Three Weeks Into the Iran War: A Maritime Intelligence Breakdown

At a Glance

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near collapse throughout the third week, with only 16 AIS-visible crossings recorded over a seven -day period and one full day with zero AIS-confirmed crossings in either direction.
• Selective transit behavior became more visible, with authorized cargo vessel crossings, bulk carriers routing through Iranian territorial waters, and evidence of a controlled, permission-based transit model.
• Remote Sensing Intelligence identified eight large vessels operating dark inside the Strait, indicating concentrated AIS suppression among high-capacity maritime assets.
• The Gulf of Oman became a major holding area, with approximately 400 vessels detected outside Hormuz, while total vessel presence across the Gulf reached 686 ships, reflecting accumulation rather than system clearance.
• Iranian export activity continued under constrained conditions, with sustained loading at Kharg Island and a rare crude shipment from Kooh Mobarak enabling exports east of the Strait, while overall Gulf crude and LPG export volumes declined to recent lows.
• Global routing patterns began to rebalance, with increased transits through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, while traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated.
• Port disruption remained significant across Gulf-adjacent logistics hubs, with sharp increases in rollovers and delays at Khalifa, Karachi, and Salalah, alongside early signs of localized easing outside the Gulf by March 22.
• Maritime risk widened beyond the Gulf, with a tanker strike in the Black Sea, unusual Russian tanker activity in the Arctic, and continued anomalous AIS behavior linked to Cuba-bound energy flows.
• Policy responses also expanded, including OFAC General License 134, which allowed previously loaded Russian oil cargoes to complete delivery across a large global tanker fleet, while European enforcement escalated to physical interdictions of a sanctioned vessel.

The Third Week of the Iran War at Sea

Three weeks after the launch of Operation Epic Fury, the maritime conflict in the Gulf has moved beyond immediate disruption into a more structured and adaptive phase. Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains near collapse, but the operating picture is no longer defined only by paralysis. Instead, the third week has been marked by controlled movement, dark activity, and selective access, alongside visible adaptation by both state and commercial actors.

The clearest shift is in how access through Hormuz appears to be functioning. Rather than a fully open corridor or a formally declared closure, the Strait increasingly appears to be operating under a selective, permission-based transit model. A small number of cargo vessels were confirmed crossing under exceptional circumstances, bulk carriers were observed routing through Iranian territorial waters, and Iranian officials continued to describe the Strait as open to international shipping while asserting restrictions on specific flags and operators.

At the same time, the wider maritime system continued adjusting around the disruption. Hundreds of vessels accumulated outside the chokepoint in the Gulf of Oman, long-haul Cape diversions remained elevated, and traffic through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal began to recover unevenly. Iranian exports also continued under constrained conditions, with loading at Kharg Island still active and a rare crude export from Kooh Mobarak showing how Tehran is testing alternative outlets beyond the Strait.

Energy markets are also beginning to show visible strain, with declining export volumes, disrupted refined product flows, and increasing reliance on alternative corridors to sustain global supply. 

As a result, the third week of the war at sea has been characterized less by a total shutdown than by an emerging constrained equilibrium: highly restricted movement through Hormuz, controlled exceptions for selected vessels, sustained use of dark maritime behavior, and continued rerouting across the wider global shipping system.

Hormuz Becomes a Controlled Transit Zone

Commercial activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained exceptionally limited throughout the third week of the conflict. On March 14, traffic fell to zero for the first time since the war began, with no AIS-confirmed vessel crossings recorded in either direction. On March 15, only three outbound crossings were recorded, followed by just two crossings on March 16, consisting of one inbound and one outbound bulk carrier. By March 22, only 16 AIS-visible crossings were recorded in a seven-day period, including 11 outbound and 5 inbound transits. These levels remain drastically below normal commercial throughput and reinforce that the Strait is still operating far below standard conditions. 

Yet the third week also showed that the Strait is not uniformly closed. Windward confirmed that four cargo vessels crossed or were crossing the Strait overnight on March 13 and into the early morning hours, including one Pakistani vessel. Turkish authorities reported that a Turkish-owned ship was permitted to transit after calling at an Iranian port, while 14 additional Turkish-owned vessels remained in the region awaiting clearance.

By March 15–16, at least five bulk carriers were observed exiting the Gulf via routes within Iranian territorial waters, sailing along the Iranian coastline instead of standard international navigation channels.

SAR imagery from March 19 showed limited use of standard navigation lanes, with increased routing through Iranian territorial waters. Bulk carriers and LPG vessels were observed using these routes, often following prior calls at Imam Khomeini port, reinforcing that passage is increasingly conditional.

This is further supported by the March 21 transit of a falsely flagged LPG carrier that was signaling China as its destination.

These movements indicate that access is increasingly being managed through selective authorization rather than normal freedom of navigation. The result is a more controlled operating model in which movement remains possible, but only under narrow political or operational conditions.

Dark Vessel Activity Rises Inside the Strait

The third week also produced some of the clearest evidence yet that AIS-visible traffic is no longer an adequate proxy for actual vessel presence inside Hormuz. On March 16, Remote Sensing Intelligence identified eight vessels exceeding 290 meters in length operating within the Strait without AIS transmission. While exact vessel classifications could not be confirmed, their size is consistent with high-capacity platforms such as VLCCs, VLOCs, Capesize bulk carriers, ultra large container ships, or New Panamax vessels.

This concentration of large, dark vessels inside the chokepoint suggests intentional suppression of visibility among high-value maritime assets operating in a high-risk environment. Additional low-visibility behavior also appeared earlier in the week. 

SAR imagery collected on March 16 identified an OFAC-sanctioned vessel operating without AIS within the Strait of Hormuz. The vessel was assessed to be underway and entering the Arabian Gulf, consistent with ballast status data. It last transmitted AIS on March 13 near Khor Fakkan before going dark. The vessel is associated with sanctioned networks and fraudulent flag registration, highlighting the continued use of AIS suppression and identity obfuscation to enable movement under heightened monitoring conditions.

Taken together, these patterns suggest that the true level of activity inside Hormuz is materially higher than AIS alone implies. The operational picture is therefore one of highly restricted but not absent movement, sustained in part through deliberate visibility suppression.

The Gulf of Oman Becomes a Maritime Holding Zone

As visible traffic through Hormuz collapsed, the Gulf of Oman emerged as a major staging and waiting area for commercial shipping. Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence identified approximately 400 vessels operating across the Gulf of Oman on March 13, creating a densely populated maritime environment just outside the Strait.

The vessel size distribution underscores the scale of this concentration. Windward detected 24 vessels under 80 meters, 127 vessels between 80 and 150 meters, 178 vessels between 150 and 250 meters, 60 vessels between 250 and 350 meters, and 11 vessels above 350 meters. 

Satellite imagery also identified at least eight vessels positioned east of the Strait, likely operating in floating storage or waiting-to-load patterns. At the same time, Remote Sensing Intelligence identified GPS jamming clusters in the area on March 13, indicating degraded navigation and tracking conditions across the Gulf of Oman and adjacent approaches to the Strait.

This buildup suggests that many operators have chosen to hold position outside Hormuz rather than commit immediately to long-haul rerouting. In practical terms, the Gulf of Oman has become a maritime buffer zone where ships wait for either controlled transit access or clearer signals about the persistence of the disruption.

By March 22, approximately 686 cargo and tanker vessels were operating in the region, including 292 tankers and 394 cargo vessels.

Vessel subclass distribution:

• Bulk carriers: 156 vessels.
• Crude oil tankers: 76 vessels.
• LNG and LPG carriers: 37 vessels.
• Container ships: 36 vessels.

This reinforces that the system is not clearing. Vessels are accumulating within the Gulf, with movement constrained and dependent on access rather than operational demand.

Iranian Exports Continue Through Constrained and Alternative Routes

Despite sustained military pressure and restricted movement through Hormuz, Iranian crude exports continued during the third week under constrained and increasingly adaptive conditions.

Kharg Island — which handles the majority of Iran’s crude exports — remained operational despite recent U.S. strikes. The attacks targeted military infrastructure on the island, including missile and mine storage sites, while deliberately avoiding oil loading facilities. However, U.S. leadership has continued to signal that energy infrastructure could be targeted in future strikes, maintaining uncertainty around the terminal’s operational continuity.

On March 14, EO imagery identified six VLCCs and two smaller tankers positioned at or near the terminal.

SAR imagery on March 15 showed approximately ten tankers in the anchorage area, indicating continued queuing for loading. 

By March 17, Remote Sensing Intelligence detected two VLCCs and one Aframax tanker berthed at the terminal, with sixteen additional vessels present in anchorage, including nine ships in the 250–333 meter range.

Cargo movements also continued. Two sanctioned tankers departed Kharg after March 11 — SERENA (IMO 9569645) on March 11 and ARK III (IMO 9187655) on March 15 — with a combined estimated cargo of approximately 2.68 million barrels of crude oil. 

Separately, the sanctioned VLCC NORA (IMO 9237539), which had loaded about 2.01 million barrels at Kharg Island, was observed transiting the Strait of Hormuz on March 15 en route to Ningbo, China.

At the same time, Iran demonstrated an effort to diversify export routes beyond the Strait. 

On March 8, a sanctioned VLCC departed the Kooh Mobarak terminal east of Hormuz carrying approximately 1.77 million barrels of Iranian Heavy Crude bound for Dalian, China. The vessel has remained in a 15+ day AIS blackout following its departure.

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirmed a matching VLCC-class vessel at the terminal on March 7, and the ship has remained in a prolonged AIS blackout since departure. 

This marks the first recorded export from Kooh Mobarak in 2026, following only a single shipment in 2025, indicating that Iran is testing alternative export pathways that reduce direct reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

By the end of the third week, broader Gulf export flows had declined further. Over a seven-day period, approximately 23 million barrels of crude departed the region, marking the lowest level in two weeks relative to the previous 12-month baseline. Around 8 million barrels of that volume were loaded by Iran, primarily via Kharg Island.

Iranian exports remained comparatively stable relative to other Gulf producers, with China accounting for 79% of volumes, followed by Syria at 13% and the UAE at 8%. 

At the same time, approximately 161 million barrels of Iranian-origin crude remained on the water, reinforcing continued reliance on floating and in-transit volumes to sustain exports under restricted conditions. 

LPG exports followed a similar pattern of constrained movement. Over a seven-day period, approximately 1.5 million barrels were loaded, the lowest level in at least 12 months, with volumes primarily directed toward Asia. Some cargoes continued moving via Iranian-controlled routing, but overall flows remained constrained and selective.

Regional export dynamics are also shifting beyond Iran. Saudi Arabia continues accelerating crude export rerouting through the East-West Pipeline (Petroline) to reduce dependence on Gulf shipping routes. 

Weekly tanker port calls at Saudi Red Sea ports increased from roughly 58 in late December 2025 to more than 90 by early March 2026. This shift has contributed to a visible buildup of VLCCs near Yanbu, where vessels are waiting to load crude transported across the Arabian Peninsula, underscoring the scale of Saudi Arabia’s effort to sustain exports while bypassing Hormuz-related risk.

By March 22, more than 30 tankers were present at Yanbu port and anchorage, while 64 crude tankers were signaling Yanbu as their destination, reinforcing the Red Sea corridor as a primary alternative to Hormuz transit.

Jet Fuel Market Disruption

By the end of the third week, disruption extended into refined product supply chains. Strikes on Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla refineries on March 19 affected facilities responsible for a significant share of global seaborne jet fuel supply, with Kuwait accounting for approximately 10% of global exports, which amounts to just under 260,000 barrels per day out of an estimated 1.77 million bpd global seaborne trade. This removes a meaningful portion of available seaborne supply at a time when transit constraints are already limiting distribution. 

Windward data identified 73 LR1 and LR2 tankers carrying jet fuel, including 10 signaling destinations to Europe. Eight cargoes were positioned west of Hormuz without onward movement, and no new loadings were observed for more than three days.

The exposure is particularly acute for northwest Europe, with France, the U.S., the Netherlands, and Belgium among the primary destinations for Kuwaiti jet fuel. With global demand at approximately 7.9 million barrels per day, the aviation sector is directly exposed to sustained supply disruption.

Jet fuel was already trading above $202 per barrel on March 17, indicating elevated pricing prior to the disruption. Kuwait National Petroleum Company has not yet provided clarity on outage timelines, increasing uncertainty across aviation fuel supply chains.

Bandar Abbas Activity

Satellite imagery indicates a complete absence of observable activity at Bandar Abbas as of March 15.

At the commercial dock, five vessels were present on March 2, compared to none on March 15. At the military dock, seventeen vessels were observed on March 2, with no vessels detected on March 15.

This sharp reduction suggests a temporary drawdown or shift in both commercial and military maritime presence at one of Iran’s primary port facilities.

Global Shipping Starts to Rebalance Outside the Gulf

While Hormuz remained highly constrained, maritime traffic across other key corridors began to show early signs of rebalancing during the third week.

Bab el-Mandeb showed the clearest shift. On March 14, traffic remained broadly stable at 21 crossings. By March 15, however, activity fell sharply to just 10 crossings, well below the seven-day average. Then on March 16, crossings surged to 38, a 280% increase from the previous day. This volatility suggests that operators are still adjusting to the security environment, but that some traffic is returning to shorter routes when conditions allow.

Suez Canal traffic also fluctuated. On March 14, traffic dropped sharply to 23 crossings, well below recent averages. On March 15, however, throughput rebounded to 39 vessels, with bulk carriers, crude oil tankers, and container ships leading the traffic mix. That rebound indicates that some operators continue to test Red Sea-linked routes despite the wider regional threat picture.

Cape of Good Hope traffic remained elevated throughout the week, even as daily totals fluctuated. On March 14, 69 vessels transited the Cape. On March 15, that number rose to 82, and on March 16, traffic fell back to 71. These totals confirm that long-haul diversions around Africa remain a central alternative for operators avoiding Gulf and Red Sea risk corridors, even as some traffic begins to return to shorter routes.

Overall, the routing picture in week three suggests not a return to normality, but a more complex form of adaptation: continued heavy use of the Cape, selective recovery through Bab el-Mandeb and Suez, and a shipping system that is recalibrating route choices in real time.

Port and Infrastructure Disruption Spreads Beyond the Chokepoint

The operational effects of the conflict continued to propagate beyond transit corridors and into port systems, export infrastructure, and subsea assets during the third week.

Port disruption remained visible across Gulf-adjacent logistics hubs. On March 14, disruption was concentrated in Oman and Pakistan, with Karachi recording 6 transshipment rollovers and 9 delay cases, while Salalah recorded 34 rollovers and 36 delays.

On March 15, disruption intensified outside the Gulf, with Karachi recording 8 transshipment rollovers, while Salalah recorded 26 rollovers and 72 delay cases, marking a sharp spike in congestion at key transshipment hubs.

By March 16, disruption remained uneven. Karachi recorded 7 rollovers alongside 2 port-of-loading late departures, while Salalah showed a temporary easing, with 11 rollovers and 19 delay cases, both below the previous day.

On March 17, disruption spiked inside the Gulf, with Khalifa recording 15 transshipment rollovers and 8 delay cases. Jubail recorded 12 rollovers, while outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded 5 port-of-loading rollovers, 4 transshipment rollovers, and 2 delay cases. Salalah continued to show mixed but volatile activity, including 11 late departures, 17 transshipment rollovers, and 69 transshipment-delay cases.

These patterns indicate persistent instability in cargo flow and scheduling, with congestion redistributing across regional hubs rather than stabilizing.

By March 22, there were signs of localized easing outside the Gulf. Karachi recorded one transshipment rollover and three delay cases, while no major delay exceptions were recorded inside the Gulf. This suggests temporary stabilization in specific locations, even as broader disruption persists.

Energy infrastructure disruption also widened. On March 14, oil loading operations at Fujairah were temporarily suspended after debris from an intercepted drone caused a fire at the facility. Fujairah is a critical outlet for Murban crude and one of the world’s largest bunkering hubs, with more than 70 million barrels of storage capacity, making the incident operationally significant far beyond the immediate Gulf threat zone.

The conflict also began to affect non-shipping maritime infrastructure. Work on the “Pearls” segment of the 2Africa subsea cable project in the Arabian Gulf was suspended under force majeure after contractor Alcatel Submarine Networks cited security risks. This marked one of the clearest indications yet that the conflict is beginning to affect digital and subsea infrastructure in addition to shipping and energy systems.

Maritime Security Risk Expands Across Multiple Theaters

The third week also reinforced that the maritime consequences of the war are no longer confined to the Gulf alone.

Within the Gulf region, the cumulative security picture remained severe. Since the start of the war, 20 confirmed maritime security incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure have been recorded across the Northern Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. 

Cargo vessels made up 90% of all affected ships, including eight bulk carriers, six tankers, four container ships, and two support vessels. The Northern Arabian Gulf accounted for 45% of all incidents, followed by Hormuz at 30% and the Gulf of Oman at 25%.

Ownership and flag analysis indicate that several affected vessels had Western or Gulf-state linkages, with three vessels each connected to U.S., UAE, and UK interests based on flag state or ownership. Recent port call analysis further suggests elevated exposure after entering the regional threat environment, with approximately 45% of targeted vessels having recently called at UAE ports and 20% at Iraqi ports. At the same time, affected vessels also included ships arriving from Thailand, Vietnam, and Brazil, indicating that risk extends beyond regionally linked trade and reflects broad targeting of commercial shipping lanes.

Tanker Struck Near Fujairah Anchorage 

Additional low-intensity incidents continue to affect vessels operating near key Gulf anchorage areas. A tanker was struck by an unknown projectile 23 nautical miles east of Fujairah while at anchor, sustaining minor structural damage without injuries or environmental impact. The presence of a GPS jamming zone in the area limited vessel identification and tracking. The incident reinforces the persistence of localized, high-frequency threat activity in proximity to critical maritime infrastructure.

MARAN HOMER Incident Near Novorossiysk 

Beyond the Gulf, a Greek-flagged tanker, MARAN HOMER, was struck near Novorossiysk in the Black Sea on March 14 while awaiting loading orders. Although the damage was limited, the incident highlighted the emergence of a broader multi-theater maritime risk environment.

Arctic Vessel Activity Near Metagaz Platform

At the same time, unusual Russian tanker behavior was observed near the damaged Arctic Metagaz platform — which experienced an explosion on March 3 that has been widely suspected to be linked to Ukrainian sabotage — where a vessel assessed to be carrying Wagner-linked or military personnel had been loitering since March 9, suggesting a security or support mission rather than standard commercial activity.

SEA HORSE AIS Anomaly in the Atlantic 

Additional opaque maritime behavior persisted outside the Gulf as well. The Russia-linked tanker SEA HORSE continued broadcasting a prolonged “Not Under Command” status in the Atlantic without clear movement toward its previously declared Cuban destination, reinforcing concern around ongoing AIS anomalies and opaque energy logistics linked to Cuba-bound flows.

European Enforcement Activity

European maritime enforcement is shifting toward physical interdiction. On March 20, French naval forces boarded the sanctioned tanker M/T DEYNA (IMO: 9299903) in the Western Mediterranean under UNCLOS Article 110, with UK naval assets providing surveillance support. The vessel, carrying Russian crude from Murmansk, was operating under a fraudulent Mozambican flag and is now being escorted to Marseille. It is designated across six jurisdictions and linked to Russia’s shadow fleet.

The vessel’s activity reflects a structured evasion pattern. Since 2020, DEYNA has undergone 13 identity changes, including 8 flag changes in 13 months. It adopted a false flag immediately prior to loading, executed 103 hours of AIS blackout, and maintained a prolonged transmission gap between March 1 and March 20. A draft change from 8 to 14 meters indicates cargo loading during AIS silence.

This marks the sixth confirmed shadow fleet boarding by European forces in three months, alongside similar actions involving GRINCH, ETHERA, REYFA, and TAVIAN, all showing the same profile of false flags, AIS manipulation, and sanctioned cargo.

At the same time, the scale of activity remains significant. Russia’s shadow fleet has expanded to approximately 1,100-1,200 vessels, with around 600 designated under EU sanctions. Operators are adapting, including reflagging approximately 80 tankers to the Russian registry, reducing exposure to false-flag enforcement.

Policy and Sanctions Responses Continue to Reshape Oil Flows

The third week also saw policy action expanding alongside the operational disruption.

On March 12, the U.S. Treasury issued OFAC General License 134, temporarily authorizing the completion of deliveries for Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded on vessels on or before March 12. The measure was designed to stabilize commodity markets disrupted by the Gulf conflict and affected approximately 215 million barrels of Russian oil carried by 377 tankers at sea or in floating storage. 

The cargo mix included roughly 126 million barrels of crude, 60 million barrels of refined products, and 35 million barrels of fuel oil. Windward data indicated that 44% of the affected tankers were already sanctioned, while roughly half were classified as high-risk vessels.

Despite disruption in the Gulf, global oil flows remain active. As of March 22, approximately 159 million barrels of Russian crude were on the water across roughly 256 tankers, primarily destined for Asian and Mediterranean markets, including China, Italy, and Turkey.

At the same time, only one tanker was signaling a destination toward Cuba — a sanctioned Russian vessel carrying approximately 749,000 barrels of crude and broadcasting “ATLANTIC FOR ORDERS,” reinforcing continued use of opaque AIS signaling in sanctioned trade routes.

Taken together, policy intervention is shaping how flows continue, but not reducing their scale, with sanctioned and high-risk movements persisting under adjusted operating conditions.

Outlook

Three weeks into the Iran war, the maritime system is defined by a constrained and adaptive operating environment.

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains near collapse, and the chokepoint continues to function under selective, tightly controlled conditions rather than normal commercial access. Yet the emergence of authorized crossings, Iranian coastal routing, dark vessel activity, and continued crude loading at Kharg and Kooh Mobarak shows that maritime and energy flows are still moving through structured, non-transparent channels, alongside Saudi Arabia’s increased use of Red Sea export routes and shifting activity at key Iranian ports such as Bandar Abbas.

Beyond Hormuz, global shipping patterns are beginning to rebalance rather than simply divert. Operators continue to rely on the Cape of Good Hope, but increased activity through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal suggests that some traffic is recalibrating toward shorter routes where conditions permit. Meanwhile, instability in regional ports, the Fujairah incident, and the suspension of subsea cable work show that the operational consequences of the war are spreading across logistics and infrastructure systems.

At the same time, declining Gulf export volumes, disruption to refined product supply chains, and sustained Russian crude flows indicate that global energy markets are absorbing the shock unevenly rather than stabilizing.

Enforcement dynamics are also shifting, with increased physical interdictions and continued adaptation by sanctioned networks, reinforcing a cycle of pressure and response rather than a reduction in activity.

Absent a major de-escalation, the next phase is likely to be defined by continued restricted transit in Hormuz, sustained reliance on alternative corridors, and growing adaptation by both states and commercial operators to a persistent, fragmented maritime risk environment.