U.S. Treasury Expands Pressure on Iran’s Shadow Fleet and Weapons Procurement Networks

At a Glance

• OFAC sanctioned 12 shadow fleet vessels involved in transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemicals.
• Multiple shipping companies and vessel owners were designated under Executive Order 13902.
• The designations reinforce the link between Iranian oil exports and weapons proliferation.
• Maritime intelligence and behavioral monitoring remain central to enforcement.

Expanding Pressure on Iran’s Maritime and Weapons Networks

On February 25, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 30 individuals, entities, and vessels linked to Iran’s shadow fleet and to networks supporting ballistic missile and advanced conventional weapons production.

The action targets two interconnected pillars of Iran’s sanctions evasion architecture:

1. Maritime oil transport networks that generate revenue.
2. Procurement channels that convert that revenue into military capability.

Together, they form a closed loop between energy exports and weapons development.

Targeting Iran’s Shadow Fleet Revenue Streams

The latest action intensifies pressure on vessels operating as part of Iran’s shadow fleet – ships transporting petroleum and petrochemical cargoes outside mainstream compliance frameworks.

OFAC-designated vessels flagged in Panama, Barbados, Comoros, Palau, Vanuatu, and Iran itself. Several had been transporting millions of barrels of Iranian LPG, high sulfur fuel oil, condensate, grey ammonia, and other products across Asia and beyond since 2023-2025.

Notably, multiple vessels have operated within the shadow fleet ecosystem for years, underscoring the durability of these networks. Ownership structures span jurisdictions including Panama, the Marshall Islands, Liberia, and the British Virgin Islands.

Windward data shows the scale of this ecosystem. Of approximately 430 tankers currently engaged in Iranian trade, roughly 62% are falsely flagged, and 87% are sanctioned. The Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, China, and Panama represent the top four jurisdictions of incorporation for registered owners, reflecting how ownership structures are distributed across global maritime registries.

Insurance coverage is unknown for all but a small handful of these vessels, reinforcing the opacity of the fleet’s operating model.

This round of designations highlights several recurring characteristics of shadow fleet operations:

• Flag and ownership changes across low-oversight registries.
• Longstanding vessel participation in sanctioned trade corridors.
• Petroleum cargo routing through permissive jurisdictions.
• Multi-year integration into Iranian export networks.

In addition to crude and product tankers, Windward data shows that roughly 100 LPG carriers are actively engaged in Iranian trades, expanding the sanctions-evasion footprint beyond traditional oil segments.

Rather than ad hoc activity, these vessels reflect embedded commercial structures that sustain Iranian petroleum exports under sanctions pressure.

From Oil Revenue to Weapons Programs

The Treasury’s action extends beyond maritime transport.

OFAC simultaneously designated procurement networks facilitating access to precursor chemicals, sensitive machinery, and UAV components tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.

The designated networks include financial intermediaries supporting engine production for Shahed-series UAVs and procurement of missile propellant precursors such as sodium perchlorate.

The connection is direct: Oil exports generate revenue.

Procurement networks convert that revenue into missile, UAV, and advanced weapons capacity.

The designations, therefore, reinforce the strategic logic of maximum pressure, constraining energy flows to limit military capability.

These maritime networks are supported by well-developed financial channels designed to operate beyond Western jurisdiction, enabling revenue movement even as vessels are designated or sanctioned.

Enforcement Expands Across Maritime and Procurement Networks

This action was taken pursuant to Executive Orders 13902, 13382, and 13949 and forms part of the Treasury’s broader campaign under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.

In 2025 alone, OFAC sanctioned more than 875 persons, vessels, and aircraft tied to Iranian sanctions evasion.

What distinguishes this round is its integrated focus:

• Maritime transport disruption.
• Weapons proliferation financing.
• Procurement and intermediary networks.
• Individual facilitators operating across borders.

Rather than targeting isolated transactions, the strategy addresses entire ecosystems.

What This Means for Maritime Stakeholders

The designations reinforce several realities for maritime stakeholders:

1. Shadow fleet vessels continue to operate across multiple flags and ownership layers, often embedded within broader commercial structures.
2. Enforcement increasingly targets not only ships but service providers, owners, intermediaries, and financial conduits.
3. Oil transport cannot be analyzed in isolation from weapons procurement and geopolitical risk.

For maritime intelligence teams and compliance departments, this means monitoring must extend beyond vessel identity checks. Effective detection requires:

• Behavioral tracking of vessels operating in sanctioned trade corridors.
• Monitoring of ownership and flag transitions.
• Cross-referencing petroleum movements with designated entities.
• Identifying shifts in chartering, management, and insurance affiliations.

Operationally, many of these vessels rely on highly inefficient logistics chains, including three to four ship-to-ship transfers between load and discharge ports, designed to obscure cargo origin and counterparties.

Detection is further complicated by AIS spoofing, the use of fake or defunct IMO and MMSI identities, and deliberate manipulation of vessel tracking data.

The shadow fleet is not static, and it is evolving in response to pressure.

Secondary Sanctions Risk and Global Exposure

The action also reiterates the risk of secondary sanctions.

Foreign financial institutions facilitating significant transactions involving designated persons may face restrictions on correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States.

For insurers, classification societies, and ship managers, the expanding scope of designations increases exposure risk if due diligence frameworks rely solely on static sanctions lists.

Behavioral and network-based analysis becomes more important as vessels shift ownership or management to evade detection.

A Continued Campaign, Not a Singular Event

The Treasury described the action as part of an ongoing maximum pressure campaign. The objective is not solely punitive but behavioral, to constrain revenue streams supporting destabilizing activities.

The latest round suggests that maritime enforcement will remain central to Iran-related sanctions policy.

As long as petroleum exports serve as a primary revenue source for missile and UAV development, the maritime domain will remain a focal point of regulatory and intelligence scrutiny.