Ukraine’s Drones Reach Western Tonnage in the Black Sea as Saudi Diversions Around the Cape Widen

At a Glance

• Ukrainian sea drones struck BOURDA, a Liberian-flagged Greek-owned Aframax tanker near Taman on August 1, one of the first confirmed strikes on a vessel not part of Russia’s own shadow fleet, following five Western-affiliated tankers previously struck at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal between July 17 and 30.
• Two separate projectile incidents were reported at the same location approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, within 24 hours, with one crew member reported missing.
• Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi described Oman-mediated Hormuz transit talks as nearing completion, referencing a new corridor neither the northern nor the southern route.
• Eight OFAC-sanctioned Iranian-flagged tankers carrying approximately 8.56 million barrels of Iranian crude are dark around Malaysia’s Eastern Outer Port Limits ship-to-ship transfer zone.
• Eight Saudi-flagged VLCCs and two bulk carriers are now diverting via the Cape of Good Hope, adding approximately 14 sailing days and $600,000 in fuel oil costs per voyage.
• Operation IRINI conducted its second flag verification boarding in 11 days, boarding the sanctioned TOA PAYOH tanker falsely broadcasting a Cameroon flag.

Operational Overview

Two parallel adaptations are now visibly reshaping the world’s crude flows. In the Black Sea, Ukraine’s drone campaign has widened beyond Russia’s own shadow fleet to Western-affiliated vessels legally operating under the G7 Oil Price Cap, with a Greek-owned tanker struck near Taman on August 1 and five Western-affiliated tankers previously struck at the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk between July 17 and 30. Kazakh crude exports were temporarily suspended, and insurance and routing calculations across the entire Black Sea now sit under review.

In the Red Sea, Saudi diversions via the Cape of Good Hope have expanded, with eight Saudi-flagged VLCCs and two bulk carriers rerouting around the African continent to avoid a single strait. At Hormuz, the eastern approach is under sustained kinetic pressure, with two projectile incidents at the same Khasab coordinates within 24 hours as Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi described Oman-mediated transit talks as nearing completion. Iranian crude exports continue at scale through offshore ship-to-ship laundering, with eight OFAC-sanctioned Iranian-flagged tankers carrying approximately 8.56 million barrels dark around Malaysia’s EOPL.

Windward assesses the operational risk environment across the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean as Critical across all theaters simultaneously, with kinetic activity recurring at the same coordinates within days, structural commercial diversions hardening across two continents, and enforcement gaps continuing to define the Iranian export pipeline.

Ukraine’s Black Sea Drone Campaign Widens to Western-Affiliated Targets

Ukrainian sea drones struck BOURDA (IMO 9312846), a Liberian-flagged Greek-owned Aframax tanker, near Taman on August 1 while the vessel was reportedly sailing to load Russian oil. This is one of the first confirmed strikes on a vessel not part of Russia’s own shadow fleet. The same operation sank YANINA (IMO 9301304), a Rosatom-linked 962-TEU container ship, approximately 130 nautical miles off Novorossiysk.

Five Western-affiliated tankers were previously struck at or near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk between July 17 and 30, through which approximately 1.5 million barrels per day of Kazakh crude was shipped last month per Vortexa. The strikes included NORDIC ZENITH (IMO 9588469), a Liberia-flagged Suezmax owned by U.S.-listed Nordic American Tankers, struck July 17; ASIA (IMO 9905318) and NISSOS IOS (IMO 9884045), struck July 20; NISSOS SIFNOS (IMO 9884045) and MARATHI (IMO 9772357), struck July 30. 

Kazakh crude exports were temporarily suspended following the strikes, though two tankers were seen transmitting AIS while loading at the CPC terminal on August 4. Ukraine’s Operation MoLoChKa, launched July 6, initially focused on smaller tankers in the Sea of Azov supporting Crimean logistics before expanding to commercial vessels at Novorossiysk.

The widening of Ukrainian drone strikes to Western-affiliated vessels legally facilitating Russian oil exports under the G7 Oil Price Cap represents a significant escalation in the campaign’s target set, with implications for war risk insurance and vessel routing across the entire Black Sea.

Two Projectile Incidents at the Same Hormuz Approach in 24 Hours

Two separate projectile incidents were reported at the same location approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, within 24 hours, establishing a pattern of sustained kinetic activity at the Hormuz eastern approach.

On August 2, UKMTO reported an explosion in close proximity to a tanker approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, Oman, with all crew and the vessel reported safe. Open-source tracking identified VELOS AMBER (IMO 9571038), a Marshall Islands-flagged oil products tanker last seen approaching Hormuz via the U.S.-designated shipping route along the Omani coast before its AIS went dark, as the likely candidate, though UKMTO did not officially confirm the vessel’s identity. 

Windward tracking shows the vessel continuing to sail normally following the incident, having transited the Strait dark and resumed AIS transmission afterward, with no course or speed anomaly detected. The vessel is assessed as having suffered minor damage or being unaffected, in ballast from Saesan, South Korea toward Jebel Ali, UAE per Vortexa.

On August 3 at 22:00 UTC, UKMTO issued Warning 104-26 after a cargo vessel broadcast on VHF Channel 16 that it had been struck by an unknown projectile approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. UKMTO classified the incident as an attack and advised vessels to transit with caution. The vessel involved was identified as the Liberian-flagged bulker MINOAN PIONEER, with one crew member reported missing following a distress call received by a nearby Panama-flagged tanker. 

UKMTO WARNING 104-26

Click here to view the full product⤵️ https://t.co/YeKyizmufu#MaritimeSecurity #MarSec pic.twitter.com/oeaeGR2ENg

— UKMTO Operations Centre (@UK_MTO) August 3, 2026

The identity, damage status, and projectile origin have not been officially confirmed by the UKMTO. Prior kinetic attacks at this exact location have been Iranian in origin, though Iran denies involvement and points to ongoing Oman-mediated talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that negotiations with Oman regarding a new Hormuz transit route are nearing completion, describing a corridor neither the northern nor the southern route.

IRGC High-Speed Craft Activity Spikes to Second-Highest Day on Record

EO imagery collected over the Strait of Hormuz on August 4 at 06:39 UTC identified an IRGC high-speed craft swarm of 5 craft in the center corridor and 8 vessels in the southern corridor. The stationary dark tanker cluster above Larak Island grew slightly from 18 to 19 vessels compared to the prior collection, with 15 dark and non-transmitting, 14 in ballast, and 5 laden.

The IRGC high-speed craft tracker through August 1 documented a significant escalation. After the July 21 peak of 219 craft decayed to 24 on July 26 and 6 on July 27, a second independent step-up occurred on July 30 with 73 craft, 36 in the northern corridor and 37 in the southern corridor simultaneously, the first day with simultaneous north-and-south elevation and the third-largest boxed reading in the tracker’s history. On August 1, approximately 249 craft were documented across both corridors, 106 northern and 143 southern, the second-largest single-day total in the tracker’s entire history.

Iranian Dark Fleet Converges on Malaysia EOPL

Eight OFAC-sanctioned Iranian-flagged tankers are dark or recently dark around Malaysia’s Eastern Outer Port Limits ship-to-ship transfer zone, approximately 70 kilometers off Johor. Seven are currently dark, with dark onset dates clustering between July 2 and August 1. The eighth resurfaced on July 31 after a 28-day dark period.

According to Vortexa, the fleet carries a combined approximately 8.56 million barrels of Iranian crude loaded in 2026, with cargoes predominantly loaded at Kharg Island and assessed as undergoing ship-to-ship discharge to counterparty vessels at the EOPL before onward routing to Chinese ports. Cargo details per Vortexa include one vessel carrying approximately 1.99 million barrels of crude loaded at Kharg Island on July 6 with an estimated China arrival of August 13, one carrying approximately 2.01 million barrels loaded at Kharg Island on March 7 with an estimated China arrival of August 14, and one carrying approximately 1.70 million barrels loaded at Kharg Island on June 20 with an estimated China arrival of August 27. Two vessels in ballast are assessed as returning toward Khor Fakkan STS following discharge.

The Malaysia EOPL sits outside Malaysian territorial waters but within its EEZ, where limited radar tracking and enforcement coverage makes it the preferred zone for large-scale illicit ship-to-ship transfers. All eight vessels show multiple extended dark periods across 2026 ranging from 7 to 131 days, assessed as systematic operational practice rather than opportunistic evasion. 

Operation IRINI’s Second Flag Verification Boarding in 11 Days

An Italian frigate boarded TOA PAYOH (IMO 9298492), an EU, UK, and U.S.-sanctioned medium-range tanker under Operation IRINI on August 2, west of Pantelleria in the Mediterranean. The vessel is falsely registered as Madagascar-flagged in the EU’s Equasis database but has been broadcasting a Cameroon flag since March per Windward data. The captain initially refused to cooperate, requiring boarding by helicopter supported by a Greek vessel and Polish patrol aircraft. The vessel was sailing in ballast following delivery of a cargo of Russian diesel to Cotonou, Benin, per Vortexa, and was likely heading for Novorossiysk despite declaring Turkey as its destination.

This is the second Operation IRINI flag verification boarding in 11 days, following the boarding of SOUTH STAR (IMO 9263186) on July 20, and brings the total of Russia shadow fleet tankers boarded by EU forces to 18 since December 2024 and 15 in 2026. Unlike French, Swedish, UK, and Belgian interdictions that have resulted in vessel seizures, Operation IRINI has no seizure authority and released the vessel after inspection. 

Boardings are conducted under UNCLOS Article 110, which permits boarding of vessels suspected of being stateless, including those flying false flags or using fraudulent registries. EU member states have authorized Operation ATALANTA to begin flag verification boardings alongside IRINI, per EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas on July 22.

Bab el-Mandeb Stabilizes as Saudi Diversions Expand

Bab el-Mandeb crossings have stabilized at a new lower baseline rather than continuing to decline. The July 27 to August 2 window averaged 37.3 crossings per day — essentially flat against the 37.2 per day post-announcement average from July 20 to 26 — and approximately 22% below the pre-announcement baseline of 47.8 per day. Tanker traffic ticked up modestly from 10.5 to 11.9 per day while Saudi-linked crossings continued to ease, averaging 0.86 per day in the continuation window against 1.0 per day post-announcement and 1.83 per day pre-announcement. Three of the seven continuation days recorded zero Saudi-linked crossings. The two populations are diverging — the broader fleet has stopped shrinking while Saudi-linked traffic continues to contract, consistent with a durable targeted effect rather than a general corridor-wide dip.

An Indian-flagged VLCC carried approximately 2.05 million barrels of Saudi crude loaded at Yanbu toward Vadinar, India, per Vortexa, running dark on AIS for more than 10 consecutive days spanning arrival, loading at Yanbu, and the full Bab el-Mandeb transit, resuming visible tracking only after clearing the strait. The sustained dark posture is assessed as a defensive measure against Houthi targeting rather than a technical outage, with the Indian flag and government operator identity providing partial cover. 

Four tankers with only 15.6% Saudi beneficial ownership are also avoiding Bab el-Mandeb entirely, even on cargoes of Russian origin that the Houthis have committed to letting pass unharmed, indicating that Saudi beneficial ownership alone, not cargo origin, is now the driver of Red Sea diversions.

An eighth Saudi-flagged VLCC has joined the six previously reported diverting via the Cape of Good Hope, with two bulk carriers also now rerouting, bringing the total to eight VLCCs and two bulk carriers sailing around the Cape to avoid Bab el-Mandeb. The Bahri-owned tankers are typically used for lifting Saudi cargoes only and are occasionally chartered in the spot market. The Cape routing adds approximately 14 extra sailing days and increases fuel oil costs by approximately $600,000 depending on speed. Vessels previously signaling Yanbu are now signaling Durban, South Africa, or Port Elizabeth, standard bunkering areas around the Cape, indicating diversion decisions are being baked into voyage planning at the outset rather than being reactive course changes.

Saudi Arabia is simultaneously running multiple workaround routes to keep crude flowing. VLCC shuttle services are moving crude from Yanbu to Ain Sukhna for delivery via the SUMED pipeline, loading at the Mediterranean port of Sidi Kerir — VLCCs are too large to transit the Suez Canal fully laden. Additional VLCCs are sailing via the Suez Canal with Saudi cargoes, partially discharging at the SUMED pipeline. AIS-visible traffic through Bab el-Mandeb has declined approximately 25% since the Houthi blockade declaration on July 20, with vessels now transiting dark. Three Houthi attacks on Saudi-flagged tankers have been confirmed, including ENCELIA on July 22, NCC MASA on July 25, and NCC GHAZAL on July 28, with a fourth remaining unconfirmed. These uneconomic Cape diversions underscore the severity of the threat facing Saudi-linked shipping across Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the southern Red Sea.

Yanbu Sustains Fully Dark Operations Since July 27

EO imagery collected over King Fahd Industrial Port on August 3 at 08:35 UTC confirmed that fully dark operations continue with increased vessel complexity. Thirteen tankers were assessed loading across four distinct berth clusters, with a mix of continuing vessels and new arrivals across all positions. A ship-to-ship transfer between two dark tankers of approximately 106 meters each was assessed as ongoing in the waiting area, alongside four additional dark holding vessels. Vessel cycling was confirmed with departures recorded between the August 1 and August 3 collections.

The August 4 collection at 08:14 UTC showed 15 vessels in total, all dark, comprising 6 tankers at berth, 4 general cargo and bulk carriers at berth, and 4 tankers in the waiting area. Two product tankers were identified via Vortexa, comprising a Gibraltar-flagged tanker, dark since July 30, and a Cyprus-flagged tanker, dark since July 23, both operated by the same Liberian entity and holding approximately 640 meters apart in the waiting area. Both carry clean compliance profiles with no sanctions exposure. The fully dark run at Yanbu King Fahd has now been sustained continuously since July 27.

Outlook

The world’s crude flows are adapting to two parallel campaigns at once. Ukraine’s Black Sea drone strikes have widened beyond Russia’s shadow fleet to Western-affiliated tankers legally operating under the G7 Oil Price Cap, with insurance and routing calculations across the entire Black Sea now under review. In the Red Sea, Saudi diversions via the Cape of Good Hope have expanded to eight VLCCs and two bulk carriers at 14 extra sailing days and $600,000 in additional fuel oil costs per voyage, with Saudi beneficial ownership confirmed as the primary driver independent of cargo origin. At Hormuz, the eastern approach is under sustained kinetic pressure alongside continued IRGC high-speed craft escalation, and Iranian crude exports continue to operate at scale through offshore ship-to-ship laundering at Malaysia’s EOPL.

Windward assesses the operational risk environment across the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Black Sea, and eastern Mediterranean as Critical across all theaters simultaneously, with kinetic activity recurring at the same coordinates within days, structural commercial diversions hardening across two continents, and enforcement gaps continuing to define the Iranian export pipeline.