Trump Says Hormuz Will Open: A Deal Takes Shape as Iran Expands the PGSA

At a Glance

• Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) extended its claimed zone boundary to the UAE coast south of Fujairah on May 20, asserting administrative authority over the maritime approaches to the UAE’s primary Hormuz-bypass terminal.
• Five Gulf states (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar) formally rejected the zone in a joint letter to the IMO, as the UKMTO published its first dedicated Strait of Hormuz transit guidance the same day.
• Within 24 hours, chemical tanker AIS suppression spiked 59% in the Fujairah area, crude exports fell to a six-month low, and VLCC counts dropped from 23 to 14.
• U.S. Marines boarded the Iranian-flagged tanker CELESTIAL SEA in the Gulf of Oman on May 20, the fourth at-sea interdiction of the campaign, following SKYWAVE, MAJESTIC X, and TIFANI.
• Kharg Island resumed partial crude loading with three confirmed tanker loadings across May 20–23, the first since the terminal went inactive around May 7, though approximately 27 vessels remain waiting offshore.
• President Trump publicly stated on May 23 that an agreement with Iran has been “largely negotiated” and that the Strait will be opened, marking the first publicly announced diplomatic resolution framework of the conflict.
• Three commercial vessels are currently held off the Puntland coast of Somalia, the first simultaneous three-vessel piracy hold since the 2010–2012 peak years, with the resurgence tied directly to vessels rerouting around Africa to avoid Hormuz.
• Vortexa data shows approximately 39.79 million barrels of Iran-origin oil now held in floating storage across 79 tankers, with no laden VLCC or Suezmax tracked arriving in Asia since May 4.

Operational Overview

The Hormuz operating environment moved through one of its most consequential five-day windows of the conflict between May 20 and May 24, with Iranian administrative escalation, sustained U.S. enforcement, partial export recovery, and the first publicly announced diplomatic framework all advancing in parallel.

Iran’s PGSA extended its claimed zone to the UAE coast south of Fujairah, drawing formal rejection from five Gulf states and triggering observable behavioral effects in the Fujairah area within 24 hours. U.S. Marines boarded the Iranian-flagged tanker CELESTIAL SEA on May 20. Kharg Island resumed partial loading after 13 days of inactivity. On May 23, President Trump publicly stated that an agreement has been largely negotiated and that the Strait will be opened.

The combined picture is a Hormuz environment approaching an inflection point shaped by competing escalation and de-escalation pressures, with the announced diplomatic framework now the central variable to watch.

PGSA Zone Extends to the UAE Coast

Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority published a zone boundary on May 20 that extends across the Strait of Hormuz and into the Gulf of Oman to the UAE coast south of Fujairah. The zone runs from a western boundary connecting the tip of Qeshm Island to the UAE’s Persian Gulf coast at Umm Al Quwain, to an eastern boundary running from Mount Mubarak on the Iranian coastline across to the coast south of Fujairah.

The eastern extension is the most significant component of the announcement. Fujairah is the UAE’s main port for exporting oil along a route specifically built to avoid the Strait. By extending its claimed authority to the waters adjacent to the bypass route, Iran is asserting control beyond the Strait itself and into the maritime approaches to the UAE’s primary Hormuz-bypass terminal.

Vessels intending to cross the zone are reportedly required to submit declarations covering vessel owner, cargo, crew nationalities, and destination, and to obtain a transit permit before entering. Fees of up to two million U.S. dollars per crossing have been reported, payable in Chinese yuan or Bitcoin. Iran has released no official fee schedule.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar formally rejected the zone in a joint letter to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), warning commercial and merchant vessels not to engage with the PGSA or transit the Iran-designated route. The five Gulf states argued that recognising Iranian authority over the waterway would create a dangerous precedent. The UAE and 21 other countries had separately rejected the claim earlier in the cycle as incompatible with international maritime law.

The framework is being enforced in practice. Two vessels were seized near Fujairah on May 14, approximately eight to twelve hours after Iranian advance warnings to the UAE. Paying Iranian permit fees may itself violate U.S. sanctions per OFAC guidance issued on May 1, leaving operators caught between two simultaneous legal risks.

The UAE is responding by accelerating a pipeline that moves crude from interior fields directly to Fujairah, where it can be loaded onto tankers without touching the Strait. The pipeline is assessed at approximately 50% complete.

Windward identified the operational impact of the announcement on May 21. AIS detections in the Fujairah area collapsed within 24 hours of the PGSA boundary publication, with Windward Early Detection recording a 59% increase in chemical tankers turning off AIS transmissions. 

SAR imagery from May 21 at 14:15 UTC confirmed widespread vessel presence in the Fujairah area without a corresponding AIS broadcast, in sharp contrast to a May 9 SAR collection that showed broadly AIS-compliant vessel posture in the same area. 

Total Fujairah crude exports for the week ending May 21 came in at 3.84 million barrels, among the four lowest weekly export totals in the past six months, against a six-month average of approximately 10 million barrels. 

Total wet cargo exports for the week were 4.69 million barrels, the lowest weekly total in six months, against an average of approximately 13 million barrels.

VLCC counts in the Fujairah area also decreased over the same period, falling from approximately 23 on May 9 to approximately 14 on May 21.

Fujairah Exports Resume After Two-Day Halt

Following two consecutive days of zero exports from Fujairah after the PGSA boundary announcement, Windward identified a single 1.35 million barrel crude export on May 24, lifted by one VLCC destined for South Korea. The export resumption is assessed by Windward as potentially connected to the publicly announced diplomatic framework.

UKMTO Issues Hormuz Transit Guidance 

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) published industry guidance for Strait of Hormuz transits on May 20, the same day the PGSA published its expanded zone boundary. The guidance provides operational direction for vessels navigating the contested transit environment under conditions of competing Iranian administrative claims, ongoing seizures, and U.S. sanctions exposure.

The publication marks one of the first formal industry-side responses to the PGSA framework, signaling that commercial shipping bodies are now treating Hormuz transits as requiring dedicated navigational guidance rather than standard high-risk-area protocols. 

U.S. Marines Board CELESTIAL SEA in the Gulf of Oman

U.S. Marines boarded the Iranian-flagged tanker CELESTIAL SEA (IMO 9397030) in the Gulf of Oman on May 20 under Operation Epic Fury enforcement operations. U.S. Central Command confirmed the boarding. The vessel is OFAC-designated under Executive Order 13902 for supporting Iran’s oil export network.

Earlier today in the Gulf of Oman, U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/T Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port. American forces released the… pic.twitter.com/1AVT0MudKY

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) May 20, 2026

CELESTIAL SEA‘s operator, Glory International FZ LLC, is also OFAC-listed. The vessel executed a systematic sanctions-evasion operation over the prior twelve months, including 47 identity changes within a 25-day window, 216 hours of AIS-dark activity across nine separate incidents, six ship-to-ship transfers with UAE hub vessels during identity manipulation periods, only one port call in twelve months, and 131 hours of dark activity in the Malaysia EOPL zone, a documented Iranian oil-smuggling area. The vessel adopted an Iranian MMSI registration while anchored off China in December 2025.

The interdiction reinforces the picture of U.S. enforcement against the Iranian shadow fleet operating as a distinct track from the broader blockade on Iranian ports, with vessels targeted during shuttle and discharge cycles outside the immediate Hormuz operating environment.

Kharg Island Resumes Partial Loading

EO imagery collected over Kharg Island on May 20 at 11:24 UTC identified a 183-meter dark Panamax tanker at the main T-pier loading berth, the first crude tanker confirmed at a Kharg loading berth since the terminal went inactive around May 7. The vessel was assessed with high confidence as matching a dark Panamax detected transiting inbound through the Strait of Hormuz on May 14, following a bunkering operation on May 13. A flexible loading hose was visible connecting the vessel’s cargo manifold to the pier loading arm, consistent with active crude transfer at the time of the May 20 collection. 

SAR imagery collected on May 21 at 05:38 UTC confirmed the T-pier loading position was empty, with the vessel having departed within the standard 9-16 hour Panamax loading window. A dark outbound Hormuz transit was assessed as likely within 24-48 hours of departure.

EO imagery collected on May 22 at 07:50 UTC identified a second 190-meter dark Handymax tanker at the same T-pier berth, assessed as a different vessel than the May 20 observation despite physical similarities. On May 23 at 07:32 UTC, an Aframax-class tanker was observed loading at the Northern Berth of the T-Jetty.

The three loadings across May 20-23 represent a partial recovery of Kharg operations following 13 days of inactivity, though the cadence remains a fraction of the early-April multi-tanker tempo. The May 14 inbound transit to May 20 loading provides a confirmed end-to-end logistics cycle for the current Iranian dark-fleet operating pattern.

Approximately 27 vessels remained in the offshore anchorage east of Kharg as of May 21, with the majority of VLCCs at anchor assessed by Windward as being used for floating storage. Among the 27 tankers, 18 are VLCCs. Vortexa data indicates 39.79 million barrels of Iran-origin oil are currently in floating storage across 79 tankers.

Chabahar Holds as a Multi-Fleet Staging Zone

Multi-collection SAR and EO imagery over the Chabahar offshore holding area between May 10 and May 23 identified continuous activity at the holding area, with peak vessel counts of approximately 35 on May 10, declining to approximately 14 tankers on May 23. A persistence overlay across six collections identified a dwell zone 15-25 kilometers southwest of the port occupied on four or more of six collection dates, indicating a long-dwell cohort that has not departed.

Vessel mix observed on EO collection dates includes crude tankers, product tankers, cargo, bulk, and LPG vessels, indicating that the holding area serves multiple fleet segments rather than exclusively crude operations.

EO imagery on May 22 at 07:54 UTC identified that of 20 vessels anchored in the offshore holding area on May 21, 15 are dark. Of the dark vessels, 12 are tankers, including 8 VLCCs between 330-340 meters, an increase of 3 VLCCs over the May 21 count. At least three possible IRGC speedcraft were observed sailing within the port waiting area on May 22 in separate directions.

EO collected on May 23 at 06:14 UTC identified 14 tankers at the Chabahar holding area, with 6 assessed as VLCCs and the remaining 8 assessed as Suezmax-class.

Windward assesses the Chabahar holding area as a multi-purpose staging zone east of the Strait, absorbing mixed-fleet traffic that cannot or will not transit through the disrupted corridor. Count fluctuations are consistent with rotation rather than sustained departure.

Trump Says the Strait Will Open

U.S. President Trump publicly stated on May 23 that an agreement with Iran has been largely negotiated and that the Strait of Hormuz will be opened. Earlier in the cycle, Trump told reporters he had been “an hour away” from ordering new military strikes on Iran but held off at the request of Gulf allies. Windward will monitor for confirmation of the framework’s terms and any observable changes in vessel posture.

Hormuz Transits Remain Constrained 

Commercial transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz between May 20 and May 24 remained heavily constrained and dominated by small vessels operating under both AIS and dark profiles. Hormuz transits across May 20-21 identified four inbound AIS-transmitting vessels, all between 106 and 229 meters in length, with two of the four operating under U.S. sanctions. 

SAR imagery on May 21 at 14:16 UTC identified four outbound transits, of which three were dark, and one was AIS-transmitting.

Satellite imagery on May 22 at 06:57 UTC and 07:52 UTC identified one dark 180-meter general cargo vessel transiting inbound and one dark 190-meter bulk carrier transiting outbound, alongside two likely IRGC hovercraft observed for the first time in the eastern area between Larak and Qeshm Islands.

SAR imagery on May 23 identified five dark transits, with three inbound, including one 360-meter vessel through the Northern Corridor, and two outbound. Two additional AIS-transmitting cargo vessels transited outbound concurrently.

SAR and EO collections on May 23 identified one dark 80-meter landing craft transiting inbound west of Larak Island, alongside six AIS-transmitting commercial transits between 58 and 225 meters.

SAR imagery on May 24 at 01:05 UTC identified four large dark vessels, all over 300 meters, stationary north of Larak Island in close proximity to Hormuz Island, alongside the Netherlands Caribbean-flagged 333-meter tanker, observed stationary while transmitting AIS in the Northern Corridor. Five India-flagged small cargo vessels of approximately 50 meters transited Hormuz openly under AIS, with four outbound and one inbound, representing the functioning India-Iran bilateral arrangement inside the blockade perimeter.

BARAKAH (IMO 9902615) was confirmed stationary off the Omani Peninsula in the May 24 collection, within 150 meters of its May 20 position and 280 meters of its May 17-18 position, marking day 13 of continuous stationary hold at this anchorage since first identified on May 12.

Dark Transits Rise Across Four Tiers

Rising numbers of vessels are transiting the Strait of Hormuz with AIS switched off amid deteriorating security and safety conditions tied to Iranian attempts to consolidate control over the waterway and continued pressure from the six-week U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. No Iran-trading laden crude tanker has arrived in Asia via the Malacca, Lombok, or Sunda Straits since May 4, cutting off Iran’s primary export channel to China, its sole buyer. At current crude prices, a single VLCC cargo represents approximately $200 million in revenue, making these tankers the regime’s revenue lifeline.

Windward identifies four scenarios under which AIS is being switched off during current Strait transits. The first is disabling for safety reasons as permitted under SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 19.2.1.6, typically on advice of maritime security or marine insurance providers. The second is concealment to avoid detection, used by Iranian dark-fleet tankers and blockade-evading vessels. The third is commercial concealment for trading purposes. The fourth is to avoid secondary sanctions exposure tied to allegations of PGSA toll payments.

Industry feedback indicates that most, but not all, dark transits have occurred with the tacit permission of Iranian authorities through diplomatic-level negotiations. A smaller cohort, including vessels with perceived U.S. or Israeli ties, exited the Strait without Iranian acquiescence.

Between April and May 23, fifteen ship-to-ship transfers were tracked in waters off Fujairah or Oman after nine non-Iranian VLCCs sailed dark to and from ports west of Hormuz to load crude per Vortexa data. Fourteen cargoes were loaded at UAE ports and one at Iraq. Four of the ship-to-ship transfers occurred in waters off Fujairah after tankers loaded dark at the UAE’s Das Island or Zirku Island terminals west of Hormuz, with AIS switched off for either one or both vessels in each transfer. Seven additional tankers called at Zirku Island and transited the Strait dark before conducting eleven ship-to-ship transfers in waters off Oman, primarily off Muscat. The last ship-to-ship transfer was tracked on May 16.

Beyond the UAE-origin cargoes, at least seven other tankers are trading dark. In some cases, these vessels have made multiple dark Hormuz calls for the duration of the closure, with cargoes loaded from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the UAE.

Between March 29 and May 7, Windward identified 38 dark-transiting vessels not associated with Iranian trading or the U.S. blockade. Of those, 17 were cargo vessels, comprising 9 bulk carriers and 8 containerships. Based on Windward data, the majority of dark transits were made by stranded vessels exiting the Gulf.

Intra-Iran Maritime Trade Shifts to Landing and Small Crafts

Multiple SAR and EO collections between May 21 and May 24 identified elevated maritime activity within Iranian waters and across the Strait conducted by landing craft and small cargo vessels rather than the larger commercial tonnage normally observed.

On May 21, five landing craft were observed transiting outbound together from the port and vicinity of Seerik, Iran. All five vessels were transmitting AIS, with four Iran-flagged and one Comoros-flagged. All five had conducted dark activity in Iran or Oman within the prior month.

On May 21 at 21:29 UTC and May 22 at 01:28 UTC, six landing craft of 50-60 meters were observed in the Eastern Corridor of the Strait, heading northwards toward Iranian northern ports. Two 105-meter vessels were observed leaving the Omani Peninsula heading northwards, likely toward Iran. Windward notes that 105-meter vessels departing Oman toward Iran are an uncommon observation in the area.

SAR imagery collected over Khasab, Oman, on May 23 at 02:15 UTC identified a cluster of over 35 stationary high-speed craft, the first time a concentration of this scale has been observed in the area. The observation may help explain the recent relative decrease in IRGC high-speed craft activity directly in the Strait of Hormuz, with only 3-4 craft observed operating around Larak Island in the same window.

Windward assesses the pattern as indicative of an elevated intra-Iran maritime trade tempo using non-commercial and small-craft tonnage during the period of heaviest blockade enforcement against Iranian-linked vessels.

Hudaydah Remains Operationally Constrained 

EO imagery collected over Hudaydah Port, Yemen, on May 20 at 07:28 UTC identified four commercial vessels above 100 meters in the port area, comprising three AIS-transmitting bulk carriers and general cargo vessels, and one dark general cargo vessel. The port’s oil storage infrastructure included approximately 26 damaged oil tanks, alongside approximately 9 large tanks of 25-35 meters assessed as crude oil or heavy fuel oil storage, observed unharmed, and approximately 14-16 medium tanks of 10-18 meters assessed as refined products storage, also observed unharmed.

Clusters of trucks were observed at the dock during vessel offloading operations, indicating limited available port-side offloading and loading facilities. A small cluster of 10 dhows was observed in the western bay of the port. Among the three AIS-transmitting vessels in the port, a vessel was identified as arriving directly after a nearly four-day dark activity period off Romania, a medium-risk hub for arms trafficking originating from Russia.

The observation indicates Hudaydah remains operationally constrained, with vessels relying on truck-based offloading rather than port-side loading and unloading infrastructure, and with at least one AIS-transmitting vessel arriving from a dark-activity period tied to a higher-risk source jurisdiction.

Three Vessels Held Off the Somali Coast 

Three commercial vessels are currently held off the Puntland coast of Somalia, the first simultaneous three-vessel piracy hold since the 2010-2012 peak years. The fuel tanker MT HONOUR 25 was seized with 17 crew on April 21. The cargo vessel MV SWARD was seized with 15 crew on April 26. The product tanker MT EUREKA was seized with 8 crew on May 2.

Ransom demands range from 3.5 million to 10 million U.S. dollars per vessel. No crew has been released. Conditions aboard HONOUR 25 have been described as poor.

The resurgence follows the near-complete withdrawal of dedicated counter-piracy naval patrols from the Somali Basin. Forces were diverted first to the Red Sea Houthi campaign and subsequently to the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Open-source reporting indicates pirate groups have allegedly received GPS tracking equipment and weapons from Houthi networks, enabling mothership tactics extending attacks up to 600 nautical miles offshore.

The compounding factor is route displacement. Vessels rerouting around Africa to avoid the closed Strait of Hormuz are now transiting the same waters where all three seizures occurred, with less naval protection than at any point since 2009. The International Maritime Bureau formally lifted the Indian Ocean High Risk Area designation in 2023 following more than a decade of effective counter-piracy operations. Windward assesses the current three seizures as likely the beginning rather than the peak of the resurgence, absent the return of dedicated counter-piracy assets to the Somali Basin.

Iraqi Authorities Investigate Two Missing Vessels 

The General Company for Ports of Iraq reported it is investigating the disappearance of two Bolivia-flagged vessels, BRIDGE 1 (IMO 8784133) and BRIDGE 2. Neither vessel has issued distress calls, but Iraqi authorities cited messages from security authorities at several Gulf-region ports and reported failure of the vessels’ owners to make contact in recent days. The Iraqi Ports Company has mobilized all personnel in its maritime control department and search and rescue center.

BRIDGE 1 is a 128-meter general cargo vessel. Its last port call was in Oman at the end of March. The vessel went dark in Kuwait just outside the Basrah Oil Terminal on April 9, reappearing two days later in Iran on April 11 and sailing near the port waiting area of Imam Khomeini before going dark to enter the PWA. The vessel remained in the Iranian PWA for 15 days before sailing to Bushehr Port. Transmissions stopped entirely on May 5. Satellite imagery from May 18 confirms the vessel is no longer at its last transmitting location. BRIDGE 2 does not appear in the standard vessel identification system.

Windward assesses BRIDGE 1 as probably remaining in Iranian waters under a prolonged dark posture.

Possible Oil Spill Observed North of Larak Island

SAR and EO imagery collected on May 23 identified a 31-nautical-mile surface trail beginning north of Larak Island, consistent with a possible oil spill. Two candidate tankers were identified in the vicinity. The vessels’ identities and the precise cause of the trail are not yet confirmed.

Gulf Floating Storage and Asian Supply Constraint 

Vortexa data shows that approximately 39.79 million barrels of Iran-origin oil are currently held in floating storage across 79 tankers. Approximately two-thirds of Iranian-trading tankers are now constrained in the Gulf of Oman or Arabian Gulf. The remaining one-third are either at ports off China, with approximately 11 vessels identified in Chinese waters, or engaged in floating storage off the Riau archipelago in Malaysia’s EEZ. Vessels that arrived in the Gulf of Oman after April 28 are subject to the U.S. blockade.

No laden VLCC or Suezmax has been observed arriving in Asia via the Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok Straits since May 4, sustaining the supply constraint identified earlier in the reporting cycle. The blockade is continuing to interrupt the flow of Iranian crude into Asian markets while concurrently bottling up tankers within Iranian waters.

The prolonged Hormuz disruption is also reorganizing Russian oil price cap compliance. European Union shipowners shipped 15.5% of crude, 43.6% of total products, and 62% of fuel oil from Russia in April, even as prices for all three commodities surpassed the G7 Oil Price Cap for the second consecutive month. Russia’s Urals and ESPO crude grades averaged $92-96 per barrel in April per IEA data, more than double the $44.10 EU and UK cap and 53% above the $60 U.S. cap. Russia’s diesel prices averaged $158.10 per barrel against the $100 cap. 

The scenario indicates that Russian sellers and traders are providing attestation documents falsely stating sale prices and that these are being accepted by Western marine service providers, including shipowners and insurers, with U.S. sanctions waivers on Russian oil-on-water further complicating enforcement. The third 30-day waiver expires on June 18.

Russian Research Vessel Loiters Near Atlantic Telecommunications Cable 

Windward identified the Russian-flagged service and research vessel as having executed an extended pattern of life consistent with maritime espionage and infrastructure mapping in the Caribbean and North Atlantic between February and April 2026. The vessel’s “Care of” entity is a Russian organization designated under OFAC sanctions since February 2023.

Following a Panama Canal transit on February 16, the vessel executed four distinct anomaly points across the post-transit voyage. 

The first was a 48-hour pattern consistent with location tampering through February 18. 

The second was a 48-hour loiter from February 24-26, followed by a course deviation inconsistent with the declared destination of Bridgetown, Barbados. 

The third was a structured 48-hour back-and-forth pattern off Tobago in early March, assessed as indicative of coordinate manipulation rather than actual maneuvering. 

The fourth and most significant was a 41-day loiter beginning March 10 at a position approximately 850 nautical miles west of Barbados, with speeds remaining below one knot within an 11-nautical-mile radius. 

Cross-referencing with subsea infrastructure data confirms the vessel’s posture during this period was consistent with research and survey operations in the vicinity of the MONET telecommunications cable.

As of May 14, the vessel is transiting the Pacific en route back to Russia, with an estimated arrival at Kursanov on June 14. The absence of port calls since December 2025, the first appearance of this vessel in the Caribbean and Atlantic theaters under Russian flag and the specific corporate umbrella, and the lack of detected supply or ship-to-ship operations inconsistent with the declared service profile reinforce the assessment of a potential maritime espionage or hybrid-warfare preparation mission.

While operationally distinct from the Hormuz environment, the observation reflects the broader pattern of state-linked maritime activity targeting critical undersea infrastructure during periods of heightened global maritime tension.

Outlook

May 20–24 is the closest the Hormuz environment has come to a turning point since the conflict began, with four pressures running in parallel: Iranian administrative escalation, sustained U.S. enforcement, partial export recovery, and the first publicly announced diplomatic framework.

The PGSA extension to the UAE coast is the highest-signal escalation, with observable behavioral effects in Fujairah waters indicating that Iran’s administrative coercion now reaches well beyond Iranian territorial jurisdiction. U.S. enforcement is operating at a sustained tempo, and the supply constraint into China is structural rather than transient. Iranian export tempo is being maintained at a reduced level, but the offshore queues at Kharg and Chabahar indicate the underlying backlog has not moved.

Trump’s May 23 statement is the resolution variable. If the framework materializes, the indicators to watch are the PGSA zone status, the U.S. blockade posture, and whether VLCC and Suezmax movement resumes through Malacca into Asia. If it doesn’t, the PGSA expansion and the enforcement tempo will harden into a sustained two-front operating environment.