Hormuz Re-Closure Meets Market Resistance as Traffic Returns

At a Glance

• Iran reinstated PGSA toll and clearance requirements on June 21, attempting to re-close the Strait of Hormuz.
• Despite the announcement, 25 AIS-visible transits were recorded on June 22, including French- and Qatari-linked LNG carriers.
• Kharg Island resumed multi-berth crude loading, with Iranian exports reaching 6.79 million barrels during the week ending June 21, the highest level in nearly two months.
• A cluster of 17 tankers, including 10 OFAC-sanctioned vessels, was observed operating in the southeastern Hormuz corridor.
• Fujairah and Khor Fakkan remained heavily congested as operators continued waiting for clarity on transit conditions.
• Windward identified an extensive sanctions-evasion network linked to 38 vessels expelled from the Cameroon registry.

Operational Overview

The June 18-22 reporting period captures a rapid shift from cautious normalization to renewed uncertainty.

Following the June 17 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the formal lifting of the blockade on June 18, commercial shipping responded immediately. Transit volumes rose above 20 crossings per day, Chinese-affiliated and European-owned vessels resumed movement, and Kharg Island restarted visible crude-loading operations.

That momentum appeared short-lived when Iran announced on June 20 that Hormuz was closed, and it was reinstating the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) toll and clearance system.

Yet the June 22 data tells a more complicated story.

Rather than collapsing, traffic continued moving through the Strait. EO imagery collected after the announcement became effective showed active two-way movement, while AIS tracking recorded 25 visible transits in a single reporting window. French- and Qatari-linked LNG carriers transited openly with AIS active, suggesting that at least some international operators are choosing to test the post-agreement environment rather than suspend operations.

At the same time, Iranian exports accelerated, sanctioned fleets operated with increasing visibility, and key Gulf anchorages remained crowded with vessels waiting for greater clarity.

The result is a Strait operating between competing realities: renewed Iranian restrictions on one side and growing commercial willingness to challenge them on the other.

Iran Attempts to Re-Close the Strait

On June 20, Iran announced the reinstatement of PGSA transit requirements, reversing the framework established after the June 17 agreement.

The move effectively forces operators using the northern corridor near Larak Island to obtain advance authorization through an entity that remains sanctioned under Western frameworks.

For commercial operators, the dilemma is straightforward. Complying with PGSA requirements may create sanctions exposure, while refusing to comply risks Iranian enforcement action.

The immediate impact became visible on June 21.

Transit activity fell from the roughly 20 daily crossings recorded after the MoU to 12 transits. European and neutral commercial operators largely disappeared from the traffic picture, while sanctioned Iranian-linked vessels and smaller regional operators dominated movements. Five of eight inbound contacts were operating without AIS.

The pattern resembled conditions observed during the blockade itself, raising questions about whether the reopening had already begun to reverse.

Traffic Returns Despite the Restrictions

Just 24 hours later, however, the picture changed again.

EO imagery collected on June 22 showed active two-way traffic in the northern corridor, while AIS data recorded 25 visible transits, including 10 inbound and 15 outbound crossings.

Among the most notable movements were LNG carriers linked to France and Qatar transiting openly toward Ras Laffan with AIS active.

This activity suggests that at least part of the market is treating the PGSA announcement as a manageable operational complication rather than a reason to halt movement altogether.

The coming days will determine which interpretation prevails.

If European, Chinese, and Gulf-state operators continue moving through the Strait, Iran’s attempt to create a second pause may prove ineffective. If operators begin delaying departures or diverting cargoes, the PGSA system could once again suppress traffic.

Kharg Island Returns to Loading Mode

The clearest operational signal of normalization has emerged at Kharg Island.

EO imagery collected on June 20 identified two VLCCs loading at the western terminal for the first time since roughly June 5-6. A third tanker was positioning nearby for a berth slot.

High-resolution imagery later confirmed three sanctioned VLCCs loading crude while actively transmitting AIS.

That behavior represents a significant departure from the conflict-period baseline.

Throughout the blockade, sanctioned Iranian-linked tankers relied heavily on AIS blackouts, ship-to-ship transfers, fraudulent flags, identity manipulation, and dark transits. Openly transmitting AIS while loading Iranian crude suggests a fleet operating with significantly greater confidence than it displayed during the conflict.

Activity expanded further on June 21.

One VLCC remained in active loading at the western terminal, while a ballast VLCC arrived at the eastern terminal, bringing a second berth back into operation after approximately ten days of inactivity.

The reopening of multiple berths simultaneously indicates that Kharg is actively increasing throughput.

Iranian Exports Reach a Two-Month High

Export data supports the imagery assessment.

Vortexa data for the week ending June 21 recorded 6.79 million barrels exported from Iran, the highest weekly volume since early May.

The cargoes were loaded primarily from Kuh Mubarak, Bandar Imam Khomeini, and increasingly from Kharg Island as terminal activity resumed.

Of the 12 tankers identified loading Iranian crude during the week, three were already operating outside the Arabian Gulf by June 22.

China remains the dominant destination, while the UAE and Oman continue to appear as important intermediate locations within the broader export network.

Although volumes remain below pre-conflict levels, the trend is unmistakably upward.

The Sanctioned Fleet Is Operating More Openly

Another notable development is the changing behavior of sanctioned fleets.

EO imagery collected on June 22 identified a cluster of 17 tankers in the southeastern Hormuz corridor. Ten were sanctioned under OFAC Iran programs.

Remarkably, 16 of the 17 vessels were transmitting AIS.

The network shows all the hallmarks of a mature sanctions-evasion architecture: fraudulent registries, repeated MMSI changes, extensive dark activity, ship-to-ship transfers, and layered ownership structures.

Yet many of these vessels are now operating with greater visibility than during the blockade period.

Windward assesses that at least ten vessels within the cluster are participating in a coordinated Iranian export system that uses transshipment and vessel-to-vessel transfers to obscure cargo origin before products enter global markets.

The shift toward AIS visibility suggests operators increasingly believe enforcement pressure has eased relative to conditions during the conflict.

IRGC Activity Remains Elevated

The ceasefire and MoU have not resulted in a reduction in IRGC maritime activity.

During the reporting period, IRGC small-craft operations remained persistent across the Strait and inside the Arabian Gulf.

At peak activity, 648 craft were recorded in a single day.

Imagery collected on June 19 identified 13 high-speed craft operating alongside two dark Aframax tankers transiting inbound through the northern corridor.

Separate imagery documented likely escort behavior around a dark container vessel exiting the Strait.

On June 20, more than 40 high-speed craft were observed moving northwest through the central Strait, while another collection identified over 30 craft operating in the same general pattern on June 22.

Although some recurring concentrations near Qeshm Island are now assessed as fishing activity rather than military operations, the overall IRGC footprint remains substantial.

Fujairah and Khor Fakkan Continue to Wait

The region’s major anchorage areas remain crowded despite the reopening.

Fujairah surged from just five vessels on June 15 to approximately 90 vessels by June 18.

Most were ballast tankers holding position while waiting for clarity on transit conditions. Ship-to-ship transfers and bunkering operations continued throughout the anchorage.

Khor Fakkan remained even more congested.

Imagery collected on June 19 identified approximately 130 vessels, the majority of them stationary ballast tankers.

Despite the reopening, operators have not yet begun departing in masses. The fleet continues to maintain a cautious holding posture while awaiting greater certainty regarding Iranian restrictions and enforcement.

Cameroon Shadow Fleet Investigation Reveals a Vast Network

Beyond Hormuz, Windward’s investigation into vessels expelled from the Cameroon registry highlights the scale of modern sanctions-evasion infrastructure.

The review covered 38 tankers removed from the registry on May 26.

Of the 38 vessels, 37 were sanctioned under Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, DPRK, or related sanctions programs.

The ownership structure was exceptionally fragmented. Windward identified 89 companies linked to just 38 vessels, with most operating through single-vessel shell entities incorporated in jurisdictions such as Seychelles, Samoa, the UAE, and the Marshall Islands.

Across the fleet, Windward documented:

• 117 flag changes.
• 98 MMSI changes.
• 58 vessel name changes.
• 94 ISM manager changes.

The average vessel recorded 9.7 identity changes over 36 months.

Most notably, 24 vessels continue broadcasting the Cameroon flag despite being expelled from the registry, effectively rendering them stateless.

Meanwhile, Equatorial Guinea is rapidly emerging as a preferred replacement registry, with Windward now tracking 44 sanctioned shadow fleet tankers broadcasting that flag.

Outlook

The June 18-22 reporting period illustrates how fragile the Hormuz recovery remains.

Iran’s re-closure announcement initially appeared capable of reversing the gains made after the June 17 agreement. Yet the June 22 data shows that commercial operators have not immediately retreated.

Traffic continues moving. LNG carriers are testing the corridor. Iranian exports are increasing. Kharg Island has resumed multi-berth loading operations. Sanctioned fleets are operating with greater visibility than at any point during the conflict.

At the same time, IRGC activity remains elevated, AIS manipulation continues, major anchorages remain crowded, and the compliance risks created by the PGSA system remain unresolved.

The next several days will determine whether the post-agreement recovery continues or whether renewed restrictions succeed in slowing commercial confidence once again.