Iran Formally Closes the Strait of Hormuz as the U.S. Launches a Third Round of Strikes

At a Glance

• Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed until further notice after the U.S. military launched a third round of strikes on July 11, hitting approximately 140 Iranian military targets.
• The IRGC struck a Cyprus-flagged container ship transiting the Strait, causing significant damage to the engine room, with one crew member reported missing.
• Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases, targeting Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan, with air defense activations across Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE.
• Qatar’s Transport Ministry issued an urgent advisory suspending all maritime vessel activity until further notice, the first blanket maritime suspension by a Gulf state since the conflict began.
• July 11 recorded 21 transits with the southern corridor near total collapse, one of 12 outbound vessels using it and no inbound traffic.
• Iranian crude export volumes are flat week-on-week at approximately 1.28 million barrels per day, with visibility collapsing following a large loading spike on July 6.
• Nine OFAC-sanctioned NITC tankers carrying approximately 14.59 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensate valued at approximately $989 million have gone dark off Port Klang, Malaysia, in an established Iran-to-China laundering route.
• Windward assesses the operational risk environment across the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and northern Arabian Gulf as critical.

Operational Overview

Iran has formally closed the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC declared the waterway closed until further notice following its strike on a Cyprus-flagged container ship for using what it described as an unauthorized route, marking the first formal closure declaration of the conflict.

The U.S. responded with a third round of strikes on July 11, hitting approximately 140 Iranian military targets. Iranian retaliation has now widened geographically to include Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, with the IRGC targeting Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan and air defenses activating across three Gulf states.

Qatar’s Transport Ministry issued an urgent advisory suspending all maritime vessel activity until further notice, the first blanket maritime suspension by a Gulf state since the conflict began. The suspension has direct implications for LNG export flows from Ras Laffan.

Iranian crude export volumes have not declined despite the escalation. What has changed is visibility and timing, with loadings spiking sharply on July 6 ahead of a feared return of the U.S. blockade before falling to near zero by July 9 to 11 as AIS transponder shutdowns spread across the sanctioned fleet. Nine OFAC-sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company vessels have gone dark off Port Klang, Malaysia, carrying approximately 14.59 million barrels of Iranian crude and condensate, worth an estimated $989 million, bound for Shandong teapot refineries under the established Iran-to-Malaysian-blend-to-China laundering route.

Oman has drafted a tentative proposal for managing routes in the Strait, and U.S. officials have stated that nuclear talks cannot progress until the Strait is secure. The maritime picture is no longer about corridor selection or transit avoidance. It is about a formally declared closure, a widening regional strike exchange, and the collapse of any remaining commercial confidence in the Strait as a normal waterway.

Iran Declares the Strait Closed After Striking a Cyprus-Flagged Container Ship

The IRGC struck a Cyprus-flagged container ship transiting the Strait of Hormuz on July 11, causing significant damage to the engine room, with one crew member reported missing. The IRGC attributed the strike to the vessel’s use of an unauthorized route.

Following the strike, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed until further notice. 

The U.S. responded with a third round of strikes, hitting approximately 140 Iranian military targets on July 11, according to CENTCOM.

At 7:15 p.m. ET today, U.S. Central Command forces began launching the third round of strikes this week against Iran after Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps forces blatantly attacked M/V GFS Galaxy, a Cyprus-flagged container ship transiting the Strait of Hormuz. A civilian crew…

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 11, 2026

Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases, with the IRGC saying it targeted Prince Hassan Air Base in Jordan. UAE authorities said they were responding to missile and drone threats. Bahrain activated sirens and told residents to seek shelter. Qatar’s Ministry of Defense said it intercepted a missile attack targeting the country. The strike exchange has now widened geographically to include Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE.

Qatar’s Transport Ministry issued an urgent advisory urging all maritime vessels to temporarily cease sailing and engaging in maritime activity until further notice. This is the first blanket suspension of maritime activity by a Gulf state since the conflict began, with direct implications for LNG export flows from Ras Laffan.

Oman has drafted a tentative proposal for managing routes in the Strait, while U.S. officials have stated that negotiations on nuclear weapons cannot progress until the Strait is secure.

Strait of Hormuz Transits

July 11 recorded 21 transits, nine inbound and 12 outbound, continuing the sharp downward trend documented across the reporting period.

The inbound group comprised six AIS-transmitting and three dark vessels, with two tankers under Guyana and Hong Kong flags, two bulk carriers under Iran and San Marino flags, and two cargo vessels under Comoros flags. Six transited via the northern corridor with no southern corridor inbound traffic recorded.

The outbound group comprised seven AIS-transmitting and five dark vessels, with three tankers under Mozambique, Liberia, and Netherlands Caribbean flags, one bulk carrier under the India flag, and four cargo vessels under Comoros, Bolivia, Netherlands Caribbean, and Iran flags. Seven transited via the northern corridor and one via the southern corridor.

Windward assesses the near-total collapse of southern corridor usage, with one of 12 outbound vessels and zero inbound vessels, reflecting the sustained IRGC enforcement posture and continued operator avoidance of the Omani-side lane.

Dark Vessel Consolidation Off the UAE and Oman Coast

SAR imagery collected over the Strait of Hormuz on July 12 at 02:06 UTC identified a consolidating dark vessel picture across the Gulf of Oman approaches east of the Strait, anchored by an active ship-to-ship transfer.

A ship-to-ship transfer pair was observed off the UAE and Oman coast, comprising two dark vessels of approximately 310 meters each with no AIS from either hull. Four additional dark vessels ranging from approximately 80 to 330 meters were assessed as moving inbound. One dark stationary vessel of approximately 140 meters was newly present in this collection with no detection in the prior pass, assessed as a possible new arrival. A probable dark container vessel of approximately 350 meters was transiting the same corridor.

Iranian Crude Exports Hold Flat as Visibility Collapses

Per Vortexa data covering four weekly windows from June 14 to July 11, Iranian crude export volumes have not declined despite the escalation. What has changed is visibility and timing, not volume.

Total Iranian-origin loadings in the week of the attacks, July 5 to 11, reached approximately 1.28 million barrels per day, essentially flat against the prior week’s approximately 1.29 million barrels per day, a change of -0.5% within noise for a 12 to 24 cargo sample. The week of June 21 to 27 was the peak at approximately 2.24 million barrels per day. The week of June 14 to 20 was the trough at approximately 1.0 million barrels per day.

Loadings spiked sharply on July 6, the day strikes resumed, to the single largest loading day in the four-week dataset. The spike is consistent with open-source reporting that Iran rushed cargo out ahead of a feared return of the U.S. blockade. Reported new loadings fell to near zero by July 9 to 11, but this coincides with widespread AIS transponder shutdowns and 41 laden tankers spotted on July 9 that a ship-tracking feed cannot fully capture once vessels go dark. All July 5 to 11 cargoes remain in transit at the time of writing, none have been discharged, making this week’s figures provisional.

China absorbed approximately 79.8 to 86% of identified-destination Iranian-origin volume in every week of the period, with no China-side pullback detected. The UAE accounted for approximately 8%, assessed as a Fujairah and Hamriyah re-export hub rather than a real buyer.

Direct Iran-to-India flows were already at zero in the week before the attacks, June 28 to July 4, a full week before the July 6 to 7 escalation, meaning the dataset cannot support a causal link between the U.S. strikes and any reduction in India’s Iranian imports.

India’s actual exposure runs primarily through a different channel. Approximately 40% of India’s crude imports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait also transit Hormuz, and war risk insurance running at four to six times pre-crisis levels affects the cost of all Indian crude imports, not just Iranian-origin flows.

Nine OFAC-Sanctioned NITC Tankers Go Dark in the Port Klang Ship-to-Ship Box

Nine OFAC-sanctioned tankers, comprising eight Iran-flagged vessels operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company plus one that has flag-hopped to São Tomé and Príncipe, have gone dark from July 1 to 11 in Malaysia’s East off Port Klang ship-to-ship transfer box.

The nine vessels with known cargo are carrying approximately 14.59 million barrels of Kharg Island and Assaluyeh-origin crude and condensate, estimated at approximately $989 million, according to Vortexa. Cargoes are predominantly bound for Shandong teapot refineries at Dongjiakou, consistent with the established Iran-to-Malaysian-blend-to-China laundering route.

The eight dark vessels with known cargo comprise four VLCC-class tankers of 333 meters each carrying approximately 2.01 to 2.18 million barrels of crude loaded at Kharg Island between March and April 2026, one VLCC-class tanker of 333 meters carrying approximately 1.94 million barrels of crude loaded at Kharg Island in June 2026, two Suezmax-class tankers of 274 meters carrying approximately 1.0 million barrels of crude and approximately 1.32 million barrels of condensate respectively, and one VLCC-class tanker of 330 meters carrying approximately 2.01 million barrels of crude.

Dark periods across the group range from one to 11 days as of July 11. The ninth vessel, a São Tomé and Príncipe-flagged VLCC of 333 meters under OFAC Iran program sanctions, went dark on July 11 with no Vortexa cargo trace. It is the only non-Iranian-flagged vessel in the cluster, representing a flag-hop away from the Iran registry while remaining under the same OFAC designation, a common shadow fleet tactic to blur the sanctions nexus.

A tenth vessel, a Mali-flagged tanker of 183 meters under OFAC Iran program sanctions and operating under a fraudulent registry given Mali is a landlocked country with no ship registry, has already completed a ship-to-ship transfer in the same box, a bunkering event with a Malaysian-owned Belize-flagged tanker of 50 meters, and is now underway between the Philippines and Hong Kong carrying approximately 34,900 barrels of diesel with a destination of Quanzhou and an estimated arrival of July 14.

Iranian-Flagged Vessels Surge Into Zhuhai’s Gaolan Island Terminal

Sanctioned Iranian-flagged shipping surged into Zhuhai’s Gaolan Island terminal between July 5 and 9, with six arrivals in five days against a baseline of three arrivals across the prior 25-day period. 

The Zhuhai terminal now accounts for 41% of all tracked China calls for this fleet. Dwell times also lengthened to 26 to 47 hours against a baseline of approximately 19 to 26 hours, consistent with fuller cargo cycles rather than quick stops.

Windward identified 15 vessels in the network. All 15 carry a significant Windward compliance risk score under the Iran program. Eleven of the 15 called a Chinese port in the trailing 30 days, nine at Zhuhai, with four more inbound. Two operators account for 78% of the spike-window traffic, with synchronized scheduling pointing to a single coordinated liner service layering sanctions evasion tradecraft, including dark AIS, ship-to-ship transfers, and flag changes, onto otherwise routine monthly Iran-China trade.

The fleet’s evasion tradecraft across the trailing period included 198 loitering events, 130 dark AIS periods, and 19 ship-to-ship meetings, alongside flag changes, circuitous routing via East Africa, and MMSI and name changes on rotation vessels.

Gaolan Island is a documented sourcing hub for sodium perchlorate, a precursor to ammonium perchlorate used as the solid-fuel propellant in Iran’s ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The same container and bulk carrier hulls this fleet operates move cargo through this terminal, raising a missile-precursor question that warrants further monitoring.

Kharg Island Loading Cycle Continues

EO imagery collected over Kharg Island on July 10 at 07:31 UTC showed all terminal berths clear of tankers, with a single VLCC-class dark vessel of approximately 333 meters underway on a course consistent with an approach toward the terminal complex. The eastern waiting area held 22 dark stationary vessels spanning Aframax through VLCC size classes with no AIS across the group.

The July 11 collection showed a dark ballast tanker of approximately 333 meters arriving at the eastern terminal since the prior collection. The LPG and western terminals remained empty. The eastern waiting area held 23 dark tankers across four size classes, comprising 13 vessels of approximately 333 meters (five ballast and eight laden), two vessels of approximately 280 meters both in ballast, four vessels of approximately 250 meters (three laden and one ballast), three vessels of approximately 180 meters (two laden and one ballast), and one vessel of approximately 118 meters laden. Six high-speed craft were intermixed among the tankers in the waiting area.

The July 12 collection showed 24 dark tankers across the waiting area and eastern zone. The waiting area held 21 dark tankers, predominantly 333-meter VLCCs alongside smaller vessels ranging from 86 to 320 meters, the majority laden. The eastern zone held three dark tankers, two newly appeared vessels of approximately 278 meters in ballast, and one vessel that had been ballast in the prior collection and was now laden, indicating a likely recent loading event. Both the LPG and western terminals were empty.

Bandar-e-Jask, Kuh-e Mobarak, Asaluyeh, and Chabahar Staging Activity

Bandar-e-Jask and Kuh-e Mobarak

EO imagery collected on July 8 identified 15 dark tankers across two stationary clusters and one underway group, all without AIS. A five-vessel cluster south of Bandar-e-Jask comprised approximately three VLCC-class hulls of 333 meters, one vessel of approximately 280 meters, and one of approximately 125 meters. A six-vessel cluster east of Kuh-e Mobarak comprised approximately two vessels of 250 meters, two of 333 meters, one of approximately 270 meters, and one of approximately 280 meters. Three additional dark tankers were observed underway on a northeast heading between the two anchorage clusters, on a track consistent with a possible transit toward the Strait of Hormuz.

Asaluyeh

EO imagery collected on July 9 identified six dark hulls at the Asaluyeh petrochemical port anchorage and berths, consistent with sanctions-evasion ship-to-shore activity. A Suezmax-class tanker of approximately 280 meters was anchored offshore. Three tankers of approximately 180, 190, and 230 meters were berthed alongside the jetty complex. A vessel of approximately 170 meters was at shore, and a tanker of approximately 210 meters was anchored further west. All six were confirmed dark via absent AIS correlation.

Chabahar

EO imagery collected on July 10 documented an active tow-in of a dark 101-meter cargo hull under Iranian-flagged service vessel escort, flanked by one dark approximately 30-meter escort, consistent with an assisted port entry for a hull avoiding AIS correlation. Three AIS-matched vessels were berthed at the main pier alongside two additional dark hulls. A dark tanker of approximately 183 meters remained anchored offshore, consistent with prior Chabahar pass patterns. Compared to the July 7 pass, the VLCC-class hull previously anchored offshore has departed. No GPS spoofing or jamming signature was detected over Chabahar during the pass.

Ukraine’s Drone Campaign in the Sea of Azov

EO imagery collected over the Sea of Azov on July 11 fell within Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces drone campaign against Russia’s shadow fleet, which struck approximately 76 vessels between July 6 and 11. The overnight July 11 figure was initially reported as 28 vessels and subsequently revised upward to 48 vessels struck.

The imagery identified a dark vessel of approximately 100 meters trailing a widening oil slick at the western end of the observed corridor, a dark vessel of approximately 140 meters with an oil spill trailing, a slick reaching the coastline with a dark vessel of approximately 140 meters in proximity, and a six-vessel dark cluster amid a spreading oil slick. A dark vessel of approximately 70 meters was observed near the Kerch Strait approach emitting smoke consistent with fire or strike damage rather than routine engine smoke, though not confirmed as a USF strike without further correlation. A separate 17-vessel dark anchorage was observed further south, geographically distinct from the slick cluster, assessed as a possible staging or shelter formation warranting follow-on monitoring.

Seven Russian shadow fleet tankers are separately identified as currently or recently dark in the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov area, all flagged under Russia and Russia General compliance programs, with dark periods ranging from three to 30-plus days. Hull-to-strike attribution could not be established from imagery alone due to sea-surface weather conditions and the absence of visible strike signatures.

Kerch Port has recorded zero cargo departures since March 13, four months before the drone campaign began, with the last three callers departing in February and March, according to Vortexa. The collapse in Kerch departures predates the drone campaign by approximately four months, indicating the strikes explain why traffic stayed at zero rather than why it fell. Regional Sea of Azov tanker presence, however, held up and grew through spring, peaking at approximately 50 tankers in May, suggesting vessels shifted to waiting and loitering in the wider area rather than departing the theater before the July strikes began thinning the staged fleet. Russia has since closed the Kerch Strait following the drone campaign.

St. Petersburg Cold Chain Cocaine Seizure

Russian authorities seized 500 kilograms of high-purity cocaine hidden inside frozen tuna carcasses at a St. Petersburg container terminal. Windward analysis identifies three vessels that arrived in St. Petersburg from Ecuador within the timeframe of the seizure, suggesting transnational criminal syndicates are systematically exploiting refrigerated supply chains to move illicit goods.

The St. Petersburg logistics hub appears to function as a transit point for European drug distribution, with Balkan cartels leveraging operational cells in Ecuador and influence in Russia to infiltrate legitimate commercial routes.

Outlook

The Strait of Hormuz is formally closed. Iran’s declaration, the first of the conflict, follows a strike on a Cyprus-flagged container ship and lands as the U.S. is now three rounds deep into its retaliatory strike campaign against Iranian military targets.

The escalation is no longer confined to the Strait. Iranian retaliation has reached four Gulf states and Jordan, Qatar has suspended all maritime activity for the first time in the conflict, and the southern corridor, sustained through most of the reopening period by U.S. escort under Project Freedom, has effectively collapsed, with only one of 12 outbound vessels using it on July 11.

Iranian crude exports have not stopped. They have gone dark, with volumes holding flat at approximately 1.28 million barrels per day even as visibility collapses. Nine NITC tankers carrying approximately 14.59 million barrels are dark off Port Klang in the established Iran-to-China laundering route. A parallel surge into Zhuhai’s Gaolan Island terminal raises separate questions about missile-precursor flows that warrant follow-on monitoring.

Oman has drafted a route proposal, and U.S. officials have stated that nuclear talks cannot progress until the Strait is secure. Windward assesses the operational risk environment across the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and northern Arabian Gulf as Critical, with a formal Iranian closure declaration, a widening geographic footprint of strike exchanges, the first Gulf-state maritime suspension of the conflict, and the collapse of the southern corridor all compounding simultaneously.