MIOC INTELLIGENCE
Two Supply Lines, One Terminal: 12 Sanctioned Tankers at the Houthi-Controlled Ras Issa
What’s inside?
This analysis was produced by Windward’s Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC), combining Maritime AI™ platform data, satellite imagery, coastal camera intelligence, and wet-cargo data. The observation window is between September 16 and November 7, 2026.
Between September 16 and November 7, 2026, Windward MIOC identified 12 sanctioned tankers delivering fuel to Ras Issa, the Houthi-controlled oil terminal on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, together carrying an estimated 3.26 million barrels.
Eleven of the twelve had their AIS switched off when Windward found them. Five broadcast false positions ranging from 80 to 2,800 nautical miles away. All 12 were already sanctioned. Eleven of them carry U.S. designations.
Tracing the cargo back from the terminal, Windward found two distinct supply lines, one carrying Russian diesel and other fuels south through the Suez Canal, and one carrying Iranian-origin cargo out of the Middle East Gulf. This brief sets out what Windward identified across each supply line and how the tankers concealed themselves.
What Happened
Twelve Sanctioned Tankers, Eleven of Them Dark
Across the seven-week window, Windward identified 12 sanctioned tankers at the Houthi-controlled Ras Issa terminal and the nearby Salif anchorage. All 12 were already on sanctions lists at the time of identification, 11 of them under U.S. programs. Five were designated under counter-terrorism (SDGT), four under the Iran program, four under Russia programs across U.S., UK, and EU lists, and one under the Venezuela program.
Two tankers carry both Iran and Russia sanctions. Three were sanctioned specifically for supplying Ras Issa, and eight were repeat suppliers to Ras Issa or Yemen. The average vessel age was 25 years, with two built in 1993. The 12 tankers sailed under 11 different flags, including the landlocked states of Malawi, Mali, and Botswana.
Eleven of the twelve had their AIS switched off while at the terminal. Five broadcast false positions while sitting off Ras Issa, ranging from 80 nautical miles away (mid-Red Sea) to 2,800 nautical miles away (between Sri Lanka and Malaysia).
Cargo on two of the tankers reached Ras Issa through chains of ship-to-ship transfers. One tanker has been dark since May 30, 2026. At least four additional tankers were seen at the anchorage on November 7 and have not yet been identified.
The Northern Supply Line: Russian Diesel Through Three Transfers
The northern supply line carried fuel south from Russia’s Black Sea ports through the Suez Canal, with cargo frequently changing hands off Port Said or in the Gulf of Suez before moving down the Red Sea to Ras Issa. Six of the 12 tankers took this route, carrying an estimated 1.57 million barrels between them.
The route carries more than Russian cargo. Gulf-loaded gasoline also changes hands at the northern transfer points before heading south.
One case illustrates the pattern end to end: On June 9, about 130,400 barrels of Russian diesel was loaded at Taman onto a Russian-flagged tanker sanctioned under Russia programs. Between September 11 and 20, the cargo passed through three ship-to-ship transfers, one off Port Said and two in the Gulf of Suez, each between Russian-flagged tankers sanctioned under Russia programs. Cargo data and draught changes matched at every step.
The final tanker in the chain, ASTRA (IMO 9296585), a U.S.- and UK-sanctioned Russian-flagged product tanker built in 2005, carried the cargo south. It anchored off Djibouti for 17.5 days, declared “SUEZ” as its destination and turned north while still laden, then went dark 39 nautical miles from Ras Issa on October 14 and stayed dark for 26 days.
Windward identified it at the Ras Issa mooring buoy on high-resolution imagery between October 30 and November 5, with a floating hose alongside, consistent with discharge. Electro-optical imagery matched it again in port on November 5. It reappeared on AIS on November 9, 180 nautical miles north of Ras Issa, heading up the Red Sea.
One tanker on the northern route is the sole fully AIS-visible vessel among the 12. MD MIRANDA (IMO 9198290), a Gambia-flagged product tanker built in 1999, is sanctioned by the UK and EU as part of Russia’s shadow fleet under Russia programs.
It made three Ras Issa port calls in 2026, in February, March, and July. In April, it went dark for four days off Novorossiysk, then sailed back via the Bosporus and Suez to Ras Issa, most likely with Russian cargo. MD MIRANDA broadcast openly from the Salif anchorage throughout the observation window.
The Southern Supply Line: Iranian LPG Through the Strait of Hormuz
The southern supply line carried Iranian LPG out of the Middle East Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, across the Arabian Sea, and into the Red Sea through Bab el-Mandeb. Five of the 12 tankers took this route, carrying an estimated 1.3 million barrels.
Three of those tankers were LPG carriers that loaded in Iran and were later identified in the Ras Issa area. Together they carried about 770,000 barrels of LPG. All three were sanctioned, and all three were dark when Windward identified them at the terminal.
The clearest case is SARAH (IMO 9014420), a Comoros-flagged LPG carrier built in 1993. SARAH was designated by OFAC under the counter-terrorism SDGT program in April 2025 for supplying LPG to Ras Issa. Windward assesses that SARAH discharged at Ras Issa on November 5.
On August 2, 2026, it entered the Middle East Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Its AIS sent 46 positions at 0°N 0°E, indicating GPS jamming, over 3.3 hours before reappearing in Iranian territorial waters 44 nautical miles further on. It then anchored for about 10 days off Bandar Imam Khomeini while broadcasting an Iraqi destination.
On August 15, it loaded about 114,600 barrels of LPG in Iran, declaring Kamaran, the island off Ras Issa, as its first destination before changing to Iraq. On August 16 and 17, Windward observed impossible position jumps off the United Arab Emirates as it exited the Strait of Hormuz. Its AIS never went off. It broadcast false positions throughout.
On November 5, Windward identified SARAH dark at the Ras Issa terminal berth, while its AIS placed it anchored off Shinas, Oman, more than 1,500 nautical miles away by sea.
Two other LPG carriers loaded in Iran contributed the remaining volume. One loaded about 521,000 barrels on May 31 while declaring a destination in China. The other loaded about 133,800 barrels on August 19, declaring Kamaran, and crossed Bab el-Mandeb with its AIS off. Across all three tankers, about 770,000 barrels of Iranian LPG reached the Ras Issa area during the observation window.
An Estimated 3.26 Million Barrels Across Seven Weeks
Across the 12 identified tankers, Windward estimates total deliveries at about 3.26 million barrels.
About 1.94 million barrels is confirmed by wet-cargo data for seven of the tankers. The remaining 1.31 million barrels is estimated for the other five, using deadweight at 95% capacity and seven barrels per ton, counted at half to reflect the part-laden pattern seen in the tankers with known cargo. One tanker in the set that had known cargo carried about 40% of capacity; another carried about a third. The estimate assumes each tanker discharged its full cargo at Ras Issa and counts each tanker once.
Roughly half the fuel came down from the north, and four in ten came up from the south.
One tanker’s origin is undetermined, carrying an estimated 391,000 barrels. By fuel type, Iranian LPG accounted for about 769,000 barrels, Middle East Gulf (potentially Iranian) gasoline for about 585,000, fuel oil for about 176,000, and Russian-origin diesel traced end to end for about 130,400. About 1.6 million barrels moved on tankers whose cargo type was not independently confirmed.
A Houthi-controlled floating storage tanker anchored three nautical miles off the terminal has received at least one million barrels of mostly Russian-origin products, according to Lloyd’s List.
A Congested Terminal
Wait times between arrival and discharge ranged from two and a half weeks to more than five months. One tanker has been anchored off Ras Issa, dark, since the end of May 2026. Another was seen in the area 12 times over 60 days. A third waited about four weeks before it moored at the terminal.
The queue points to limited discharge capacity at Ras Issa since the 2025 strikes, and the predictability it creates makes the anchorage a reliable place to find the vessels operating on this route.
How Windward Identified Them
An AIS-only view of the Ras Issa terminal across this seven-week window would have shown one tanker: MD MIRANDA, broadcasting openly from the Salif anchorage. Windward identified more. The gap between the one and the twelve is what this report is about, and it rests on four capabilities applied together.
The first is identifying dark vessels from satellite imagery. Eleven of the twelve tankers had their AIS switched off at the terminal and were identified by matching dark hulls in high-resolution and satellite imagery against known vessel references, a capability powered by Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence.
The matching rests on sophisticated algorithms developed by Windward MIOC that compare hull geometry, length-to-beam ratios, deck features, and shadow signatures against a reference library of known vessels. Candidates that do not meet strict confidence criteria are omitted. ASTRA was identified at the Ras Issa mooring buoy for over 26 days with its AIS off. SARAH was identified at the Ras Issa berth on November 5 while its AIS placed it more than 1,500 nautical miles away.
The remaining three capabilities cross-check and enrich what the imagery surfaces.
The second is tracking cargo from where it is loaded to where it is delivered, including across ship-to-ship transfer chains. Windward followed about 130,400 barrels of Russian diesel from the Taman loading on June 9, through three Russian-flagged tankers sanctioned under Russia programs, to ASTRA. Cargo data and draught changes matched at every step. The same approach followed three LPG cargoes totaling about 770,000 barrels from loading in Iran to the Ras Issa area.
The third is detecting falsified AIS. A vessel broadcasting openly can still be reporting a false position, and five of the 12 did so. SARAH broadcast as anchored off Shinas, Oman, while imagery placed it at the Ras Issa berth more than 1,500 nautical miles away. Impossible position jumps, fixed positions in open ocean, and declared destinations inconsistent with cargo records are the signatures Windward tracked across the five.
The fourth is the fusion of these inputs with analyst review. Satellite imagery, coastal camera intelligence, wet-cargo data, and AIS behavior analytics each show a part of the picture. The 12 identifications hold because each was built from more than one source and reviewed by MIOC analysts.
What It Signals
Across the two supply lines, the ownership picture is where the Russian and Iranian lines diverge most sharply. Four of the 12 tankers at Ras Issa, plus three in the transfer chain that delivered cargo to ASTRA, are sanctioned under Russia programs.
The Houthi-controlled floating storage anchored off the terminal has received mostly Russian-origin products, per Lloyd’s List. Windward assesses that this pattern may reflect Russian state-tolerated or coordinated support for the Houthis. One possible motive is safe passage through Bab el-Mandeb for Russian-linked shipping, consistent with publicly reported Houthi assurances to Russian-linked vessels. Confidence is low to moderate, as Windward sees vessels, cargo, and routes, not intent.
The Iranian supply line runs on a different playbook. The cargo is predominantly Iranian LPG. The tankers are already sanctioned for moving Iranian- or Houthi-bound fuel. The concealment pattern is consistent across the three tankers. They used falsified AIS rather than switched-off AIS through the Strait of Hormuz, declared false destinations in Iraq and China, and went dark across Bab el-Mandeb. Windward assesses that the Iranian line is resilient and adaptive, and its vessel movements cannot be followed on AIS alone.
Analysis by Yaniv Assayag, MIOC Team Lead, Windward.
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The vessel identifiers, ownership entities, specific transfer points, and network relationships in the full report have been redacted for public distribution, except for three tankers Windward has named in the analysis. To access the full report or to discuss ongoing intelligence coverage and ad-hoc forensic deep dives tailored to your operational theater, get in touch below.