The Red Sea Reopens as a Second Front While Saudi Crude Routes Around the Blockade

At a Glance

• The Houthis resumed attacks on July 22 following a September 2025 ceasefire, hitting or affecting four vessels across the reporting period.
• Houthi missile strikes hit the Saudi Aramco refinery at Jizan on July 25, with five thermal anomalies detected across the complex, while missiles inbound for Yanbu were intercepted.
• Yanbu port has transitioned from predominantly AIS-active to entirely AIS-dark tanker operations at berth as vessels shield against the Houthi hit list.
• Saudi Arabia has established a working alternative export route via the SUMED pipeline and Cape of Good Hope, adding approximately $9 per barrel to transport cost.
• U.S. Central Command boarded and released the sanctioned CHARMINAR in the Gulf of Oman, the first significant confirmed blockade breaker to pass through U.S. enforcement, and separately disabled the MT LAVINE after four blockade breach attempts.
• Windward Early Detection flagged 43 crude oil tankers with AIS gaps in the Arabian Gulf for July 15 to 22, the highest single reading in four years.
• The EU released its 21st sanctions package, designating 41 additional vessels and, for the first time, a crewing agency.

Operational Overview

The Red Sea has reopened as a second active front. The Houthis resumed attacks on July 22 following a September 2025 ceasefire, hit a Saudi Aramco refinery at Jizan on July 25, and launched missiles intercepted before reaching Yanbu. Four vessels have been hit or affected across the reporting period.

Saudi crude has not stopped moving. It has bifurcated. Yanbu port has transitioned to entirely AIS-dark tanker operations at berth as vessels shield against a Houthi hit list. Saudi Arabia has established a working alternative export route via the SUMED pipeline and Cape of Good Hope, adding cost and voyage time but demonstrating the market’s adaptability. Chinese-linked tonnage continues transiting Bab al-Mandeb under the Houthis’ established carve-out.

In the Gulf of Oman, CENTCOM disabled the MT LAVINE after four blockade breach attempts and separately boarded and released the sanctioned CHARMINAR, exposing gaps in the U.S. verification process. The broader Arabian Gulf dark activity picture continues to intensify, with 43 crude tankers flagged in a single week, half of them laden with Gulf crude, the highest reading in four years.

The Houthis Resume Attacks and Hit the Jizan Aramco Refinery

The Houthis resumed attacks on July 22 following a ceasefire that had been in place since September 2025. The resumption followed Saudi airstrikes on Houthi targets in Hodeidah.

Four vessels were hit or affected across the reporting period. ENCELIA (IMO 9240172) was struck by an unidentified projectile approximately 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, Saudi Arabia on July 22. LAYLA (IMO 9336098) is claimed to have been hit by the Houthis, but unconfirmed, and tracking has been offline since July 15, last seen entering Saudi waters near the Yemen border. NCC MASA (IMO 9688336), a Saudi-owned oil products tanker of 183 meters carrying approximately 215,100 barrels of diesel according to Vortexa, was struck in the Red Sea on July 24, suffering minor hull damage. The vessel later reached its destination with all crew safe. The tanker had been dark since July 19, departing Yanbu around July 18. 

No group has claimed the attack as of July 25. MT LAVINE was disabled by U.S. forces in the Gulf of Oman on July 24 in a separate incident covered above.

On July 25, the Houthis launched ballistic missiles at Jizan and Yanbu following Saudi airstrikes on Hodeidah. Greek air defense systems intercepted two ballistic missiles inbound for Yanbu, with EO imagery showing a smoke plume directly south of the Yanbu Saudi Aramco refinery consistent with possible missile debris impact following interception. 

Multiple open-source videos show the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan was hit, with overhead fire monitoring data identifying five thermal anomalies in the eastern half of the complex. The Jizan refinery is capable of processing approximately 400,000 barrels per day, approximately 4% of Aramco’s total daily output. Despite the strikes, Bab al-Mandeb transits on July 25 remained roughly in line with the prior 24-hour window, with 17 inbound and 14 outbound against 20 inbound and 19 outbound previously.

Yanbu Port Goes Dark as Vessels Shield Against the Houthi Hit List

EO imagery collected over King Fahd Industrial Port at Yanbu on July 24 and July 26 documents a sharp transition from predominantly AIS-active to entirely AIS-dark tanker operations at berth.

The pre-Houthi-threat baseline in May showed 9 AIS-active tankers at berth alongside 5 dark vessels. By July 22, 9 AIS-active and 3 dark tankers were at berth. By July 24, 8 dark tankers were at berth with 3 more dark in the waiting area and no AIS-active tankers confirmed. By July 26, 11 dark tankers were at berth and 3 dark tankers in the waiting area, all vessels dark with no AIS transmission. 

Of 24 available berth positions, 14 are in use. Two vessels confirmed transmitting AIS on July 22 had gone dark by July 24 at the exact same berth positions. The transition from AIS-active to entirely AIS-dark operations at a major Saudi crude export terminal reflects vessels actively turning off their AIS when approaching the port to shield themselves from the Houthi hit list targeting Saudi-related vessels.

Saudi Crude Reroutes via SUMED as Yanbu Loadings Collapse

Yanbu loading volumes fell approximately 40% after July 19, from approximately 5.16 million barrels per day before July 19 to approximately 3.09 million barrels per day after, per Vortexa 30-day data. South Korea flows dropped to zero while Egypt flows rose from approximately 1.15 million to approximately 1.60 million barrels per day, consistent with increased use of the SUMED pipeline routing through Egypt.

Saudi Arabia has established a working alternative export route, moving crude via the SUMED pipeline from Ain Sokhna to Sidi Kerir on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, with vessels then sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to Asian destinations. One confirmed fixture has a Korean energy major paying $18.5 million to load 280,000 metric tons, equivalent to approximately $9 per barrel or approximately 8 to 9% of total transport cost. Five VLCCs were observed in the Ain Sokhna area, four around the mooring berths. 

The workaround adds cost and voyage time but demonstrates the market’s adaptability. Whether Saudi Arabia can scale this route and whether the Houthis, whose prior attack patterns have focused on southern areas near Bab al-Mandeb rather than northern Red Sea, will allow it to operate unimpeded remains uncertain.

Tanker routing responses to Houthi pressure included a Greek-flagged crude tanker of 333 meters arriving in the Gulf of Aden on July 23, drifting rather than continuing toward Bab al-Mandeb with Suez listed as destination, assessed as owner-side caution linked to the Greek flag itself given the Houthis’ documented history of targeting Greek-flagged vessels. 

A Hong Kong-flagged VLCC of 333 meters reversed course in the Gulf of Oman on July 24, changing destination from Suez to onboard armguard, carrying approximately 366,100 barrels of crude loaded at Muscat for Yantai, China, according to Vortexa, assessed as Bab al-Mandeb risk avoidance.

A Malta-flagged oil products tanker switched its AIS destination field to “NO LINK ISR/US/UK” and went dark in the Gulf of Aden on July 25, sailing in ballast from Haldia, India to Rabigh, Saudi Arabia, a known AIS masking pattern assessed as an attempt to reduce targeting signature given the Saudi Arabia destination, according to Vortexa.

Three Chinese-owned VLCCs transited Bab al-Mandeb without incident on July 23 to 24, consistent with the Houthis’ established carve-out for Chinese and Russian-linked vessels. A Hong Kong-flagged VLCC carrying approximately 2 million barrels of crude loaded at Yanbu transited with AIS active toward Ningbo, China on July 24. 

This marks the third China-linked VLCC to transit the area in two days despite the Houthi blockade on Saudi-origin cargoes.

Container Vessel Transits Jeddah to Aden During the Houthi Blockade

EO imagery collected over the Port of Aden on July 26 at 10:37 UTC confirmed a Panama-flagged container vessel of 179 meters berthed alongside a quay crane with containers stacked on deck and quayside, consistent with routine container discharge or loading with no anomalous cargo-handling pattern visible.

The vessel arrived at Aden on July 24, having departed Jeddah Islamic Port, Saudi Arabia on July 21 following a call there from July 18 to 21. The transit from Jeddah to Aden ran entirely within the window of the Houthi-declared maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, effective July 20, and the vessel transmitted AIS continuously throughout with no dark gap, reaching Aden without incident. This Saudi-origin cargo movement was not intercepted despite falling within the declared blockade parameters.

Aden is operationally significant in this context. Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council and Homeland Shield forces retook full control of Aden and its port in January 2026, and the port falls outside UNVIM’s mandate, clearance covering only Houthi-held Hodeidah and Saleef, meaning Aden-bound cargo clears through the Yemeni government’s own Ministry of Transport, with weaker multilateral inspection oversight than Red Sea Houthi ports.

CENTCOM Boards and Releases a Sanctioned Blockade Breaker in the Gulf of Oman 

U.S. Central Command boarded the CHARMINAR (IMO 9318022), a Comoros-flagged oil and chemicals tanker of 183 meters designated under OFAC sanctions, in the Gulf of Oman, and released it after completing a verification boarding. The vessel is laden with diesel loaded from Bandar Mahshahr, Iran, per Vortexa, with a dark activity period from June 8 to 26 consistent with that assessment. CHARMINAR is also falsely flagged, as it is one of more than 60 tankers expelled from the Comoros registry under a flag governance crackdown in late 2025, rendering it stateless under international maritime law. 

This is the first significant confirmed blockade breaker to pass through U.S. enforcement, and suggests that the fraudulent documentation used by shadow fleet tankers — bills of lading, flag registry — was sophisticated enough to pass CENTCOM’s verification process. The vessel was a sanctioned, stateless tanker carrying Iranian diesel, and it was allowed to continue its voyage.

The U.S. naval blockade against Iran remains in full effect. As of July 25, CENTCOM has redirected 12 commercial vessels trying to run the blockade, disabled 2 that didn't comply, and boarded 2 to ensure total compliance.

Earlier today, U.S. forces completed a verification… pic.twitter.com/eyp1N2B9sO

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 25, 2026

MT LAVINE Disabled by CENTCOM After Four Blockade Breach Attempts 

On July 24, U.S. Central Command conducted disabling fire against MT LAVINE (IMO 8818219), a Mozambique-flagged LPG tanker of 230 meters under OFAC sanctions, after the vessel attempted to run the blockade four times. The vessel has not transmitted AIS since July 15. 

Vortexa assesses its departure from Yemen on July 9 in ballast with a Dubai STS destination assessed with high confidence around July 31. This is a separate incident from the disabling action reported on July 17 and is not a repeat.

Arabian Gulf Dark Activity Hits a Four-Year High

Windward’s Early Detection flagged 43 crude oil tankers with AIS gaps in the Arabian Gulf for the July 15 to 22 period, against an expected baseline of 35, approximately a 25% increase. This is the highest single reading in four years and the third consecutive reading — 41, then 29, then 43 — to sit far outside the historical expected range, distinguishing it from prior noise events that reverted within weeks.

The fleet is not 43 independent actors. Four operator clusters account for 23 vessels, including a 13-vessel cluster linked to a major Korean maritime operator, a 4-vessel National Iranian Tanker Company fleet, a 4-vessel ADNOC fleet, and a 2-vessel Saudi state fleet. The remaining 20 vessels show no shared operator. Behavioral convergence is near-total, with 100% of the fleet showing dark activity, 77% still ongoing as of July 2026, consistent with either coordinated evasion or shared exposure to regional GPS jamming.

Of the 43 vessels, 63% carry high risk or sanctioned compliance ratings, overwhelmingly under the Iran program. Per Vortexa cargo data, 22 are laden (51%) — carrying predominantly Saudi, UAE, and Iraqi crude alongside approximately 5.3 million barrels of Iranian-origin crude across 3 vessels — with 18 in ballast (42%) and 2 in floating storage (5%). The laden share is the more consequential signal, as half this fleet is actively moving Gulf crude while running dark, not idling or hiding empty tonnage.

Three external factors plausibly drive the increase and likely act together: security-driven AIS shutdowns during Strait of Hormuz transit, continued Iranian shadow fleet crude loading, and a structurally elevated dark AIS baseline across the wider region, with approximately one-third of tankers in the region not transmitting AIS and the AIS-inactive share highest inside the Arabian Gulf west of Hormuz.

Kharg Island Terminal Activity and a Growing Waiting Area

EO imagery collected on July 24 at 10:55 UTC identified two dark tankers of approximately 117 and 108 meters at the LPG and Sulphur terminal, a notable departure from expected traffic patterns given the terminal typically handles sulphur and LPG cargo rather than tankers of this size class. This was the first confirmed activity at the LPG terminal since a dark LPG tanker on July 7.

The July 25 collection at 07:11 UTC showed 21 dark tankers across the island. The eastern oil terminal held one dark tanker escorted in by three support and tug vessels on July 24 with no AIS. The LPG terminal held one remaining dark tanker, down from two on July 24, with the second having exited and positioned stationary approximately 6 nautical miles south of the island. The eastern waiting area held 18 dark tankers, within the 16 to 24 range logged across prior collections.

The July 26 collection at 02:38 UTC showed 24 dark tankers in the waiting area, up from 21 the prior day, with three new arrivals including a tanker of approximately 320 meters and a pair of approximately 226 and 211 meters. All Kharg Island terminals were empty as of this collection, with the tankers previously at the eastern and LPG terminals having departed.

Oil Slicks Confirmed at Larak Island

Multi-collection SAR and EO imagery confirmed two tankers near Larak Island are both leaking oil. The KAVOMALEAS (IMO 1042823), the tanker struck in an earlier attack, was confirmed in ballast, and its spill is therefore assessed as vessel fuel or bunker oil tied to attack damage rather than a cargo release. A second, still-unidentified dark tanker to the west was confirmed via a July 23 pass to have an active slick fingering east toward the Larak Island coastline. Merge-over-time analysis confirms the dark tanker has held this position since May 2026 with no AIS or identity match throughout. Slick drift direction reversed between the July 21 and July 23 passes, consistent with current and wind variation rather than a new discharge event. Both slicks were tracking toward the Larak Island and Qeshm coastlines as of the July 23 collection.

Strait of Hormuz Transits

July 25 recorded 1 transit — 0 inbound and 1 outbound. The sole outbound vessel was a Comoros-flagged cargo vessel transiting via the northern corridor with AIS active. 

EU 21st Sanctions Package Extends the Enforcement Perimeter

The EU released its 21st sanctions package, designating an additional 41 vessels — 34 tankers, 6 bulk carriers, and 1 service vessel — adding to the 632 already designated. The package targeted ships supporting Russia’s energy sector, transporting military equipment, or carrying stolen Ukrainian grain. Smaller bunkering tankers used to supply shadow fleet vessels were included. Eight ship managers across India, Singapore, Oman, China, and the UAE were sanctioned, alongside the first crewing agency designation,  a Dubai-based firm. Three Russian oil refineries and one in Belarus were sanctioned, along with an Indian national identified as the architect behind a network of fraudulent ship registries used by shadow fleet tankers, including the Guyana registry, the largest fraudulent ship registry used by shadow fleet tankers.

Notable package elements include the oil price cap for crude oil being frozen at $44.10 per barrel until July 2027, an LNG terminal services ban clarified to take effect January 1 covering Russian, EU, and non-Russian third-country operators controlled by Russian companies, restrictions on EU-owned LNG tanker sales to third countries pending a full ban assessment, Japan’s exemption on receiving crude from Russia’s Sakhalin 2 project extended, and authorization for authorities to dispose safely of Russian oil cargoes they seize and confiscate — a provision with direct implications for the three shadow fleet vessels currently seized in France, Germany, and Belgium. The proposed full maritime services ban was shelved following disagreements led by Greece, allowing European shipowners to continue shipping Russian oil below the oil price cap.

Outlook

The maritime operating environment is now defined by two active fronts. The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb theater has reopened with the Houthis resumed, a Saudi Aramco refinery hit, and Yanbu port operating entirely dark. The Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz theater continues under active U.S. enforcement, with the CHARMINAR release exposing the sophistication of shadow fleet fraudulent documentation and the Strait recording just one transit on July 25.

Saudi crude is finding new pathways at added cost, and the broader Arabian Gulf dark activity signal continues to intensify beyond sanctioned Iranian tonnage into a shared operating mode across the wider Gulf fleet. Windward assesses the operational risk environment as elevated across the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, northern Arabian Gulf, and now the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, with the resumption of the Houthi campaign, active U.S. kinetic enforcement, and structurally elevated dark activity across the region all compounding simultaneously.