Five Weeks Into the Ceasefire, Hormuz Is Operating Under Control

At a Glance

• Kharg Island remained effectively non-operational, with no confirmed crude departures since May 7.
• Around 20 dark tankers stayed staged near Kharg, holding major export capacity in reserve.
• Dark tanker concentrations expanded near Larak, Qeshm, eastern Hormuz, and Chabahar.
• Commercial movement through Hormuz continued, but under dark, AIS-suppressed, or EMCON conditions.
• IRGC-linked small-craft activity remained elevated, with hundreds of fast craft observed across key Hormuz sectors.
• Qatar-linked LNG movement resumed in limited form, while Iraq and Pakistan reportedly coordinated passage with Iran.
• U.S. forces disabled additional Iran-linked tankers, while Iran seized JIN LI in what appears to be a signaling move.
• Somalia piracy risk remained elevated, adding pressure beyond the Gulf.

Operational Overview

Five weeks into the ceasefire, the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained, opaque, and increasingly managed through selective access.

The clearest signal is the state of Iranian export infrastructure. Kharg Island showed no active tanker loading for multiple consecutive days, while large tanker queues remained staged nearby. No confirmed crude departures have been observed from Kharg since May 7, and imagery indicates continued repair activity near damaged western infrastructure. Iran appears to be holding export capacity in reserve while attempting to restore loading operations.

At the same time, commercial traffic through Hormuz has not stopped. Windward identified inbound and outbound movements, including VLCCs, LPG carriers, product tankers, bulk carriers, and limited Qatar-linked LNG transit. But movement is increasingly fragmented, with vessels operating dark, under EMCON conditions, or through selective clearance patterns.

IRGC-linked maritime activity remained elevated across the Strait, with fast craft, dhows, coastal vessels, and patrol concentrations operating near commercial lanes, staged tankers, and choke points. This suggests a layered maritime-control posture that combines military surveillance, civilian maritime traffic, and controlled commercial movement.

The result is an operating environment where Hormuz functions less like a conventional transit corridor and more like a managed maritime zone shaped by staging, surveillance, enforcement, and degraded visibility.

Kharg Island Remains Stalled as Tanker Queues Hold

Kharg Island remained a central pressure point throughout the week.

EO and SAR imagery collected between May 11 and May 13 showed no active tanker loading operations for a third consecutive day. On May 11, all Kharg loading terminals were observed empty for the first time since April 18, despite 19 staged tankers nearby with a combined carrying capacity of approximately 25 million barrels.

By May 13, approximately 20 dark tankers remained stationary in the Kharg waiting area, including eight VLCCs, two Suezmaxes, six Aframaxes, three Panamax tankers, and one smaller vessel. No large tankers in the waiting area were transmitting AIS.

The export impact is significant. No confirmed crude departures have been observed from Kharg since May 7. Windward assesses crude export volume for the week of May 4–10 at approximately 2.68 million barrels, below the previous low-export week in mid-April.

Imagery also showed visible structural disruption near the southwestern terminal area, along with tugboat and barge activity near western in-sea infrastructure. Windward assesses that this may reflect repair work linked to earlier damage affecting loading throughput.

Dark Holding Zones Expand Across Hormuz and Chabahar 

Large concentrations of dark commercial vessels continued operating inside protected Iranian waters.

On May 12, EO imagery over the northern Hormuz corridor identified 10 large commercial vessels above 100 meters, all operating without AIS. No movement or Kelvin wakes were detected, indicating a stationary corridor fleet.

The same area included a persistent dark ship-to-ship transfer pair involving two tanker-class hulls measuring approximately 230 and 250 meters. The pair remained moored in the same location for a third consecutive day, reinforcing assessments that this was an ongoing commodity transfer rather than routine bunkering.

Eastern Hormuz showed similar patterns. EO imagery identified 36 commercial vessels near Seerik, 35 of them dark and stationary. Only one outbound crossing was observed, involving a 79-meter dark cargo vessel.

Chabahar also remained a major staging zone. Imagery collected on May 11 identified 20 vessels, including 12 commercial vessels operating without AIS. The dark inventory included five VLCC-class tankers, five Suezmaxes, one mid-sized tanker, and one general cargo vessel. Most remained within approximately 150 meters of previous positions, indicating stable holding behavior.

One dark VLCC showed signs of loaded draft with a support vessel alongside its bow, suggesting a possible pre-departure staging posture. Windward also identified an anomalous military cluster northeast of Chabahar, including approximately 29 government or warship-class craft, three of them larger warships, all dark and stationary for more than 24 hours.

IRGC Maritime Activity Remains Elevated

IRGC-linked maritime surveillance and patrol activity remained high across Hormuz.

On May 11, Windward identified more than 200 fast craft across the broader Strait area. By May 13, approximately 342 high-speed craft were assessed across five monitored Hormuz sectors. Although below the May 12 surge of approximately 668 craft, activity remained significantly above the May 4–10 baseline of 27–230 craft.

The northern corridor remained the dominant operating zone, with approximately 189 craft observed during the May 13 collection window. Mid-strait activity remained elevated at approximately 73 craft, while eastern-sector activity near Bandar Seerik declined from roughly 240 craft on May 12 to 22 on May 13.

On May 14, Windward identified approximately 333 IRGC-linked small craft operating across three major concentration zones in the Strait. The southern operating zone, containing roughly 160 craft, showed large swarm formations moving northeast. The northern corridor contained approximately 122 craft, with imagery indicating an inbound swarm arriving from the same direction, while mid-strait activity remained active with roughly 30 craft operating along both northbound and southbound patrol axes.

Additional imagery showed persistent dhow traffic between the Omani Peninsula and Qeshm Island, alongside fast-craft concentrations near the central Strait and Khasab approaches. Windward also observed IRGC-linked boats operating near staged tankers for extended periods, likely supporting surveillance, escort, logistics, or security activity.

This pattern reinforces the assessment that Iran is combining IRGC patrol craft, civilian maritime traffic, coastal logistics vessels, and small commercial craft into a layered maritime-control system.

Commercial Shipping Continues Under Dark and EMCON Conditions

Commercial movement through Hormuz continued, but under degraded visibility.

On May 11, satellite imagery identified nine commercial tanker transits through Hormuz, including six outbound and three inbound vessels. Two outbound vessels were AIS-identified dark fleet-linked operators: TARA GAS (IMO 9290270), a Panama-flagged LPG carrier operating under near-full load conditions, and a Cameroon-flagged product tanker linked to Iranian methanol trade flows.

On May 13, Windward identified several AIS-transmitting commercial transits, including the China-flagged VLCC YUAN HUA HU (IMO 9723588), carrying Basrah crude bound for Zhoushan, China. Additional dark vessel transits were also observed inbound and outbound.

RF collections reinforced the EMCON pattern. On May 12, RF collections continued to show no detectable emissions in key portions of the northern corridor despite visible vessel movement in EO and SAR imagery.

SAR imagery collected over Hormuz on May 13 identified 100 vessels, including 56 operating dark. Windward observed two inbound dark transits and one outbound dark transit, while most vessels near Bandar Abbas, Shahid Rajaee, and the Qeshm Shipyard complex remained stationary rather than actively transiting.

EO imagery collected May 14 also identified two Iranian-flagged OFAC-sanctioned ultra-large container vessels operating dark inside the Bandar Abbas waiting area. Both 366-meter vessels stopped transmitting AIS within 12 minutes of each other on May 9, behavior Windward assesses as coordinated rather than accidental.

Windward assesses that one vessel is effectively blockade-stuck while laden with Iranian export cargo bound for China, while the second appears linked to a separate inbound cargo disruption after arriving from Zhuhai and failing to berth. Combined demurrage costs for both vessels are estimated at approximately $5 million to date, excluding the value of trapped cargo.

Qatar LNG Transit Resumes Under Controlled Conditions 

Qatar-linked LNG movement through Hormuz showed a limited but significant restart.

AL KHARAUTIYAT (IMO 9397327) successfully transited the Strait on May 9 via the northern corridor, becoming the first Qatar LNG cargo to clear Hormuz since Iran’s February 28 closure. The vessel was en route to Port Qasim, Pakistan.

The passage appears to have been enabled under the U.S.-Iran ceasefire framework mediated by Pakistan, with reported Iranian prior approval granted as a goodwill gesture. The timing indicates the clearance was framework-driven rather than vessel-specific.

Two additional Qatar-linked LNG vessels remained idled near Qatari waters after being turned back by the IRGC on April 6, before the formal ceasefire. No updated transit clearance has been confirmed for either vessel.

U.S. and Iranian Enforcement Signals Intensify

Enforcement and signaling continued on both sides.

On May 8, U.S. forces disabled two sanctioned Iranian tankers, SEA STAR III and SEVDA, while both were transiting toward an Iranian port in the Gulf of Oman. Neither was transmitting AIS, and both had gone dark in April. Together with the May 6 disabling of M/T HASNA, this brought the last week’s total to three potential blockade-breaking tankers disabled by U.S. forces.

Both SEA STAR III and SEVDA had recently sailed to Malaysia, where they conducted dark activity before returning toward Iran without AIS transmissions. This pattern suggests that Iranian tankers conducting dark activity in Malaysia or near the Strait of Malacca may provide early indicators for future blockade-breaking attempts.

Iran also seized JIN LI (IMO 9855525), previously known as OCEAN KOI, in the Gulf of Oman on May 8. The vessel is an OFAC-sanctioned tanker linked to Iranian oil trading. Windward analysis found the vessel was manipulating its reported location at the time, with SAR imagery showing that its transmitted position did not correlate with its true location.

Given the vessel’s sanctions status, Iran-linked history, and location manipulation behavior, the seizure appears more like strategic signaling than conventional enforcement.

Additional AIS manipulation patterns were also identified near Iraq’s Basra Oil Terminal. SAR imagery collected on May 13 identified four vessels transmitting synthetic AIS positions that did not correlate with physical vessel locations, including three tankers and one cargo vessel.

Windward assesses the behavior as operationally significant because similar spoofing patterns have previously been associated with concealed Iran-linked movements near Basra and neighboring Gulf operating areas.

Iran Appears to Be Formalizing Selective Transit Control

Regional reporting reinforced indications that Iran is moving from attempted Strait closure toward controlled access management.

Iraq and Pakistan reportedly reached separate arrangements with Iran to secure passage for crude oil and LNG cargoes through Hormuz under Iranian oversight. Iraqi officials reportedly coordinated transit approvals directly with Tehran for VLCC movements carrying Basrah crude, while Pakistan secured separate arrangements covering Qatari LNG cargoes.

This aligns with observed vessel behavior. Large commercial vessels remained stationary after arriving near Iranian waters, while some outbound movements continued under dark or EMCON conditions.

Windward assesses that Iran is increasingly attempting to formalize operational influence over vessel movement through Hormuz while preserving selective energy flows under wartime conditions.

Somalia Piracy Risk Remains Elevated

Piracy risk off Somalia remained elevated, with multiple hijacked or seized vessels still positioned near the Somali coast.

MT EUREKA was reportedly seized around May 2 after a suspicious approach involving a green vessel and a fishing boat southwest of Yemen. Yemeni authorities reported that armed men seized the vessel and directed it toward the Gulf of Aden and Somali territorial waters.

HONOUR 25, a Palau-flagged oil products tanker hijacked on April 21, was observed approximately 2.19 nautical miles off the Somali coast. The vessel remains under pirate control after being seized roughly 30 nautical miles off Somalia while carrying an estimated 18,000 barrels of oil.

SWARD, flagged to St. Kitts and Nevis, was hijacked on April 26 while carrying cement from Suez to Mombasa. EUNAVFOR Atalanta confirmed the vessel was pirated near Somalia’s northern coast, with 17 crew taken hostage.

The clustering of multiple hijacked vessels near Somali coastal positions reinforces the re-emergence of piracy risk across the Gulf of Aden and Somali basin during a period of broader maritime disruption.

Outlook

Five weeks into the ceasefire, Hormuz remains defined by control rather than normalization. Commercial movement continues, but increasingly through selective access, dark operations, EMCON behavior, and staged vessel movement inside protected Iranian waters.

Kharg Island remains the clearest sign of export strain. With no confirmed crude departures since May 7 and large tanker queues holding nearby, Iran appears to be preserving export capacity while attempting to restore damaged loading infrastructure. Chabahar, Larak, Qeshm, and eastern Hormuz are increasingly functioning as staging and holding zones that buffer crude flows under blockade pressure.

IRGC-linked activity across the Strait remains elevated, while U.S. interdiction against Iran-linked tankers continues to intensify. This creates a more volatile operating environment, where commercial shipping, sanctions enforcement, covert logistics, and military signaling are increasingly overlapping.

At the same time, growing AIS ambiguity, persistent dark staging behavior, and expanding vessel spoofing patterns near both Hormuz and Basra are further degrading maritime transparency across the region. Commercial operators increasingly face an environment where actual vessel movement, export activity, and operational intent no longer reliably correlate with AIS-visible behavior.The Strait of Hormuz is no longer operating as a conventional commercial corridor. It is functioning as a controlled maritime operating environment shaped by surveillance, staging, selective transit management, and constrained export logistics.