typhoon.

Windward’s Ocean Freight Visibility™ platform’s data suggests that the typhoon will have a long-term impact on the supply chain. Based on the data, shipments that are headed to the port of Shanghai are experiencing delays of 7-19 days, leading to shipments’ earliest possible arrival toward the end of September 2024. These delays can further impact the supply chain by causing congestion and additional delays elsewhere toward the end of September, due to the late arrival of shipments to the port.

Example of a vessel that is experiencing a 19-day arrival delay to the port of Shanghai, possibly caused by the typhoon. It is expected to arrive on September 30, 2024.

September and October are known as a typhoon season in China and the East Asian region, which can impact the supply chain and cause delays in shipping at major ports. But climate change means we can expect to see more typhoons and increasing power – typhoons Yagi and Bebinca were historically strong. The freight and shipping industries should continue preparing for upcoming extreme weather events.