Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Monthly Intelligence Report I  October 2026

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Security Worries Reshape Russia’s September Oil Exports

Russia shipped 142.7 million barrels of crude, clean petroleum products (CPP), and fuel oil in September, according to Windward analysis using Vortexa data. Crude made up 110.4m barrels, a pace of some 3.7m barrels per day, broadly level with the prior month, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported as 3.78m bpd.

CPP accounted for 14.9m barrels, mostly naphtha (9.8m), and fuel oil and feedstocks for 17.4m.

For the third consecutive month, no oil cargoes were loaded on falsely flagged tankers, confirming that Russia has discontinued their use. Tankers have shifted to other registries, with record numbers reflagging to Russia over the third quarter in what is one of the most significant developments seen for the shadow fleet since 2022. 

Sanctioned Tankers Carry More Than Half of Russia’s Oil

Sanctioned vessels carried 78m barrels, 55% of the total, and 63% of the crude. EU-owned tankers carried 31.5m barrels (22%), and the remaining 23% moved on unsanctioned shadow fleet or other tonnage. The split varies sharply by product. EU-owned ships carried 57% of fuel oil and 41% of CPP, but only 14% of crude. This reflects the higher price of Urals, which is well above the $44.10 EU and UK price cap level.

EU-Owned Tankers Concentrate in the Baltic as September Loadings Fall

Nine in ten barrels shipped on EU-owned tonnage (28.8m of 31.5m) were loaded at the Baltic ports of Primorsk, Ust-Luga, St. Petersburg, and Vysotsk. There, EU-owned ships carried 37% of everything lifted. Elsewhere, they barely featured, with 3% of Far East volumes and nothing on Arctic crude.

Loadings on EU-owned tankers also fell throughout the month, from 20.5m barrels in September 1-15 to 11.1m in September 16-30, a drop of 46%. The steepest fall was in clean products, from 5.2m to 1.0m barrels, reflecting the ongoing export ban on gasoline and diesel following Ukrainian attacks on refineries.

Russia banned exports of gasoline in April and introduced the first-ever bans on jet fuel in mid-June, with diesel following in mid-July. The bans were extended to September 30. Russia previously exported about half its diesel and gasoil, according to the IEA.

Russian Black Sea Crude Moves on Sanctioned Tankers

68% of the 7.4m barrels of Russian oil lifted from the Black Sea was on sanctioned tankers. All 4.3m barrels of Russian crude, Urals and Siberian Light from Novorossiysk’s Sheskharis terminal, moved on sanctioned ships.

EU-owned tankers carried only diesel, moving 1.2m barrels in six cargoes on five medium-range tankers. None of them loaded after September 12, and later diesel cargoes went to sanctioned vessels. As Ukraine steps up drone attacks on tankers shipping Russian oil in the Black Sea, deteriorating security conditions mean fewer EU-owned tankers are willing to work in the region.

Sanctioned Tonnage Dominates Arctic and Far East Loadings

Arctic crude moves almost entirely on sanctioned tonnage, which lifted 84% of Murmansk crude loadings. In the Far East, sanctioned ships carried 61% and unsanctioned shadow fleet tankers 32%. In Kozmino, 30 tankers loaded 33.4m barrels of ESPO crude, most delivered to China.

Ship-to-Ship Transfers Obscure Cargo Origins

Nakhodka Bay handled 8.7m barrels via ship-to-ship transfer. Every barrel of Sokol crude loaded at De-Kastri (5.7m) was transferred there. Two shuttle tankers owned by Sovcomflot transferred cargoes to larger ships. Port Said, Egypt, handled 2.3m barrels, mostly Russian crude loaded at Novorossiysk.

The area off Ceuta near the Strait of Gibraltar was also used for ship-to-ship transfers of naphtha parcels, with some shipped on as many as three tankers, making their origin harder to trace.

VLCCs Rely on Transfers and Unsanctioned Tonnage

Five very large crude carriers (VLCCs) shipped Russian crude over the month.

Three VLCCs took on cargo by ship-to-ship transfer in Nakhodka Bay. A U.S.-sanctioned VLCC loaded Urals by ship-to-ship transfer at Port Said, and a fifth VLCC loaded Arctic crude at Murmansk.

Four of the five, carrying 85% of the VLCC volume, are shadow fleet tankers that have not been sanctioned.

The Sanctioned Fleet Turns to the Russian Flag

The sanctioned fleet is increasingly Russian-flagged. Russia flagged 46 of the 101 sanctioned tankers tracked by Windward over September shipping Russian oil.

Of the 55% of Russian oil that was loaded on sanctioned ships (78.0m bbl), 43% was on Russian-flagged ships (33.4m bbl).

Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Oman, and Equatorial Guinea flagged most of the rest.

Record Reflagging to Russia Reshapes the Shadow Fleet

Windward’s Dark Fleet (over 20,000 dwt) comprises approximately 1,229 tankers and accounts for 25% of all tankers above 55,000 dwt in the internationally trading global fleet. 

The shadow fleet is undergoing one of the most comprehensive structural changes since 2023, as tankers reflagged to Russia in record numbers over the third quarter of 2026.

There are now 223 Russia-flagged tankers in Windward’s Dark Fleet (over 20,000 dwt), with 84 changing MMSI numbers, indicating a change of flag between July and September.

This is more than four times the prior quarter and nearly equals the total number of Russia reflaggings tracked since the beginning of 2025.

This is the clearest signal yet that Russia intends to take greater control of its shipping and logistics now that European and UK regulators have sanctioned nearly 700 tankers carrying the federation’s oil and gas in the past two and a half years.

Sanctions led Russia to use fraudulent ship registries in 2024 and 2025, as tankers were expelled from legitimate ship registries following diplomatic outreach by the EU, U.S., and UK to the flag states’ governments.

Russia’s move to its own register is a response to the interdiction or seizure of more than a dozen falsely flagged ships by naval forces in 2026.

Falsely Flagged Ships Climb to 613

The number of falsely flagged ships listed by the International Maritime Organization increased to 613 by the end of the third quarter, up 39% since the start of the year.

Measured by gross tonnage, Guyana was the most-used false flag, followed by Comoros and Malawi. 15% of falsely flagged ships (by gross tonnage) falsely fly the Guyana flag.

Comoros is a legitimate registry. Falsely flagged vessels can either use a fraudulent ship registry or falsely broadcast the flag of a country whose maritime administration says they are not authorized to fly it.

There were 42 different flag countries and 27 fraudulent ship registries. Measured by gross tonnage, 95% of falsely flagged ships are crude, product, and LPG tankers, numbering 413 ships. Increasing numbers of containerships, bulk carriers, and general cargo ships are also using fraudulent registries, according to IMO data.

A U.S. Diesel Waiver Finds Little Russian Diesel to Buy

On October 9, the U.S. issued General License No. 135, which temporarily authorizes the sale and import of Russia’s diesel and gasoil until April 2027.

Despite the headlines, there isn’t any Russian diesel or gasoil to buy. Only a few cargoes are likely available for import to the U.S. right now, volumes unlikely to ease the global shortage or meaningfully influence U.S. domestic prices.

Russia’s diesel and gasoil exports cratered over the third quarter, falling to 190,000 bpd, Vortexa data show. That compares with 690,000 bpd in the second quarter and 850,000 bpd in the first. Russia extended its export ban from gasoline to diesel in July to address domestic shortfalls after attacks on refineries in 2026 left 51% of capacity offline, according to Ukraine’s Defense Ministry as of October 4.

Shortages were so acute that Russia imported diesel, gasoil, and gasoline over the third quarter. The most recent diesel import was seen on October 7, with 150,000 barrels imported to the Russian port of Vysotsk on a Russia-flagged medium-range tanker.

The tanker had taken the cargo by ship-to-ship transfer at Port Said, Egypt, from a second tanker that had loaded the diesel at the Moroccan port of Tangier.

There were 10.5m barrels of Russian diesel on the water or in floating storage, according to Vortexa, as of October 10, well below the three-year average of 17m barrels. The six-month license duration suggests that the U.S. administration doesn’t see freedom of navigation being restored to the Strait of Hormuz any time soon.

UK Expands Russia Sanctions as LNG Policy Divergence With EU Rises

The UK designated eight vessels on October 2 and 12 tankers on October 8. The October 2 designations included three liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers that had not been sanctioned before and form what the UK government called a “dangerous new shadow fleet” used by the Kremlin for gas exports.

Windward has identified a fleet of 29 LNG carriers that form part of Russia’s expanding LNG shadow fleet, including at least eight purchased this year. 

Three of these newly purchased LNG carriers were sanctioned by the UK in June. The October 2 designation means that all but one of the 29 vessels in the Russian LNG shadow fleet tracked by Windward are under some form of U.S., UK, or EU sanctions, or a combination thereof.

Of the eight vessels sanctioned on October 2, six were LNG carriers. The other two were a bunkering tanker and a Sri Lankan-flagged crew boat.

Two of the LNG carriers were Russia-flagged ice-classed ships delivered this year and in 2025 from Russia’s Zvezda shipyard on the eastern seaboard. Both were already sanctioned by the U.S. The EU had sanctioned only one of the vessels.

The designations reflect the UK’s harder line on LNG exports from Russia and increasing policy divergence with the EU. The divergence comes amid a looming winter gas supply crunch in Europe, as the continued partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz restricts exports from Qatar.

The UK has sanctioned more Russia-trading LNG carriers than any other regulatory body over the past 18 months, including three Greece-owned vessels that were involved in Russian Arctic LNG trades. 

From January 1, providing maritime services to vessels in Russian LNG trades will be banned in the UK, while the EU has allowed a partial exemption until July 2027 that affects one shipowner. The UK has extended exemptions allowing Japan and South Korea to continue importing LNG from the Sakhalin-2 project.

The targeting of a Tanzania-flagged bunkering tanker is more closely aligned with EU moves. The tanker was sanctioned by the EU in July for supplying fuel oil to sanctioned, Russia-trading vessels.

Windward’s platform tracked the bunkering tanker, which had previously been operating under a different name, meeting with more than a dozen sanctioned tankers in waters off Port Said, Egypt, in the second half of 2025, alongside multiple dark activities in the Mediterranean thereafter. The tanker remains off Aliaga, Türkiye, where it arrived in mid-September. No further supply meetings were visible on AIS.

Unlike Russia’s shadow fleet of tankers shipping oil, the Kremlin’s LNG fleet is more visible and easier to track. All second-hand LNG carriers were ultimately reflagged to Russia after purchase or used friendly flag jurisdictions, such as Sierra Leone.

A Sri Lankan-flagged offshore supply and crew boat serviced eight sanctioned shadow fleet tankers off Galle, Sri Lanka, between October 2025 and July 2026. All counterparty vessels were sanctioned by OFAC, the UK, or the EU and engaged in Iran and Russia sanctions evasion. This crew-boat servicing pattern appears to be the basis for the UK designation.

This appears to be the first crew vessel to be sanctioned for Russia sanctions circumvention and is a further demonstration of regulators and governments extending their reach beyond shadow fleet tankers shipping oil to those supplying them.

On the surface, the UK sanctions appear to lack real reach, as the main prohibitions bar the vessel from UK ports and ban UK marine service providers from dealing with it. This would be unlikely to bother a small ship that would not leave Sri Lankan territorial waters. There may, however, be a trickle-down impact on the vessel’s UAE-based manager, a well-known agent whose website lists membership in shipowner groups Intertanko and BIMCO.

The designation also serves as a warning for other supply and bunkering vessels that may be servicing Russian tankers elsewhere. Windward has tracked bunker suppliers in Türkiye providing fuel oil to sanctioned tankers, for example.

The designation will likely hit hardest in Sri Lanka, where some 26 Iran-linked tankers have remained at anchorage just outside territorial waters for more than a month. These tankers are subject to a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports, in place since mid-July, which prevents them from trading or returning to Iran via the Gulf of Oman. This may lead other suppliers to reconsider their policies on bunkering, crewing, and other assistance while the tankers remain off the coast.

All 12 tankers from the UK’s October 8 designations were already sanctioned by the EU, the U.S., or a combination of both, and bring the total designated by the UK government over the past 28 months to more than 600. There was one Aframax, four Panamaxes, and four smaller medium-range or handysize product tankers on the list. Five are trading in the Black Sea, one in the Caspian, and four in the Arctic region.

An Iranian Containership Loops Twice Through the English Channel

An Iranian-flagged, U.S.-sanctioned containership executed a double U-turn in the middle of the English Channel twice, first on a northbound transit to the Russian port of St. Petersburg and again on its southbound return 17 days later. This is a highly unusual sailing pattern for which there is no apparent maritime rationale.

The unusual and likely provocative trajectory of an Iran-linked containership in the English Channel comes against a backdrop of extreme geopolitical tension between Iran and the UK.

The two double U-turns took place on September 19-20 and October 6-8. Iran’s commercial ships have the right of innocent passage under international maritime law, allowing them to sail in the English Channel. This voyage brought the ship as close as 6 nautical miles, or about 11 km, to UK shores.

On September 27, UK police arrested five British men and thwarted a planned attack on RAF Fairford, which hosted U.S. bombers. Further arrests were reported later at another UK airbase. The U.S. withdrew its planes from Fairford amid reports that Iran planned drone strikes from within the UK.

How the Two Loops Unfolded

On September 19, the containership made a double U-turn in the English Channel as it sailed northbound, turning south off the Thames approaches around 16:50 UTC and then turning again near the Isle of Wight around 10:00 UTC on September 20 to sail north toward the Danish Straits. The loop added about 34 hours and 150 nautical miles to the voyage.

Extraordinarily, the containership repeated the same maneuver on its return voyage, executing almost the same loop in reverse after departing St. Petersburg on September 29.

On October 6, the containership made its first U-turn at about 12:35 UTC while sailing southbound, some 20 nautical miles south of the Isle of Wight. It sailed northbound overnight, turned again on October 7, and passed its first turning point around 19:45 UTC. The loop added 31 hours to the voyage before the vessel exited the Channel.

The containership was among 52 vessels, including 22 containerships, owned by Hossein Shamkhani and sanctioned by the U.S. in July 2025. Shamkhani, an Iranian oil trader known as “Hector,” is the son of the late Ali Shamkhani, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, who was killed in the U.S.-Israeli strikes on February 28, 2026. The UK sanctioned Shamkhani in August 2025.

The vessel is used exclusively for Russia–Iran trade, with its only recorded calls in the past two years at Novorossiysk and St. Petersburg. A U.S. blockade reimposed on Iranian ports in mid-July will likely prevent its return to Iran. The last tracked call was at the Black Sea Russian port of Novorossiysk, likely in late August.

Analysis by Michelle Wiese Bockmann, MIOC Senior Maritime Intelligence Analyst, Windward.

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