Hormuz Becomes a Holding Queue: Iran’s Toll Regime, Bilateral Carve-Outs, and a Bifurcating Strait

At a Glance

• Iran is moving to formalize a state-administered transit-toll regime under the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), with reported per-transit payments of up to $2 million settled in Chinese yuan and Bitcoin transfers to IRGC-linked wallets.
• Six India-flagged vessels transited inbound on May 18 as a coordinated cluster following bilateral engagement with Iran, indicating functional safe-passage arrangements outside the coalition framework.
• Two near-simultaneous vessel seizures off Fujairah on May 14 followed Iranian warnings to the UAE by 8 to 12 hours, with HUI CHUAN and EDRIS both boarded in the same operational window.
• Three IRGC-linked high-speed craft were observed at the stern of the previously struck VLCC BARAKAH on May 15, with the vessel still stationary in the central Strait corridor through May 18.
• IRGC small-craft posture shifted decisively to open water, with 369 craft concentrated in a single offshore polygon northeast of Khasab, the largest day-over-day distribution change recorded.
• Kharg Island recorded six consecutive days without crude offtake, and Sirri Island remained non-operational at 5–10% of pre-conflict capacity, with 86 days since its last departure.
• Commercial throughput held at approximately 38% of pre-disruption levels, with the central Qeshm-Larak anchorage now in its sixth consecutive day of locked dark-vessel positioning.

Operational Overview

The Strait of Hormuz has structurally shifted from a transit corridor with disrupted flow to a tanker holding queue with administrative governance layered on top. Two developments across May 17 and May 18 define the phase change: Iran’s move to formalize a sovereign transit-toll regime under the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, and the first observed coordinated bilateral cluster transit, conducted by six India-flagged vessels under operational assurances from Tehran.

Together, they signal a strategic pivot. Iran is moving from kinetic disruption toward administrative control of the chokepoint, while simultaneously carving out bilateral lanes for non-Western tonnage. The result is a bifurcating Strait, with dark and gray fleets and BRICS-aligned vessels absorbing the premiums of the new toll regime, and Western-aligned tonnage either frozen out, escorted, or exposed to interdiction.

The surrounding picture reinforces the structural read. The central Qeshm-Larak anchorage is in its sixth consecutive day of locked dark-vessel positioning. BARZIN and HAMOUNA remain stranded off Bandar Abbas, with HAMOUNA crossing day 63 of continuous stationary posture. Kharg Island has gone six consecutive days without crude offtake, Sirri Island remains strategically neutralized, and a non-sanctioned VLCC+ has held the same Hormuz approach coordinates for 17 days in what Windward assesses as covert floating storage.

IRGC posture has shifted in parallel. Approximately 369 high-speed craft are now concentrated in a single offshore polygon roughly 30 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, a decisive move from coastal patrol screen to active strait-body presence.

Iran Formalizes a Hormuz Transit Toll Under the PGSA

Iran is moving to formalize a state-administered transit-toll regime under the newly established Persian Gulf Strait Authority. On May 16, the chairman of Iran’s Parliament National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ebrahim Azizi, confirmed that Tehran will soon release the full details of the mechanism. The PGSA’s official communications channel went live on May 18, marking the framework’s move from declaration toward operational rollout.

In the Name of God

The official X account of the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (#PGSA) is now live.
Follow us for real‑time updates on the #Hormuz_Strait operations and latest developments.

— PGSA | نهاد مدیریت آبراهه تنگه هرمز (@PGSA_IRAN) May 18, 2026

Under the proposed mechanism, vessels must apply to the PGSA and submit a Vessel Information Declaration covering ownership, insurance, crew, cargo, and routing before a transit permit is issued. No official tariff has been published, but reports indicate vessels have paid up to $2 million per transit, settled in Chinese yuan. Earlier reporting referenced a $1.00-per-barrel toll for tanker cargoes. Bitcoin payments to IRGC-linked wallets are also being accepted, bypassing Western banking infrastructure entirely. Israel-linked vessels are banned outright, with U.S.-linked and other “hostile country” vessels facing severe restrictions.

The mechanism represents a strategic pivot. Rather than relying on continuous kinetic escalation, Iran is positioning itself to systematically screen, track, and profile commercial fleets in real time through an administrative framework. The PGSA gives Tehran a sovereign-sounding instrument with which to regulate the chokepoint, while preserving the option to interdict vessels that decline to comply.

The compliance dilemma is sharp. OFAC guidance issued on May 1 warned that payments to Iranian-linked entities for safe passage could constitute prohibited transactions under U.S. sanctions, exposing non-U.S. firms to secondary sanctions risk. Payments settled through opaque channels — cryptocurrency, yuan-denominated transfers, or in-kind arrangements — may not appear in a counterparty’s standard compliance trail, transmitting exposure across charterers, traders, financiers, and insurers regardless of contractual distance.

The framework is likely to accelerate the bifurcation of Hormuz traffic. Dark and gray fleets and BRICS-aligned tonnage are positioned to absorb the premiums, while Western-aligned tonnage remains effectively frozen out or dependent on naval escort.

India-Flagged Cluster Transits Under Bilateral Assurances

Windward identified six India-flagged vessels transiting inbound through the Strait of Hormuz on May 18 as a coordinated cluster. All six are small cargo vessels measuring between 25 and 60 meters in length, with assessed destinations at the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar LNG and condensate terminals.

The cluster transit follows ministerial-level bilateral engagement between India and Iran on May 14-15, with Iran reportedly providing operational assurances for Indian vessels. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported on May 13 that eleven India-flagged vessels had transited outbound without incident since the start of the current conflict period, establishing a track record of safe passage between the two governments prior to the cluster movement.

The six vessels transited with full AIS broadcast and adherence to Iran-designated corridors, behavior consistent with confidence in clearance rather than threat evasion. The pattern indicates that functional bilateral safe-passage arrangements are now operating outside the coalition framework. The contrast with Western-aligned tonnage — much of which remains frozen, escorted, or held in extended dark anchorage — is stark, and reinforces the bifurcation pattern that the PGSA framework is likely to deepen.

Two Seizures Off Fujairah Follow Iranian Warnings to the UAE

Windward identified two vessel seizures in the Gulf of Oman on May 14, both occurring approximately 38 nautical miles northeast of Fujairah within the same operational window. The boardings followed 8 to 12 hours after Iranian foreign minister Araghchi issued public warnings to the UAE regarding reported security cooperation with Israel.

HUI CHUAN (IMO 8316895), a Honduras-flagged former Taiwanese academic research vessel reflagged as a fishery/research vessel, was boarded first by unauthorized personnel as reported via UKMTO. The vessel had operated with zero port calls in the prior twelve months and a 72-day continuous AIS blackout from January 31 to April 14, 2026. Windward had raised the vessel to a high compliance risk on May 5, following a recorded contact with an OFAC-sanctioned tanker. Between May 4 and May 5, the vessel conducted five vessel meetings totaling approximately 31 hours within a 24-hour window, with durations consistent with cargo or fuel transfer rather than innocent encounter. Ownership is layered across the Marshall Islands and Taiwan.

EDRIS (IMO 9084384), a Tanzania-flagged general cargo vessel commercially managed from the UAE, was boarded approximately four hours after HUI CHUAN, roughly eleven nautical miles to the north. The vessel’s identity history includes three flags since 2018, four name changes, and three MMSIs. Over the past twelve months, EDRIS conducted 18 port calls to Bandar e Charak and 43 dark incidents. In the fourteen days prior to seizure, the vessel maintained a tight shuttle between Bandar e Charak and Omani waters, including a 33-hour dark broadcast on May 8-9 that overlapped with a declared port presence at Bandar e Charak, consistent with AIS manipulation rather than a coverage gap.

Both vessels fit a recurring pattern of Iranian retaliation against the UAE, in which “illegal trade” narratives provide public cover for politically motivated seizures of commercial vessels. The selection of vessels with extensive prior dark activity records gives Iran rhetorical justification for boardings while signaling a coordinated retaliatory posture rather than isolated maritime law enforcement.

BARAKAH Faces Follow-On Boarding Preparation in the Central Strait

EO imagery collected on May 15 at 06:44 UTC identified three high-speed craft, likely IRGC, positioned at the stern of the UAE-owned VLCC BARAKAH (IMO 9902615) in preparation for boarding. An additional three high-speed craft were detected within a 10 nautical mile radius of the vessel, bow-oriented toward BARAKAH and moving at 10-15 knots, assessed as possibly related to the same incident.

The Liberian-flagged BARAKAH was struck by two Iranian drones on May 4 while transiting the Strait of Hormuz, approximately 78 nautical miles north of Fujairah. The vessel was carrying no cargo at the time, having completed an eastbound transfer operation, and sustained damage resulting in a minor bunker fuel leak. No crew casualties were reported. The vessel went AIS-dark on April 24, ten days before the strike.

BARAKAH remained stationary approximately 9.09 nautical miles off the Omani peninsula through May 17 and held that position into May 18, marking day seven of continuous stationary posture. No salvage or escort activity has been observed. The combination of a struck vessel left in place, followed by visible boarding preparation, indicates an unresolved kinetic incident in the central strait corridor and a follow-on coercive action against a vessel already targeted.

IRGC Small-Craft Posture Shifts to Open Water

EO and SAR imagery collected over the Strait of Hormuz on May 17 identified 392 unique IRGC-linked high-speed craft at sea across five operational zones, with 369 craft (approximately 94% of the total) concentrated in a single offshore polygon in the southern Hormuz zone.

The cluster sits offshore in the open strait body approximately 30 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, spanning roughly five nautical miles by five nautical miles. The legacy Iranian-shore footprint in the northwestern Hormuz zone held only four at-sea craft during the collection window.

The shift represents the single largest day-over-day distribution change recorded in the tracker. On May 12, at-sea distribution was more balanced and weighted toward coastal activity in the northwestern zone. On May 14, the posture remained shore-led. The May 17 collection marks the first observation in which the open-strait southern zone outpaces every other Hormuz zone by an order of magnitude.

If the open-water distribution holds in subsequent collections, the operational read shifts from a patrol screen along the Iranian coast to active strait-body presence, most plausibly positioning to prevent southern corridor transits. Combined with the swarm of approximately 100 fast boats observed east of Larak Island on May 16, the pattern indicates a sustained surveillance, escort, and rapid-response posture across the central chokepoint.

The Strait Functions as a Holding Queue

SAR and EO imagery collected over the Strait of Hormuz on May 17 analyzed 35 vessels across two windows, with only one confirmed transit observed, a 173-meter dark container vessel southeast of Larak Island, assessed as outbound. Sixteen vessels were position-locked across both collection windows, and six AIS-correlated, while 29 were dark across the broader scene.

The central anchorage between Qeshm and Larak Island held 13 dark ships position-locked across both windows, marking the sixth consecutive day of the same posture. Of the 16 stationary hulls, 11 are oil tankers spanning VLCC, Suezmax, Aframax, Panamax, Handymax, and smaller classes, maintaining the 11-of-16 ratio recorded daily since May 11. The remaining stationary vessels include one ULCS container and four general cargo hulls. LNG and LPG vessels remain at zero across the stationary observation window.

Named vessels in the imagery include BARZIN (day 27 stationary at the Bandar Abbas waiting area, dark since May 9), KAROLOS (day 8 stationary at the central-corridor anchorage, dark since May 9), and BARAKAH (day 7 at its mid-strait position as of the May 18 observation). HAMOUNA crossed day 63 of continuous stationary posture, the longest of any named vessel currently tracked in the cluster. Combined demurrage costs for BARZIN and HAMOUNA continue to accumulate at approximately $60,000 per day per vessel, with BARZIN bleeding an additional ~$2.5 million per day in export-revenue opportunity cost on top of demurrage and trapped cargo value.

On May 18, Windward identified 10 commercial transits through the Strait, with 3 vessels outbound and 7 inbound, all transmitting AIS. 

The figure represents an increase from May 17’s four sub-100-meter transits, but the underlying picture is heavily constrained. The inbound count includes the six-vessel India-flagged cluster, leaving only four transits outside that movement. SAR imagery collected on May 18 at 03:06 UTC captured the Strait fully stationary, with all observed transit activity occurring later in the day. 

Total Hormuz crossings remained at approximately 38% of pre-disruption levels.

Covert Floating Storage Extends Into the Non-Sanctioned VLCC Pool

Windward identified a VLCC+, a Marshall Islands-flagged tanker, stationary inside the Hormuz approach. Imagery confirms the vessel has held the same coordinates for at least 17 consecutive days since April 27. The vessel bunkered alongside a bunker barge on May 13 and was observed again on May 14 with a small service craft astern.

The tanker is a 333-meter VLCC+ with over 300,000 DWT capacity. It is not OFAC-designated, and its owner and controller are not currently sanctioned. The vessel’s last reported voyage, per Vortexa records, loaded UAE crude grades, including Murban, Das, and Umm Lulu, at a Fujairah-area terminal in late April. Its declared destination is South Korea.

The vessel has remained continuously dark throughout the entire 17-day stationary period, with seven Iran-flagged dark periods recorded since March. The posture is consistent with covert floating storage tied to Iran-related cargo movement rather than legitimate transit toward the declared destination. The case indicates that covert holding behavior is extending beyond the sanctioned fleet into the broader commercial VLCC pool.

A separate OFAC-sanctioned Iranian Dark Fleet VLCC was identified stationary in the northern Strait off Hormuz Island with a suspected oil leakage on May 14. The vessel, a 1996-built tanker currently sailing under a fraudulent Guyana flag, has been AIS-dark since May 13. Its operational profile includes 240 consecutive days at Port Khalid, Sharjah, between July 2025 and February 2026, 28 dark periods since July 2025, four name changes since 2025, and twelve ship-to-ship meetings in the past year, including a simultaneous three-way ship-to-ship meeting on May 10. The use of an aging, poorly maintained vessel with a suspected leak in active service underscores the growing material strain on Iran’s sanctioned-trade fleet.

Iranian Export Infrastructure Remains Constrained

EO imagery collected over Kharg Island on May 15 and May 16 identified no crude tankers loading at the terminal. As of May 17, the island has gone six consecutive days without crude offtake. The May 14 observation of a 180-meter Panamax tanker loading at the eastern terminal proved to be a single-day event rather than a resumption of normal operations.

On May 16, a vessel assessed as an LPG tanker was observed berthing at the South Eastern terminal, the first such loading observed since the start of Operation Epic Fury. 

Crude can be loaded on large, fully refrigerated LPG carriers with Type A prismatic tanks, with estimated crude capacity for a 180-meter vessel between approximately 107,000 and 176,000 barrels. Whether the vessel is loading gas or crude remains an open question, but the unusual berth assignment is itself indicative of stress on Iran’s export logistics. Approximately twenty tankers remained at drift or anchor east of the island on May 16, up two from the prior day, consistent with a sustained waiting posture for loading windows that are not opening.

Sirri Island remained non-operational at an assessed 5–10% of pre-conflict capacity following the April 7-8 strikes. EO imagery collected on May 14 identified six storage tanks and zero tankers at the terminal. Two tanks are confirmed destroyed, including a ~1 million barrel tank with roof collapse and severe burn scarring, and a ~300,000 barrel tank with collapsed roof and blast damage. Three additional tanks are near-empty at 15% or below, with floating roofs resting at the bottom. A single small full tank holds product assessed as likely condensate or facility fuel. No vessels were observed at berth or in the approach zone, and no reconstruction activity was visible. Vortexa confirms there have been no departures from the terminal since February 18, 2026, a span of 86 days. Sirri is assessed as strategically neutralized for the foreseeable future.

EO imagery collected over Chabahar on May 17 identified a cluster of ten non-AIS-transmitting crude oil tankers stationary off the port, all ranging between 245 and 330 meters in length. 

An additional cluster of fourteen AIS-transmitting cargo vessels was observed in the same area. The tankers are likely awaiting orders in strategically positioned Iranian waters to avoid encounters with U.S. forces, consistent with the broader pattern of dark staging across Iranian-controlled maritime areas.

A separate falsely flagged sanctioned crude oil tanker was detected manipulating its position northeast of Larak Island on May 17. The vessel’s location manipulation likely began on April 20, following its departure from the Malaysia EOPL on March 24. It is likely maintaining its Kharg-to-Malaysia route while concealing its true position, and blockade-evasion activity executed within the strait itself.

Outlook

The Strait of Hormuz has crossed into a new operating phase. The combination of the PGSA toll framework, the India-flagged cluster transit, the seizure pattern off Fujairah, and the open-water IRGC concentration indicates that Iran is no longer relying primarily on kinetic disruption. The chokepoint is now being governed administratively, with bilateral carve-outs for selected partners and coercive interdiction held in reserve for everyone else.

The bifurcation is operational, not theoretical. Dark and gray fleets and BRICS-aligned tonnage are positioned to absorb toll premiums and continue moving. Western-aligned tonnage faces a compounding compliance dilemma: payment exposes vessels to OFAC secondary-sanctions risk, while non-payment exposes them to IRGC interdiction. Continuous naval escort is the only remaining alternative, and the volume of qualifying tonnage that can realistically be escorted is limited.

The holding-queue pattern in the central anchorage, the multi-week stationary postures of BARZIN, HAMOUNA, KAROLOS, and BARAKAH, the 17-day floating-storage posture of a non-sanctioned VLCC+, and the sustained zero offtake at Sirri and constrained loading at Kharg together indicate that the constraint is structural rather than transient. The Strait will remain commercially constrained and operationally unstable in the near term, with vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman approaches — particularly those with prior Iranian-linked behavioral profiles, UAE commercial management, or Western ownership — facing elevated coercive and kinetic risk.