March 22, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily

At a Glance

• Strait of Hormuz traffic remains near collapse, with only 16 AIS-visible crossings recorded over the past seven days.
• Transit is increasingly selective and controlled, with vessels rerouting via Iranian territorial waters.
• Gulf energy exports continue to decline, with crude and LPG flows at recent lows.
• Iranian exports remain active, supported by alternative routing and sustained on-water volumes.
• Jet fuel supply chains are under pressure following strikes on Kuwaiti refining infrastructure, impacting ~10% of global seaborne supply.
• Saudi Arabia continues to scale Red Sea exports via Yanbu as an alternative to Hormuz.
• Russian crude volumes remain elevated, reinforcing continued reliance on maritime energy transport.
• European enforcement is intensifying, with physical interdictions of sanctioned vessels increasing.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely constrained as disruption enters its fourth week. Traffic continues at minimal levels, while routing behavior is shifting toward controlled and selective transit patterns.

The system is operating under constraint, with defined access, uneven flows, and global trade adapting through rerouting, selective passage, and alternative export corridors due to disruptions from the conflict.

Energy markets are showing clear signs of strain. Export volumes are declining across key segments, while supply chains are adjusting in real time to infrastructure damage, transit restrictions, and enforcement pressure.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait remains severely limited. Over the past seven days, only 16 AIS-visible crossings were recorded, consisting of 11 outbound and 5 inbound transits.

This level of activity remains significantly below normal and reflects sustained suppression of commercial movement. SAR imagery from March 19 shows limited use of standard commercial navigation lanes, consistent with increased use of alternative routes through Iranian territorial waters.

Bulk carriers and LPG vessels are increasingly using these Iranian-controlled routes instead of traditional corridors. In most observed cases, these vessels had previously called at Imam Khomeini port, reinforcing the role of Iran in enabling selective passage.

Additional signals support this pattern. A falsely flagged LPG carrier transited the Strait on March 21 while signaling China as its destination, indicating that access is being granted under specific operational or political conditions.

Taken together, these indicators point to a transit environment that remains highly restricted and increasingly shaped by selective access rather than normal commercial movement.

Gulf Vessel Presence Overview

Despite restricted transit, vessel presence within the Arabian Gulf remains substantial. As of March 22, approximately 686 cargo and tanker vessels are operating in the region, including 292 tankers and 394 cargo vessels.

Vessel subclass distribution:

• Bulk carriers: 156 vessels.
• Crude oil tankers: 76 vessels.
• LNG and LPG carriers: 37 vessels.
• Container ships: 36 vessels.

This distribution reflects a system under constraint rather than evacuation. Vessels are remaining in the Gulf, but movement is limited. The operating pattern is defined by staging, waiting, and repositioning, rather than active transit.

LPG Exports and Flows

LPG exports from the Gulf have declined to their lowest levels in at least 12 months. Over the past seven days, approximately 1.5 million barrels were loaded, with volumes primarily directed toward Asian markets.

The decline reflects both constrained transit through Hormuz and broader disruption across Gulf energy logistics. At the same time, routing patterns indicate that some LPG cargoes continue to move under selective access frameworks, exiting via Iranian-controlled routes.

This reflects reduced volumes alongside constrained transit and routing conditions. 

Crude Oil Flows and Iranian Exports

Crude export activity from the Gulf remains suppressed, reaching its lowest levels in the past two weeks compared to the previous 12-month baseline. Over the past seven days, approximately 23 million barrels of crude departed the region, with around 8 million barrels loaded by Iran, primarily via Kharg Island.

Iranian exports remain comparatively stable relative to other Gulf producers, with the majority of flows directed toward Asia. China accounts for the largest share (79%), followed by Syria (13%) and the UAE (8%).

At the same time, approximately 161 million barrels of Iranian-origin crude remain on the water. This indicates continued reliance on floating and in-transit volumes to sustain exports under restricted conditions.

While conventional Gulf exports are constrained, Iranian flows continue through controlled routing and sustained export activity.

Russian Crude and Global Oil Flows

Beyond the Gulf, global oil flows remain elevated, driven in part by Russian volumes.

As of March 22, approximately 159 million barrels of Russian crude are on the water across roughly 256 tankers. These cargoes are primarily destined for Asian and Mediterranean markets, including China, Italy, and Turkey.

Despite increasing enforcement pressure and geopolitical tension, these flows continue to move. The system is under strain, but continues to function at scale.

Yanbu and Red Sea Export Shift

Saudi Arabia continues to redirect crude exports toward the Red Sea.

More than 30 tankers are currently present at Yanbu port and anchorage, while 64 crude oil tankers are signaling Yanbu as their destination. This marks a clear increase compared to the previous week.

The shift reflects sustained use of the East-West pipeline system to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the Red Sea is emerging as a critical alternative export corridor.

Jet Fuel Market Disruption

Strikes on Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla refineries on March 19 have introduced a new layer of disruption to global energy markets.

Kuwait accounts for approximately 10% of global seaborne jet fuel exports, shipping just under 260,000 barrels per day out of an estimated 1.77 million bpd global seaborne trade. 

Windward data shows 73 Long Range 1 (LR1) and Long Range 2 (LR2) tankers currently laden with jet fuel, including 10 signaling destinations to Europe. Eight cargoes remain trapped west of Hormuz, and no new loadings have been observed for more than three days.

The disruption is expected to have an outsized impact on northwest European supply, with France, the U.S., the Netherlands, and Belgium among the primary destinations for Kuwaiti jet fuel. Europe remains structurally dependent on seaborne imports to meet demand.

Jet fuel was already trading at just over $202 per barrel on March 17, indicating elevated pricing before the latest disruption. With supply tightening further, airlines are beginning to implement contingency planning as uncertainty grows around refinery outages and the duration of Hormuz transit restrictions.

Global jet fuel demand stands at approximately 7.9 million barrels per day, leaving the aviation sector particularly exposed to sustained supply disruptions. 

Kuwait National Petroleum Company has not yet provided clarity on the extent of damage to refining units or expected outage timelines.

Cuba-Bound Crude Flow

Flows toward Cuba remain limited. As of March 22, only one tanker is signaling a destination toward Cuba.

The vessel, a sanctioned Russian tanker carrying approximately 749,000 barrels of crude, is broadcasting “ATLANTIC FOR ORDERS” in its AIS destination field.

This reflects both reduced visible flows and continued use of ambiguous AIS signaling in sanctioned trade routes.

European Enforcement Activity

European maritime enforcement is intensifying, shifting from administrative sanctions to physical interdiction.

On March 20, French naval forces boarded the sanctioned tanker M/T DEYNA (IMO: 9299903) in the Western Mediterranean under UNCLOS Article 110. The vessel, carrying Russian crude from Murmansk, was operating under a fraudulent Mozambican flag and is now being escorted to Marseille. UK naval assets supported the operation through pre-interdiction surveillance.

DEYNA is designated across six jurisdictions, including OFAC (January 2025), the EU (May 2025), the UK (July 2025), Switzerland (June 2025), Canada (November 2025), and Ukraine (December 2025), and is linked to Russia’s shadow fleet.

The vessel’s activity reflects a structured evasion pattern:

• 13 identity changes since 2020, including 8 flag changes in 13 months.
• Adoption of a false flag on February 25, immediately before departure from Murmansk.
• 103 hours of AIS blackout, followed by a prolonged gap between March 1 and March 20.
• Draft change from 8 to 14 meters, indicating cargo loading during AIS silence.

This is not an isolated case. It is the sixth confirmed shadow fleet boarding by European forces in three months, alongside similar actions involving GRINCH, ETHERA, REYFA, and TAVIAN, all showing the same profile of false flags, AIS manipulation, and sanctioned cargo.

At the same time, the scale remains significant. Russia’s shadow fleet now numbers 1,100–1,200 vessels globally, with roughly 600 designated under EU sanctions, while export volumes remain elevated.

Russia is already adapting. Around 80 tankers are reflagging to the Russian registry, reducing exposure to false-flag enforcement, while naval escorts and escalation signals are increasing.

The result is a tightening cycle of enforcement and adaptation, rather than a reduction in activity.

Port Operations Disruptions

Port activity outside the Gulf shows signs of localized easing, with disruptions primarily observed in Karachi.

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 1 transshipment rollover (−85.71% from the previous day, −77.42% compared to the 7-day average).
• 3 delay cases (−62.5% from the previous day).

Inside the Gulf, no major delay exceptions were recorded during the same period. This suggests temporary stabilization in specific locations, even as the broader regional system remains disrupted.

Outlook

The maritime system remains under sustained disruption, with clear signs of adaptation.

Transit through Hormuz remains tightly constrained, with access increasingly defined by selective routing and controlled passage. Energy exports continue to decline across key segments, while alternative corridors such as the Red Sea expand to absorb displaced flows.

At the same time, enforcement activity is increasing, and global oil movements remain elevated despite growing complexity.

The result is a system operating under pressure but not breaking down. Movement continues, but it is uneven, conditional, and increasingly shaped by geopolitical control rather than open access.