At a Glance What Three Quarters of GPS Jamming Reveal About Maritime Risk In 2025, GPS jamming became maritime’s fastest-growing and most disruptive operational challenges. What began as concentrated interference in a few high risk zones quickly escalated into a global-scale disruption with thousands of vessels broadcasting false locations and incidents reported in every major...
A Russia-bound LPG tanker sailing for the Baltic port of Ust-Luga spoofed its location for 10 days in the Gulf of Finland, concealing the loading of its cargo of propane or butane. The 22-year-old vessel was sold to a newly incorporated single-ship company in India in late September and immediately sailed for the Baltic Sea...
A Russia-bound LPG tanker sailing for the Baltic port of Ust-Luga spoofed its location for 10 days in the Gulf of Finland, concealing the loading of its cargo of propane or butane.
The 22-year-old vessel was sold to a newly incorporated single-ship company in India in late September and immediately sailed for the Baltic Sea to make its first port of call in Russia. Between October 8-17, the tanker appeared to remain anchored in the Gulf of Finland, leaving telltale irregular AIS circular patterns that indicated location spoofing. After sailing away, the vessel updated its draft via AIS to signal it was laden, heading toward the Suez Canal with India as the probable destination.
Using Windward’s Imagery-Based Intelligence solution, the satellite imagery confirmed that no vessels were actually present where the tanker’s AIS claimed it was.
The spoofing LPG tanker appeared to be anchored in the Gulf of Finland for 11 days, but AIS data revealed it was spoofing while calling in Ust Luga. Source: Windward Maritime AI Platform™
A Broader Pattern of Deception
Location (GNSS) manipulation, or spoofing, occurs when a vessel falsifies its Automatic Identification System (AIS) position to appear in one location while operating elsewhere. This deceptive shipping practice (DSP) has long been endemic to Iranian LPG trades and is now increasingly common in Russia.
Windward’s Maritime AI™ tracked over 40 tankers and 93 ID or location-tampering events within the LPG fleet in the past year, including at least three in the Baltic Sea since February. The latest incident comes as the EU moves to close a loophole allowing Russian propane and butane to enter Europe as feedstock for petrochemical plants – a key part of the proposed 19th sanctions package, expected to go before the EU Council on October 23.
The proposed EU measures aim to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, including an accelerated phase-out of LNG imports by the end of 2026 and a ban on LPG imports.
At the same time, extensive GPS jamming has been recorded around Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Kaliningrad, causing vessels to appear inside Finnish territorial waters or even on land in Russia. Similar interference has also been detected near Poland, illustrating the broader operational disruption across the region.
Opaque Ownership and Sanctions Evasion
What makes this latest case notable is the familiar ownership pattern behind the spoofing vessel. The LPG carrier was recently purchased by an anonymous, untraceable Indian company and immediately deployed to Russian trade – a strategy mirroring Russia’s dark fleet of crude and product tankers. That pattern typically involves newly incorporated, single-ship companies with no prior maritime footprint, acquiring older tonnage from European sellers for exclusive use in sanctioned or restricted trades.
The beneficial owner of the spoofing LPG tanker remains unknown. The registered Indian owner listed in the IMO database cannot be traced, while another newly purchased single-ship company, noted as the technical manager, shares the same unverified address and email address. Windward data shows that around 25 LPG carriers have transported propane and butane cargoes from Ust-Luga over the past 18 months, bound for Belgium, Poland, France, India, and Turkey. These findings highlight how deceptive shipping practices, opaque ownership, and location (GNSS) manipulation continue to undermine enforcement transparency in global energy trade, particularly as Russia adapts its logistics networks to circumvent sanctions and maintain exports.
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At a Glance What Three Quarters of GPS Jamming Reveal About Maritime Risk In 2025, GPS jamming became maritime’s fastest-growing and most disruptive operational challenges. What began as concentrated interference in a few high risk zones quickly escalated into a global-scale disruption with thousands of vessels broadcasting false locations and incidents reported in every major...
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