Something’s Suspicious Near Sudan & the OFAC Sanctions Lowdown 

There was a major increase in slow-speed activity off the coast of Sudan during the week starting on August 18 – a 270% rise there (compared to the weekly average in 2024).

But wait a minute…this detected “spike” is actually likely connected to the burgeoning Iran-Sudan relationship. 

Meanwhile, seven tankers linked to Houthi and Hezbollah trade networks were sanctioned by the U.S. last week. This didn’t come as a surprise to Windward Maritime AI™ users…six of these vessels were already flagged in our system as “high risk,” starting in September 2022. 

Low Speed Activities or GPS Jamming Off Sudan’s Coast?

• Windward’s Early Detection Model flagged a major 270% increase in the weekly average of slow-speed activities just off the coast of Sudan (compared to the weekly average during 2024).

• Over the last few months, public sources have reported an increase in military collaboration between Iran and Sudan, with Iranian forces training the Sudanese army.

Given these geopolitical circumstances, Windward’s analysts launched an investigation into the anomaly using Windward’s platform.

• This phenomenon is not as it appears on the surface. This detected spike actually appears to be connected to the burgeoning Iran-Sudan relationship…

• An examination of the area revealed that the increase was not rooted in the actual presence of vessels in the area, but rather in human intervention from a third-party radio frequency (RF) interference (or “GPS jamming”) – probably originating from a station on the coast. 
• By overlaying satellite imagery to verify the absence of actual vessels in the area, it is easy to confirm that no vessels were actually in the area where GPS jamming is suspected, strengthening the suspicion of human intervention:

Windward’s Sequence Search capability shows that over the last year, 43 cargo vessels sailed from Yemen to Sudan (calling port in Sudan after calling port in Yemen), with a significant increase between July and August 2024: 

_{Port calls in Sudan conducted after a port call in Yemen by cargo vessels, September 2023-August 2024.}

• Windward’s data also shows that in May 2024, there was a sharp increase in slow-speed activities conducted in the Sudanese EEZ by cargo vessels arriving from Yemen:

_{Slow-speed activities conducted by cargo vessels in Sudan after coming from Yemen, January 2022-August 2024.}

For many more details on this anomaly and the Early Detection model, read our full report. 

With Windward, You Don’t Need to Wait for Official Sanctions Announcements 

• The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new sanctions on August 15 against seven liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tankers and their owners for alleged linkage to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-related Yemeni individual who was running trade networks for the Houthi rebels and Hezbollah terror group.
• The sanctioned vessels are the Victoria (IMO: 9113379), Raha Gas (IMO: 8818219), Parvati (IMO: 8519966), LPG OM (IMO: 9160475), Lady Liberty (IMO: 9005065), Fengshun (IMO: 9007386), and Divine Power (IMO: 9171357).
• Windward data shows several insights regarding these vessels:
  • All seven vessels sail under flags of convenience, mostly under the flag of Palau (43%) and São Tomé and Príncipe (29%).
  • All of the vessels are relatively old – built between 1987-2000 – usually an indicator of illicit activity.
  • Most of the vessels are owned by Hong Kong and Marshall Islands-based companies. Four out of the seven vessels have the same registered owner company, Kai Heng Global Energy Limited, which was sanctioned due to its connection to the IRGC.
  • Most of these vessels operated between East Asia and the Arabian Gulf in the past, according to our data, but more recently they shifted their routes for the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, in alignment with an ownership change.
• Windward Maritime AI™ platform flagged six of them as high risk beginning in September 2022 (but mostly since March 2023). This was largely due to their illicit behavior and engagement in deceptive shipping practices, such as ship-to-ship (STS) meetings with other sanctioned and high risk vessels and location (GNSS) manipulation. Data shows that the majority of location (GNSS) manipulations by the vessels were conducted in May 2024 within the Arabian Gulf – starting in the United Arab Emirates’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 

Check out our blog post for more info.