The Ceasefire Collapses: 80+ Strikes, a Revoked Oil Waiver, and a 1.95-Million-Barrel U-Turn

At a Glance

• U.S. Central Command struck more than 80 targets inside Iran overnight on July 7 to 8, including air defense systems, coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and more than 60 IRGC small boats in and around the Strait of Hormuz.
• Iran retaliated with missile and drone strikes on U.S. military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait, with Kuwaiti air defenses intercepting approximately 15 projectiles.
• President Trump declared the ceasefire with Iran over, and the U.S. Treasury simultaneously revoked the general license authorizing Iranian oil sales.
• Four vessels rerouted from the southern corridor to the central corridor, and an India-flagged crude tanker carrying approximately 1.95 million barrels made a full U-turn.
• July 8 to 9 overnight recorded only five transits, with a single outbound bulk carrier and zero outbound tanker cargo.
• Approximately 63 million barrels of Iranian crude are now at sea with the legal cover of the Treasury waiver stripped away, with demand outside China near zero.
• At Kharg Island, all three terminals remained occupied through both strike nights, and an Iran-flagged NITC-operated OFAC-sanctioned VLCC was confirmed loading dark on July 8.
• Windward assesses the operational risk environment across the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and northern Arabian Gulf as critical.

Operational Overview

The Strait of Hormuz is once again operating under full conflict conditions. Overnight into July 8, U.S. Central Command struck more than 80 targets inside Iran in direct response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the Strait. Iran retaliated against U.S. military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait, President Trump declared the ceasefire over, and the U.S. Treasury revoked the general license that had authorized Iranian oil sales under the now-defunct interim agreement.

The commercial response was immediate and sharp. Four vessels rerouted from the southern corridor to the central corridor within hours of the escalation, and an India-flagged crude tanker carrying approximately 1.95 million barrels of Kuwaiti crude bound for Singapore made a full U-turn. By the July 8 to 9 overnight window, transit volume had contracted to just five crossings, with a single outbound bulk carrier and zero outbound tanker cargo, the sharpest single-window contraction of the reopening period.

Iranian crude exports have not stopped. Current export pace is assessed at approximately 1.5 million barrels per day, moving almost entirely to China via flag hopping shadow fleet tankers. Kharg Island held full terminal utilization through both strike nights, and an Iran-flagged NITC-operated OFAC-sanctioned VLCC was confirmed loading dark on July 8. What has changed is the legal cover. Approximately 63 million barrels of Iranian crude are now at sea with the U.S. waiver stripped, demand outside China near zero, and any operator, insurer, or intermediary facilitating these flows now fully exposed to secondary sanctions.

The partial normalization that had been built since mid-June has effectively collapsed. Ceasefire declared over, sanctions reimposed, kinetic exchanges active on both sides, and outbound commercial traffic through the Strait now at levels not seen since the earliest phase of the conflict.

U.S. Strikes More Than 80 Iranian Targets, Iran Retaliates in Bahrain and Kuwait

Overnight on July 7 to 8, U.S. Central Command struck more than 80 targets inside Iran, including air defense systems, command and control networks, coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and more than 60 IRGC small boats in and around the Strait of Hormuz. The action was a direct response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the Strait, including the July 7 strikes on the Qatari LNG carrier AL REKAYYAT and a Saudi-owned ULCC.

Iran’s IRGC retaliated with missile and drone strikes on U.S. military sites across Bahrain and Kuwait. Kuwaiti air defenses intercepted approximately 15 projectiles, with some power lines knocked out by interception shrapnel and no reported casualties.

President Trump declared the ceasefire with Iran over. The U.S. Treasury simultaneously revoked the general license that had authorized the sale of Iranian oil, a direct reimposition of sanctions on Iranian oil sales that had been eased as part of the now-defunct interim agreement. The escalation is unfolding during multi-day funeral proceedings in Iran for former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, compounding the diplomatic and operational complexity.

The exchanges have continued into a second day. On the night of July 8 to 9, U.S. and Iranian forces traded overnight strikes for a second straight day, with the U.S. hitting additional Iranian sites and Iran’s IRGC responding with drones and missiles against U.S. bases in Bahrain and Kuwait. Both sides have publicly hardened their positions, and the International Maritime Organization has urged shipowners to avoid crossing the Strait of Hormuz until the safety of crews can be assured.

The collapse of the ceasefire framework, the reimposition of Iranian oil sanctions, and the scale of U.S. kinetic action inside Iran collectively represent the most significant escalation since the opening phase of the conflict.

Immediate Commercial Response

The overnight escalation triggered immediate commercial responses in the Strait. Four vessels rerouted from the southern corridor to the central corridor, and one India-flagged crude tanker made a full U-turn.

The U-turning vessel was an India-flagged crude tanker of 333 meters carrying approximately 1.95 million barrels of crude from Mina Al Ahmadi bound for Singapore, according to Vortexa. The vessel had transited in and out of the Gulf during the conflict before reversing course following the overnight strikes.

The four rerouting vessels comprised a Comoros-flagged cargo vessel of 57 meters departing Port Rashid toward Khor Fakkan; a Panama-flagged crude tanker of 330 meters carrying approximately 2.09 million barrels of crude from Halul, Qatar bound for Ningbo, China, transiting outbound from the Gulf for the first time since the war began; a Panama-flagged bulk carrier of 199 meters also leaving the Gulf for the first time, having previously made a U-turn on July 4; and an India-flagged bulk carrier of 225 meters departing Imam Khomeini toward Sohar.

Strait of Hormuz Transits Contract Sharply 

Transit volumes moved through three distinct phases across the reporting period, from an outbound-heavy surge on July 7 to a functional closure of outbound commercial traffic within 48 hours.

July 7 recorded 51 transits, 16 inbound and 35 outbound, consistent with operators accelerating departures while inbound traffic remained suppressed. The inbound group comprised 12 AIS-transmitting and two dark vessels, with five tankers and 11 cargo vessels across Panama, Comoros, Iran, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sri Lanka, India, Marshall Islands, and San Marino flags. The outbound group comprised 27 AIS-transmitting and eight dark vessels, with 14 tankers, four bulk carriers, and 15 cargo vessels across a broad flag spread. Twenty-two outbound transits used the northern corridor and 11 the southern corridor. The 35-to-16 outbound-to-inbound ratio is consistent with risk-driven departure acceleration rather than normal commercial routing.

July 8 recorded 35 transits, 17 inbound and 18 outbound, with the southern corridor carrying only two of 18 outbound vessels, reflecting sustained operator avoidance of the Omani-side lane following the overnight strikes. Dark vessels accounted for seven of 18 outbound contacts, a notably higher dark proportion than the inbound direction. The outbound composition included five tankers, five bulk carriers, and eight cargo vessels under Marshall Islands, Panama, Hong Kong, Barbados, Palau, India, Belize, Malta, Iran, Sri Lanka, Comoros, Singapore, Benin, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Tanzania flags.

The overnight July 8 to 9 window recorded only five transits, four inbound and one outbound, the sharpest single-window contraction of the reopening period. The single outbound vessel was a bulk carrier carrying no oil, LPG, or products cargo. The inbound picture was marked by heavy dark activity, with two of the four inbound vessels transiting AIS off for the full crossing and two Iran-flagged inbound vessels carrying no IMO number, limiting ownership traceability. One Equatorial Guinea-flagged LPG tanker of 230 meters transited inbound from Sharjah with AIS active but carries both a Windward dark fleet designation and a false flag indicator, demonstrating that identity obfuscation is not limited to vessels that go dark. One outbound vessel made a sharp U-turn near the Strait entrance off Khasab, consistent with the pattern of vessels reversing course following IRGC enforcement activity.

One outbound vessel made a sharp U-turn near the Strait entrance off Khasab, consistent with the pattern of vessels reversing course following IRGC enforcement activity.

Windward assesses that with only one outbound transit overnight, a bulk carrier carrying no oil, LPG, or products cargo, a U-turn at the Strait exit, and the southern corridor effectively abandoned, the Strait of Hormuz is functionally closed to commercial outbound cargo traffic for the first time since the partial reopening began in mid-June.

Iranian Crude Exports Continue in the Dark, With Legal Cover Stripped

Iranian crude exports have not stopped following the escalation. Instead, they have gone dark and narrowed almost entirely to a single buyer.

Current export pace is assessed at approximately 1.5 million barrels per day, up from a blockade-collapse low of approximately 209,000 to 260,000 barrels per day in May, through an April peak of approximately 1.9 million barrels per day and approximately 1.66 million barrels per day in June. Approximately 60 million barrels have moved since mid-June. Per Vortexa, 80% of tracked volume over the trailing 30 days, approximately 32.3 million of 40.5 million barrels, went to China via flag hopping shadow fleet tankers.

The legal cover for this activity collapsed overnight on July 7 to 8. The 60-day U.S. waiver issued on June 22 under Executive Order 13846 General License X was revoked following Iran’s Hormuz tanker attacks, reinstating full sanctions as approximately 63 million barrels sat in transit or idling between the Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, with Kharg Island still loading approximately six million barrels.

Demand outside China is near zero. One cargo of approximately 30,400 barrels of bitumen reached Mumbai, India, in 30 days, 0.1% of tracked volume, with no other Asian buyer purchases recorded since the waiver was issued. Vortexa destination breakdown across 71 cargoes and approximately 40.5 million barrels over the trailing 30 days confirms the single-buyer concentration. 

China accounted for approximately 79.8% at approximately 32.31 million barrels of Iranian heavy crude, the UAE approximately 8.1% at approximately 3.26 million barrels assessed as a Fujairah and Hamriyah re-export hub, unknown or undeclared destinations approximately 4.7%, Iran’s domestic coastal movements approximately 4%, Turkey approximately 1.3% primarily LPG, Malaysia approximately 0.9% as a ship-to-ship waypoint rather than a final buyer, Oman, Bangladesh, Singapore, and Iraq combined approximately 1.2%, and India approximately 0.1%.

AIS manipulation is routine across the export network. A Curacao-flagged OFAC-sanctioned oil products tanker spoofed null island coordinates during four ship-to-ship transfer handoffs. An Iran-flagged VLCC went dark for approximately 10 days into Kharg, loading approximately 2.12 million barrels, now assessed as heading to China. Two vessels confirmed using the asymmetric anchor-swing spoofing method, broadcasting fabricated anchorages in the Iraq-Kuwait-Iran tri-border area while actually loading at Kharg, moved approximately 1.87 million barrels declared as bound for Malaysia but assessed as heading to Lanshan, China.

The broader network evidence is significant. Nine sanctioned tankers made Iranian port calls in eight days, 119 conducted ship-to-ship meetings across the Gulf and Hormuz in the trailing period, and 128 high-risk tankers transited India’s exclusive economic zone in 30 days, 32 in a single 24-hour window, mostly via the Nine Degree Channel and Lakshadweep corridor, routing Gulf to Malaysia and Singapore to China.

The Qatari LNG carrier AL REKAYYAT, struck by an IRGC missile on July 7, changed its transmitted destination from the Arabian Sea to Dahej, India, a primary LNG import terminal, hours after being hit. A chemicals tanker formerly bound for Mundra, India, rerouted from the southern to the central corridor following the July 6 to 7 attacks, representing a direct impact on India-bound cargo.

Windward assesses that with the waiver revoked and demand outside China near zero, the approximately 63 million barrels now at sea faces a shrinking market willing to handle it without dark fleet tradecraft. Any operator, insurer, or intermediary facilitating these flows is now fully exposed to U.S. secondary sanctions.

Kharg Island Holds Full Terminal Utilization Through Strikes 

Kharg Island maintained full terminal utilization through both strike nights, with all three berths occupied and the eastern waiting area growing from 20 to approximately 24 dark stationary tankers, 85% laden. The loaded-and-holding posture reads as buyer and insurer caution rather than reduced loading.

SAR imagery collected over Kharg Island on July 8 at 05:38 UTC showed all three loading terminals occupied, with vessel positions and assessed lengths closely matching the July 7 collection at each berth, raising the possibility these are the same vessels holding station, though identity was not confirmed. At the western terminal, a dark vessel of approximately 333 meters was alongside at the same berth position as July 7. At the eastern terminal, two dark vessels of approximately 330 meters each were alongside at the same berth positions. At the LPG terminal, a dark vessel of approximately 120 meters was alongside, consistent with the approximately 118-meter vessel in the July 7 collection.

By the July 8 12:10 UTC collection, an Iran-flagged NITC-operated OFAC-sanctioned VLCC of approximately 330 meters was identified berthed and stationary at the western terminal with no AIS, consistent with an active loading call. The vessel has been dark since an inbound Strait transit on June 27. A second dark VLCC of approximately 330 meters was observed underway off the eastern terminal on a heading consistent with an outbound departure, also without AIS.

Compared to the earlier same-day collection at 05:38 UTC, which showed two vessels of approximately 330 meters berthed at the western terminal, only the NITC vessel remained at the western terminal by the 12:10 UTC pass, indicating a departure from the earlier configuration within that approximately six-hour window.

Chabahar Dark Tanker Cluster

SAR and EO imagery collected over Chabahar on July 7 identified three dark hulls across the port’s central to eastern approach and inner berth, all stationary with no AIS signal at the time of collection. A VLCC-class hull of approximately 334 meters was at anchor in the central Chabahar approach. A Panamax-class hull of approximately 184 meters was at anchor in the eastern approach. A third vessel, an oil products tanker hull-identified from imagery despite absent AIS, was berthed inside the port. No small-craft or patrol activity was observed in the same window.

Windward assesses the concentration of three AIS-dark hulls, two at anchor and one at berth, as coordinated staging rather than isolated AIS outages, indicating Iranian logistics activity continues outside the Strait even as the Hormuz corridor becomes increasingly contested.

A Dark Vessel Trailing an Oil Sheen in the Kerch Strait

EO imagery identified a dark vessel of approximately 100 meters north of the Kerch Strait trailing a distinct dark widening slick, consistent with an oil sheen rather than a shadow or cloud artifact.

The detection falls within Ukraine’s ongoing drone campaign against shadow fleet tankers in the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait area, running since July 6, with more than 19 tankers reportedly hit. The Rostov Oblast Governor denied any spill from tankers struck in a separate July 8 strike in Taganrog Bay, stating the tankers were empty and there was no spill of petroleum products, a denial pattern consistent with prior Russian statements on shadow fleet losses.

Windward Multi-Source Intelligence indicates an active leak is present, suggesting that the conflict’s impact on the Russian shadow fleet is producing environmental consequences that Russian authorities are denying.

Outlook

The partial normalization that had been built since mid-June has effectively collapsed. Ceasefire declared over, sanctions reimposed, kinetic exchanges active on both sides, and the Strait of Hormuz now functionally closed to commercial outbound traffic for the first time since the reopening began.

Iranian crude exports continue in the dark and continue at pace, but the legal cover of the U.S. waiver is gone. Approximately 63 million barrels of Iranian crude are now at sea with demand outside China near zero, the export network reliant on flag hopping, AIS spoofing, and asymmetric anchor-swing manipulation to reach its single remaining buyer at scale. Any operator, insurer, or intermediary facilitating these flows is now fully exposed to U.S. secondary sanctions.

The southern corridor’s viability as a safe transit lane is again in question, with only two of 18 outbound vessels using it on July 8 and a U-turn recorded at the Strait exit off Khasab overnight. The Traffic Separation Scheme remains uncleared. The IMO evacuation framework remains suspended. And with funeral proceedings for former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei still underway, no near-term resumption of diplomatic engagement is in prospect.

Windward assesses the risk environment as Critical across the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and northern Arabian Gulf, with active U.S.-Iran kinetic exchanges, ceasefire collapse, sanctions reimposition, and corridor uncertainty all compounding simultaneously.