The Top 8 Maritime Risks From Q3 2026

Executive Overview

Q3 marked the most dangerous quarter for global shipping in recent history. Four navies struck merchant ships: Iran, Russia, Ukraine and the United States. Iranian attacks in the Middle East Gulf doubled to 45. Black Sea attacks quadrupled to about 86. Hijacking attempts off Somalia rose from 2 to 5. The Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi-linked shipping and Bab el-Mandeb traffic fell by a quarter. The Gulf recorded at least 12 conflict-related oil spills, one of them covering up to 2,000 km², within reach of the desalination plants that supply the region’s drinking water. 

Falsely flagged ships are up 39% since January. Russia reflagged 84 dark fleet tankers to its own register in a single quarter. GPS jamming reached 124,000 distinct vessels. Four seafarers were killed in the Black Sea and two in the Strait of Hormuz. Hormuz traffic is recovering only because half of it moves at night under U.S. escort with AIS off.

This report is the Q3 assessment of Windward’s MIOC, built on all-source operational intelligence and verified against open reporting. The eight risks below defined the quarter.

1. Strait of Hormuz Conflict

Iranian attacks on vessels in the Middle East Gulf doubled quarter-on-quarter. 

Windward identified 45 ships attacked between July and September, cross-checked against UKMTO and media reports. That compares with 25 in Q2 and 22 in February and March. Near-misses, unidentified ships and seizures are excluded. 

The targets changed. Early in the war, Iran attacked ships of all types across the Middle East Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In Q3, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps concentrated on tankers using the U.S.-facilitated southern corridor through Omani waters, which Iran calls unauthorized. 87% of ships attacked were tankers, up from 28% in Q2, and 93% of attacks occurred in the Strait of Hormuz, up from 52%. 

Nearly half the ships hit belonged to the national fleets of Gulf energy companies, up from 12%. The attacks increased as oil and gas exports through the southern corridor increased from early May. By quarter end, Vortexa estimated West-of-Hormuz crude exports excluding Iran at 8 million barrels a day, about 55% of pre-war volume and 237% above Q2.

The attacks did not stop the traffic. UKMTO-recorded Hormuz transits roughly doubled from about 16 a day in the second half of July to about 31 a day in the last week of September, against a pre-war average of 138. 

Over the full quarter UKMTO averaged 24 transits a day: 19 in July, 26 in August and 27 in September. Iran attacked about two ships for every 100 UKMTO-recorded transits. In early September, UKMTO began including U.S.-facilitated southern corridor transits in its figures, backdated to mid-July. This was the first public count of ships moving through the corridor in night convoys under U.S. protection, which run with AIS off and outside satellite observation windows. 

Windward’s all-source Hormuz assessment combines AIS, satellite analytics and, since early September, UKMTO’s backdated count of U.S.-facilitated transits. Combining them shows how the strait recovered:

In the first half of July, before the convoys started, AIS- and satellite-visible transits exceeded UKMTO’s count. From mid-July the two diverged: UKMTO’s total rose while visible transits fell from 20 a day in July to 13 in September. By August, 47% of all transits were dark convoy passages. 

By September, 52%. Almost all of the quarter’s growth in Hormuz traffic took place in those convoys. Those convoy transits are also the exposed ones: Iran’s attacks concentrated on dark southern-corridor vessels, and 77% of the ships on Iran’s list had dark activity in the prior 90 days.

In September, U.S. forces disabled or destroyed eight shadow fleet tankers trading with Iran, on 5 and 8 Sep. Iran responded with 13 strikes between 9 and 23 Sep, the densest run of attacks since June. 

Separately, Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority published a list of 77 vessels between 12 Aug and 29 Sep that it says broke its transit rules, either by using the southern corridor or by transiting Iranian waters without paying tolls. The list describes the southern corridor’s users: 85% tankers, 24 of them VLCCs, 44% Liberian-flagged, half owned by Gulf energy companies, and 77% with dark activity in the past 90 days, consistent with AIS-off transits under U.S. escort.

Attacks

• 45 ships attacked in Q3, 25 in Q2, 22 in February-March.
• 87% of ships attacked were tankers (Q2: 28%).
• 38% of tankers attacked were VLCCs (Q2: 80%).
• 47% belonged to Gulf energy companies’ national shipping fleets (Q2: 12%).
• 93% of attacks occurred in the Strait of Hormuz (Q2: 52%).
• Most attacks hit vessels transiting the southern corridor with AIS off.
• 13 Iranian strikes between 9 and 23 Sep, beginning the day after U.S. strikes on eight Iranian tankers on 5 and 8 Sep.

Transits

• UKMTO daily transits: about 16 in the second half of July, about 31 in the last week of September. Pre-war: 138.
• UKMTO Q3 daily average: 24. By month: 19 in July, 26 in August, 27 in September.
• UKMTO monthly transits, derived by Windward: 591 in July, 791 in August, 779 in September.
• UKMTO’s figures include U.S.-facilitated southern corridor transits from mid-July, added in early September.
• Dark convoy passages, measured by Windward as the difference between UKMTO’s total and AIS- and satellite-visible transits: 47% of August transits, 52% of September transits, 35% across Q3.
• AIS- and satellite-visible transits fell from 20 a day in July to 14 in August and 13 in September while total traffic rose.
• In the first half of July, before the convoys began, visible transits (27 a day) exceeded UKMTO’s count (23 a day).
• Peak traffic for the period came on 24-25 Jun, a week after the 17 Jun Islamabad MOU: 62 and 63 visible transits, 60 and 49 UKMTO-recorded.
• About 2 Iranian attacks per 100 UKMTO-recorded transits.
• The U.S. naval blockade, reimposed in mid-July, and reduced Iranian control of the strait cut transits through the northern corridor in Iranian waters.
• West-of-Hormuz crude exports excluding Iran: 8 million bpd at quarter end (Vortexa), 55% of pre-war volume, +237% quarter-on-quarter.

Iran’s Blacklist of Vessels (12 Aug to 29 Sep)

• 85% tankers, including 24 VLCCs.
• 44% Liberian-flagged (35 ships). Panama and Barbados next at 6% each.
• Liberia is the flag of choice for ADNOC and Sinokor Marine, the owners that dominate southern corridor tanker transits.
• 50% owned by Gulf energy companies, including 31 tankers owned by Emirati companies.
• 77% recorded dark activity in the past 90 days.
• VLCCs on the list shuttle crude from West-of-Hormuz terminals to ship-to-ship transfer areas off Fujairah and Oman.

2. Conflict-Related Oil Slicks and Desalination Disruption

Conflict-related oil spills in the Gulf began in April. Between 6 and 10 Apr, three events each produced a slick: Iranian strikes on infrastructure off the Kuwaiti coast, damage to the Iranian warship Shahid Bagheri near Qeshm Island, and a strike on the Lavan Island refinery.

Q2 logged 9 incidents over 13 weeks. Q3 logged at least 12 in the 12 weeks to 22 Sep, and 8 of those 12 occurred between 24 Aug and 10 Sep.

The largest confirmed spill in Q2 was 33.2 km², from the ADNOC tanker Barakah on 4 May. The largest in Q3, from the grounded VLCC Caroline Bezengi off Oman, reached 400 km² by the Omani government’s measurement and up to 2,000 km² by independent estimates.

Every Q2 spill came from a single incident: one strike, one vessel, one leak, and every one has a measured slick or an estimated volume.

The 12 Q3 incidents are: the Kavomaleas strike near Larak Island (20 Jul); the Caroline Bezengi slick off Al Hallaniyat, measured on 26 Jul and again on 13 Aug; the Musandam VLCC spill (16-17 Aug); a Bab el-Mandeb slick (23 Aug); the Metro Venetian (24 Aug), Al-Salam II (25 Aug) and Khasab (29 Aug) tanker strikes; the SIDR and Senegal Prosperity strikes (31 Aug); the U.S. strikes on 8 Iranian tankers (5 and 8 Sep); Iran’s strikes on 10 ships, including 2 U.S. Navy destroyers (9 Sep); and the Sharjah slick (10 Sep).

Five of the 12 have a measured slick: Kavomaleas, Caroline Bezengi, Musandam, Bab el-Mandeb and Sharjah. The other seven are vessel strikes with no confirmed release. In most cases no leak was reported. In the others, satellite assessment has not yet been done. The confirmed Q3 spill figures therefore cover five events and leave out most of the quarter’s tanker strikes, including all 18 vessels hit in the 5 to 9 Sep exchange between the U.S. and Iran.

The main risk from these spills is to drinking water. All six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman) depend on desalination. Over 90% of the Gulf’s desalinated water comes from 56 plants, and most hold between a few days and a week of reserve. Oil damages reverse-osmosis membranes on contact, so a slick only needs to reach a plant’s intake pipes to shut the plant down.

Two Q3 slicks, at Musandam on 16-17 Aug and at Sharjah on 10 Sep, passed within tens of kilometers of operating plants. No intake has been hit.

The main risk from these spills is to drinking water. All six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman) depend on desalination. Over 90% of the Gulf’s desalinated water comes from 56 plants, and most hold between a few days and a week of reserve. Oil damages reverse-osmosis membranes on contact, so a slick only needs to reach a plant’s intake pipes to shut the plant down.

Two Q3 slicks, at Musandam on 16-17 Aug and at Sharjah on 10 Sep, passed within tens of kilometers of operating plants. No intake has been hit.

Incident Count

• Q2 2026: 9 dated incidents over 13 weeks.
• Q3 2026: at least 12 incidents over 12 weeks (to 22 Sep).
• 8 of the 12 occurred between 24 Aug and 10 Sep.
• 4 Q3 incidents are MIOC detections not yet independently corroborated in open-source reporting (Kavomaleas, Musandam, Bab el-Mandeb, Sharjah).

Confirmed Scale

• Q2 largest: Barakah, 4 May, 33.2 km², est. 25 to 230 bbl crude.
• Q2 largest estimated volumes: Kharg Island discharge on 6 May, 300 to 3,000 bbl; Kharg loading leak on 16 May, 200 to 2,000 bbl.
• Q3 largest: Caroline Bezengi, ~45 km² on 26 Jul, ~400 km² by 13 Aug (Oman government), 1,300 to 2,000 km² (Greenpeace and independent analysts, disputed).
• Caroline Bezengi was carrying ~800,000 bbl crude when disabled by explosion on 8 Jun; the 30 Jun grounding triggered the release.

Strikes Without a Confirmed Release, Q3

• Metro Venetian, 24 Aug: engine-room fire, disabled, no volume confirmed.
• Al-Salam II, 25 Aug: hull breach and fire, no leak reported.
• SIDR, 31 Aug: 2 seafarers killed, no spill reported (UKMTO).
• Senegal Prosperity, 31 Aug: hit three times, dead in water with port list, abandoned off Oman with environmental concerns.
• Downy, Stark 1, Kylo: disabled or destroyed by U.S. strikes, 5 Sep, off Kharg Island, near Jask and in the Gulf of Oman.
• Kaviz, Charminar, Horizon 1, Riesco, Derya: destroyed by U.S. strikes, 8 Sep, 4 in the Gulf of Oman and 1 near Kharg Island; crews ordered off first.
• 8 tankers and 2 U.S. destroyers (DDG-119, DDG-53) hit by Iranian fire, 9 Sep, in an area Iran had declared prohibited.

Desalination Exposure

• Desalination dependency: Kuwait and Qatar ~100%, Bahrain ~95%, Oman ~86%, Saudi Arabia ~70%, UAE 40%+.
• 56 plants supply over 90% of the Gulf’s desalinated water; most hold days to a week of reserve.
• Musandam’s RAECO plant is the sole water source for roughly 70 boat-access villages; the 16-17 Aug Musandam slick passed within tens of kilometers.
• No plant intake has been confirmed hit this quarter.

Fisheries

• Caroline Bezengi is tied in press and Greenpeace reporting to threatened livelihoods in Omani fishing communities inside the Al Hallaniyat marine reserve.
• The reserve hosts an estimated 200 Arabian Sea humpback whales.
• Contamination above food-safety limits forces fishing-ground closures; market damage persists after the oil is gone.

3. Houthi Threats on the Bab el-Mandeb

Bab el-Mandeb traffic in Q3 divides at 20 Jul, the day the Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi-linked shipping, one week after the Saudi strike on Sanaa airport on 13 Jul. 

Overall, all transits dropped 9.9% in Q3 to 4,554 (down from 5,054 in Q2), with unique vessels falling from 2,431 to 2,349. Tanker transits saw a sharp decline of 26.4% from 1,918 to 1,411, while cargo transits held steady at 3,012 (up 0.6% from 2,995 in Q2). Before 20 Jul the strait averaged 44.1 transits a day. After it, 33.7, and September has recovered only to 35.2.

Traffic did not collapse. It thinned by a quarter and held there, and the composition of what remained changed more than the volume did. Tankers pulled back faster than the fleet as a whole. Saudi-flagged vessels stopped transiting almost entirely, either rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope or staying inside Saudi waters.

Carriers named by the Houthis kept moving but switched off AIS. And roughly a third of the vessels still broadcasting began using the destination field to declare what they are rather than where they are bound: “ALL CHINESE CREW”, “CHINESE OWNER”, “ARMED GUARDS ONBOARD”, “NO LINK TO ISRAEL”.

Transit Volumes (AIS-visible and identified dark)

• 1-19 Jul: 44.1 transits a day.
• 20 Jul-31 Aug: 33.7 a day (-24%).
• September: 35.2 a day (-20% against the pre-blockade baseline).
• Q3 total transits: 4,554 (-9.9% from 5,054 in Q2; 2,349 unique vessels vs 2,431 in Q2).
• Q3 average: 36.9 a day.
• Tanker transits: 1,411 in Q3 (-26.4% from 1,918 in Q2); 16.1 a day before 20 Jul, 12.0 after (-25%).
• Cargo transits: 3,012 in Q3 (+0.6% from 2,995 in Q2).

Identity Broadcasting

• About one third of AIS-visible transits carry an identity message in the destination field instead of a port.
• Chinese crew or owner messages (“ALL CHINESE CREW”, “CHINESE OWNER & CREW”) are the largest group, up from 16% to 20% of transits.
• Armed-guard messages held at about 15% of transits.
• Russian, Turkish and Muslim-crew messages more than doubled, from about 1% to 2.6% of transits.
• Containerships of Houthi-threatened carriers cross dark: 5 of 142 Bab el-Mandeb transits in Aug-Sep had AIS on.
• China-, Russia- and Iran-linked operators: 54 of 90 transits had AIS on over the same period.

4. Piracy Resurgence in the Gulf of Aden

Pirate hijacking attempts in the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden reached 5 in Q3 2026, up from 2 in Q2 and five times the level recorded in the same quarter of 2024 and 2025. 

The geography narrowed as the count rose. In the comparison quarters, attempts were spread across the Gulf of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Indonesia as well as the Horn of Africa. In Q3 2026, every attempt occurred off Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden.

Outcomes split three ways. Two vessels repelled the attempt, one of them with naval support from Operation Atalanta. Three were taken. Of those, two were subsequently freed, and in neither case by an international naval coalition: Turkish forces released a vessel reportedly carrying Turkish weapons, and a vessel’s owners negotiated its release in a joint operation with Somali authorities. 

The pattern that emerges is a pirate network operating at higher tempo within a tighter area, and a response in which flag states and shipowners are acting directly rather than waiting for multinational forces.

Hijacking Attempts, Somali Basin / Gulf of Aden

• Q3 2026: 5 attempts.
• Q2 2026: 2 attempts.
• Q3 2025 and Q3 2024: roughly one fifth of the Q3 2026 level.
• All 5 Q3 2026 attempts occurred off the Somali coast or in the Gulf of Aden.
• Comparison quarters also recorded incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, Equatorial Guinea and Indonesia.

Outcomes

• Repelled: MV GOLDEN ARSENAL and GLAMOR. GLAMOR received naval assistance under Operation Atalanta.
• Hijacked: ASANA, SEAMULL and LUTUF.
• LUTUF (IMO 9109134), reportedly carrying Turkish weapons, released by Turkish forces.
• SIBU I (IMO 9204776) released by its owners in a joint operation with Somali authorities.
• One hijacked vessel remained in pirate hands at the time of writing.

5. Russia-Ukraine Maritime War Goes Global

Russia and Ukraine attacked about 86 commercial ships in the Black Sea in Q3, nearly four times the 23 attacked in the first half of 2026. 

Windward scoped 101 ships and verified 93 attacks from January to the end of August, 53 by Ukraine and 40 by Russia, with 75% of them in July and August. The increase came from a change in targeting on both sides. 

In late 2025 Ukraine’s attacks were limited to three vessels, all stateless shadow fleet tankers. By Q3 it was hitting any ship calling at Russian ports, including European-owned vessels in G7 price cap and other lawful trades. 

Seven tankers were struck at the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk, and Russia reported the containership YANINA sunk on 1 Aug. Russia concentrated on ships at Greater Odesa and Reni, carrying out 10 of 16 attacks in September. Four seafarers were killed and two are missing.

The geography changed as well. 

In the 12 months to 21 Sep, 45 merchant vessels were struck outside the Joint War Committee’s previous listed area, 31 of them since 1 Jul. The year before, none were. 

The JWC has since extended the listed area to the whole Black Sea. Turkish-linked ships took about a third of the attacks. Traffic has responded: Greater Odesa cargo handling fell more than fifteenfold after 22 Jul, Bosphorus movements dropped from more than 200 a day to under 30, and 53 million of Russia’s 67 million tonnes of grain-terminal capacity is idle. 

Russia’s dark fleet has largely left the Black Sea: Russian Black Sea port calls by sanctioned and shadow tankers fell from a peak of 267 a quarter to 8 in Q3, and the two anchorages that handled almost all Black Sea ship-to-ship transfers since the invasion are empty.

Truce proposals from Türkiye, the UN, the U.S., India and Egypt have produced no agreement. Going into Q4, any ship linked to Russian or Ukrainian trade is a potential target regardless of its sanctions status.

Attacks

• 93 commercial ships attacked from January to the end of August: 53 by Ukraine, 40 by Russia. 75% occurred in July and August.
• Q3 total including September: about 86. First half of 2026: 23.
• Ukraine’s targeting widened from three specific vessels in late 2025, all stateless shadow fleet tankers, to any ship calling at Russian ports, including European-owned ships in G7 price cap trades.
• Seven tankers struck at the CPC terminal, Novorossiysk.
• Containership YANINA reported sunk by Russia on 1 Aug (IMO Circular Letter No. 5258).
• Russia carried out 10 of 16 attacks in September, mostly on ships at Greater Odesa and Reni.
• Four seafarers killed: on the tug TEDY, on MARIAM M, and on an Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship. Two missing from ARMADA LEADER and AROYAT.
• 45 merchant vessels struck outside the previous JWC listed area in the 12 months to 21 Sep, 31 of them since 1 Jul. None the year before (Ambrey).

Ships Affected

• Turkish-linked ships: about a third of attacks. 14 with a registered owner in Turkey, 33 with a commercial owner there.
• 20 Russia-flagged ships attacked, plus four dark fleet tankers.
• Ukraine claimed 116 small Crimea logistics tankers destroyed in the Sea of Azov under Operation MoLoChKa. 27 verified and counted.

Dark Activity and the Dark Fleet

• 505 tankers and cargo ships recorded dark activity in the Black Sea over 1-26 Aug, against 1,124 in July and 920 a year earlier.
• The Black Sea accounts for 30% of GPS jamming Windward observes worldwide.
• Dark fleet calls at Russian Black Sea ports: peak of 267 a quarter, 8 in Q3.
• Median dark gap for dark fleet vessels rose from about 20 hours to 95.
• Ship-to-ship transfers since the invasion: more than 600, conducted by 86 of the 387 dark fleet tankers that have operated in the Black Sea since February 2022
• The two anchorages that handled almost all STS activity are now empty.

6. Falsely-Flagged Vessels

The number of falsely flagged ships listed by the International Maritime Organization reached 613 by the end of Q3, up 39% since the start of the year. Together they total 24.8 million gross tonnes. 

A falsely flagged ship does one of two things: it registers with a fraudulent registry that has no authority to flag ships, or it broadcasts the flag of a legitimate registry whose maritime administration says it never authorized the vessel. Both appear in the IMO list. 

Guyana is the most used false flag by tonnage, at 15% of the total. Comoros is the most used by ship count, with 81 vessels; Comoros is a legitimate registry whose flag these ships broadcast without authorization. Malawi and Nicaragua follow.

The problem is concentrated in old crude tankers. Tankers of all types make up 95% of falsely flagged tonnage. Crude tankers alone are 77%: 191 ships averaging 23 years old. 

Across the whole list, 569 of 613 ships were built before 2010. Containerships, bulk carriers and general cargo ships are a growing minority by count but a small share of tonnage. Windward analysis shows the two main state users moving in opposite directions. 

Russia stopped using fraudulent registries over the course of 2026. Iran increased its use and extended it to more vessels.

IMO List

• 613 falsely flagged ships at the end of Q3, up 39% since 1 Jan. Total 24.8m GT.
• 42 flag countries falsely claimed; 27 fraudulent registries.
• By tonnage: Guyana 15.2%, Comoros 9.3%, Malawi 8.7%, Nicaragua 8.3%, Curaçao 7.1%.
• By ship count: Comoros 81, Guyana 65, Nicaragua 57, Mali 34, Cameroon 28.
• Comoros is a legitimate registry; the others in the top five are fraudulent.

Ship Types and Age

• Tankers (crude, product, chemical and LPG): 424 ships, 95% of falsely flagged tonnage.
• Crude tankers: 191 ships, 19.1m GT, 77% of tonnage, average age 23 years.
• 569 of 613 ships built before 2010. Median build year 2002.
• General cargo ships: 71 by count but under 1% of tonnage.
• Containerships (14) and bulk carriers (10): rising share, per IMO data.

7. The Dark Fleet

The dark fleet went through its largest structural change since 2023 in Q3: tankers reflagged to Russia in record numbers. Windward’s dark fleet now contains 223 Russia-flagged tankers. Of those, 84 changed MMSI numbers between July and September, indicating a change of flag during the quarter. That is more than four times the reflaggings of Q2 and nearly equals the total tracked since the start of 2025. 

Russia is now the largest flag in the dark fleet, with 18% of vessels by number and 14% by deadweight.

The reflagging follows a sequence. The EU has designated 673 shadow fleet vessels since December 2023, most of them tankers carrying Russian oil and gas, with the UK running a parallel list. Russia’s response in 2024 and 2025 was fraudulent registries. In 2026 that stopped working. U.S., French and Belgian forces boarded or seized at least seven stateless or falsely flagged tankers between January and June, starting with the Marinera, which switched from a false Guyana flag to Russia’s mid-chase in the Atlantic before U.S. forces boarded it on 7 Jan. 

No falsely flagged tanker has loaded a Russian cargo since mid-June. Moving the fleet onto Russia’s own registry gives Moscow direct control of its shipping and removes the legal opening that a false flag creates: a stateless ship can be boarded by anyone, a Russia-flagged ship cannot without a confrontation with Russia. Iran has gone the other way. With a U.S. embargo on its ports stopping its own fleet from trading, Iran has expanded its use of stateless ships.

The dark fleet is concentrated in the mid-sized crude and product tanker classes. One in three Aframaxes and LR2s worldwide is in the dark fleet. Roughly one in four VLCCs and Panamaxes is, and one in five Suezmaxes.

Windward’s Dark Fleet (tankers over 20,000 dwt)

• Aframax and LR2s: 346 ships, 37.4m dwt, 33% of the global class.
• MRs and Handysize: 233 ships, 10m dwt.
• VLCCs: 171 ships, 52.3m dwt, 24% of the global class.
• Suezmaxes: 119 ships, 18.8m dwt, 20% of the global class.
• Panamax and LR1s: 81 ships, 5.8m dwt, 23% of the global class.
• 78% sanctioned by the U.S., UK or EU.
• 248 tankers using fraudulent ship registries, 71 of them VLCCs.
• Russia is the largest flag: 18% by number, 14% by deadweight.

Flags Broadcast by U.S./UK/EU-Sanctioned Tankers Active in the Last 90 Days

• Russia is the most common flag by a wide margin, followed by Sierra Leone (74), Cameroon (64), Iran (63), Equatorial Guinea (39), Panama (38) and Oman (32).
• Fraudulent registries in use: Nicaragua 29, Guyana 28, Netherlands Caribbean 26, Malawi 18, Aruba 13, Guinea 13, Mozambique 13, Botswana 11, Mali 9, Sao Tome and Principe 9, Gambia 8.
• Panama’s stated policy is to deregister all sanctioned tankers.

8. GPS Jamming

Global GPS jamming barely moved in Q3. Daily incidents averaged 5,131 against 5,087 in Q2, a 0.9% rise. But the stability is misleading. 

The number of distinct vessels affected climbed 11.7% to 124,235, the daily range widened at both ends, and September averaged 5,360 a day, the highest month of either quarter, after a quieter July and August. Interference is reaching more ships, more unevenly, and the quarter ended hotter than it began.

The two regions that matter most moved in opposite directions. 

In the Middle East Gulf, jamming spiked with each U.S. strike on Iran. The 1 Sep strike produced the largest spike of the quarter, 1,699 incidents in a single day against a Q3 regional average of 315, and set the global Q3 peak of 6,838 the same day.

In the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, jamming fell through the quarter, from 131.5 vessels a day in July to 47.7 by September, a 64% decline. 

Global

• Q3 daily average: 5,131 incidents, against 5,087 in Q2 (+0.9%).
• Q3 daily range: 3,987 to 6,838, wider than Q2’s 4,361 to 6,235.
• September: 5,360 a day, the highest month of either quarter.
• Distinct vessels affected: 124,235, up from 111,212 (+11.7%).

Middle East Gulf

• Jamming peaked during each U.S. strike on Iran.
• 1 Sep: 1,699 incidents, the highest single day of the quarter.
• The same day set the global Q3 peak of 6,838.
• Daily regional average: 314.92 in Q3, 329.38 in Q2.

Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb

• Q3: 78.57 vessels a day, against 94.81 in Q2 (-17%).
• July: 131.5 vessels a day.
• September: 47.7 vessels a day (-64% from July).
• The decline coincides with reduced AIS transmission and with transiting vessels broadcasting their non-involvement in the conflict.

Looking Ahead

None of the eight risks in this report is resolved going into Q4. Hormuz traffic depends on U.S. escorts that Iran has shown it will attack, and the ships on Iran’s list are the ones most likely to be hit next.

The Houthi blockade on Saudi-linked shipping has no end date, and Saudi tankers are still going around the Cape. In the Black Sea, any ship calling at a Russian or Ukrainian port is a target regardless of sanctions status, and truce talks have produced nothing. The eight tankers the U.S. destroyed in September and the ten ships Iran struck in reply have not been assessed for spills, so the Gulf’s Q3 pollution figures will rise after the fact.

Russia’s 223 reflagged tankers mean the next boarding of a dark fleet vessel is a confrontation with the Russian state, not a stateless ship. And the first weeks of October have already shown the pattern continuing: Iranian strikes on 2 Oct, GPS jamming in September at its highest monthly level of the year. Windward’s MIOC is tracking all eight risks into Q4 and will report as they develop.

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