Maritime Global Trade Roundup – May 30, 2024

Surprising Stats on Vietnamese-Flagged Vessels & LNG Tanker Port Calls

Whoa! The number of slow-speed activities (SSAs) by Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines EEZ increased by 730% between February and April 2024, according to Windward’s Maritime AI™ platform.

This week’s Maritime Global Trade Roundup has AI-powered insights on how this is happening and explains its potential impact. We also look at the possibility of Russia assembling a “new dark fleet” that could be used to skirt regulations on Russia’s liquified natural gas (LNG) industry. 

There has been a 1,600% increase in the number of port calls outside of Russia by LNG tankers previously conducting dark activities in Russia and its surroundings (the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea). 

Let’s break it down…

Vietnam Gets More Involved in the Great Power Competition? 

• Alongside the constant presence of Chinese vessels and coast guard forces in the Philippines, Windward data shows a recent increase in Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the West Philippines. Most of these vessels use super lights, which are banned by local law, and nets for fishing. Filipino fishermen claim that this undermines the operation of local fishing vessels. “Nothing is left for Filipinos to catch,” according to a fishing operator quoted in The Philippine Star.
• The number of slow-speed activities (SSAs) by Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines EEZ increased by 730% between February and April 2024, according to Windward’s Maritime AI™ platform. In comparison, between the months of February and April in recent years, there was actually a decrease in SSAs in the Philippines’ EEZ by Vietnamese fishing vessels. April 2024 constitutes an anomaly when compared to previous years. Most SSAs were conducted around the Scarborough Shoal and the EEZ border of the Philippines and Taiwan, based on Windward’s maritime insights.
• Overall, 2024 data shows a departure from the trend observed in recent years, which might suggest a change in operation that is not caused by seasonality.

_{Slow-speed activities by Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines EEZ. January 2022-April 2024.}

• Windward data also shows that there was a 384% increase in the number of dark activities conducted by Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines EEZ between February and April 2024, which also shows an anomaly compared to previous years when the months of February-April showed a decrease. It should be noted that dark activities can often be indicators for fishing operations: fishermen deliberately turn off their AIS to hide the catch location. Again, data shows that the majority of dark activities were carried out around the Scarborough Shoal. The data shows an anomaly compared to previous years, in which there were decreases between February and April, and shows a possible change in the pattern of operation. 

_{Dark activities by Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines EEZ. January 2022-April 2024.}

• Windward’s illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing risk model shows that the increase in activity by the Vietnamese-flagged fishing vessels in the Philippines correlates with the activity of vessels classified in the Windward Maritime AI™ platform as high/moderate IUU risk. The data shows that between February-April 2024 high/moderate IUU risk fishing vessels showed a 787% increase in slow speed activities in the Philippines EEZ, and a 460% increase in dark activities. The data shows an anomaly compared to previous years when there were decreases between the months of February and April.
• According to the IMO and RFMO, fishing conducted in a specific country’s EEZ by vessels flagged in another registry without the country’s agreement may be considered IUU fishing. Given that the Vietnamese fishing vessels operate in a similar pattern to vessels classified as high/moderate IUU risk, this might show that IUU fishing operations are being carried out in the Philippines by foreign fleets.

Russian LNG Trade – Sanctions, Restrictions, & the “LNG Dark Fleet”

• The European Commision proposed provisions on Russia’s liquified natural gas (LNG) industry on May 6, mostly to prevent EU countries from re-exporting Russian LNG after receiving it. It also aimed to mitigate EU involvement in upcoming Russian LNG projects, but won’t affect imports into the EU. It should be noted that currently the U.S. and UK have existing sanctions against Russia’s Novatek Arctic LNG 2 project.
• Flex LNG’s CEO, Oystein Kalleklev, recently warned that it is possible that Russia is assembling a new “dark fleet” of LNG carriers to sanction-proof its liquified natural gas exports, as Russia’s pipeline gas exports to Europe have largely shut down. But compared to crude oil, the gas trade has not faced the same restrictions in the West.
• Windward’s Sequence Search capability shows that possible “Dark LNG Fleet” operation started in the beginning of 2024, and has not been seen in previous years. Between October 2023-April 2024, there has been a 1,600% increase in the number of port calls outside of Russia conducted by LNG tankers previously conducting dark activities in Russia and its surroundings (the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and Barents Sea). It should be noted that in the past, very few LNG tankers conducted dark activities in Russia, so the trend is relatively new (it was not seen in the past).
• Most port calls conducted after the dark activity were carried out in Belgium, Norway, Sweden, France, Spain and Finland. As for the STS meetings, most were only carried out in Sweden, Belgium and Spain.

• In addition, during the same period, there was an 800% increase in the number of ship-to-ship operations for over 12 hours by LNG tankers previously conducting dark activities in Russia and its surroundings.

_{Port calls and STS meetings conducted by LNG tankers after a dark activity in Russia and its surroundings, June 2023-May 2024.}

• While there are currently no sanctions in the EU against Russian LNG trade, given the activity displayed by these vessels, it is possible that there might be a risk of export of Russian-originated LNG in European ports that might be sanctioned in the future. By using Windward’s Sequence Search capability and compliance risk classification, it is possible to detect such possible gas trades and better monitor the flow of gas.