March 30, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily

At a Glance

• Hormuz remains under controlled, selective transit with standard lanes empty.
• Ust-Luga sustained five UAV attacks in seven days, threatening Russian exports.
• Yanbu is operating as the primary Gulf bypass at ~7 million barrels per day.
• Iranian exports continue, with ~174.2 million barrels in floating storage.
• Russian oil on water stands at ~237.75 million barrels across products.
• Jet fuel supply is tightening, with tanker counts dropping from 78 to 22.
• Combined disruption across Hormuz, Yanbu, and Ust-Luga could remove ~27.15 million barrels per day.

Operational Overview 

Global oil and maritime markets are now facing simultaneous pressure across three critical export nodes.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed under selective IRGC-controlled transit. Ust-Luga has sustained its fifth UAV attack in seven days. Yanbu is operating as the primary alternative outlet for Gulf crude while facing a growing Houthi threat to Red Sea traffic.

This creates a materially different risk environment from earlier stages of the conflict. Rather than a single chokepoint disruption, the market is now exposed to the possibility that the Gulf’s primary outlet, Russia’s Baltic export corridor, and the main Saudi bypass route could all face severe interruption at the same time.

At the same time, Iranian exports remain active, and selective transit through Hormuz continues to scale for approved cargoes, and standard commercial lanes remain inactive.

Taken together, the maritime environment is defined by constrained but functioning selective transit in Hormuz, rising structural dependence on Yanbu, and growing concern that a multi-hub disruption could trigger a global oil shock, severe freight inflation, and wider geopolitical escalation.

Strait of Hormuz Controlled Transit

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remained limited on March 29. Two AIS-transmitting vessels exited the Gulf, both bulk carriers, with one AIS-transmitting crude tanker recorded entering. At the same time, commercial shipping lanes remained empty.

SAR imagery from March 28 identified at least nine vessels above 200 meters positioned north of Larak Island, likely preparing for controlled transit.

This reinforces the established pattern that commercial navigation is not resuming through standard routes. Movement is taking place through the Iranian-controlled corridor north of Larak, with vessels staged and processed selectively.

Iranian Oil Export Activity

Iranian export activity remains active despite constrained transit conditions.

Floating storage is currently estimated at approximately 174.2 million barrels, including 158.6 million barrels of crude, 13.9 million barrels of clean petroleum products, and 7.3 million barrels of dirty petroleum products.

At Kharg Island, EO imagery from March 29 at 07:31 GMT shows five tankers loading oil, comprised of three VLCCs, one Suezmax, and one Aframax, with a total loading volume estimated at approximately 7.7 million barrels. That breaks down to around 6 million barrels on the VLCCs, 1 million barrels on the Suezmax, and 700 thousand barrels on the Aframax.

This confirms that despite continued strain on the Strait and the broader conflict environment, Kharg remains an active loading node supporting ongoing Iranian crude exports.

Refined product exports are also continuing. A 120-meter OFAC-sanctioned product tanker sailing under a fraudulent Aruba flag reported loaded 53.1 thousand barrels of fuel oil at Bandar Abbas on March 28 and is now en route to Fujairah. Satellite imagery confirms vessel presence at the Shahid Rajai Terminal, supporting the reported loading activity.

These signals indicate that Iranian exports continue across both crude and refined product segments under the current operating conditions.

Russian Oil Flows

Russian oil on water now totals approximately 237.75 million barrels across crude and condensate (115.9 million barrels), clean petroleum products (51.37 million barrels), and dirty petroleum products (28.07 million barrels).

Top destinations remain India (32.7%), China (25.5%), Turkey (7%), and Singapore (6%). Deliveries on March 29 included cargoes to China (1.33 million barrels), Turkey (1.33 million barrels), India (723.6 thousand barrels), Algeria (183.8 thousand barrels), Benin (118.1 thousand barrels), and Georgia (26.3 thousand barrels).

A notable shipment involved a Sierra Leone-flagged crude tanker that loaded 758.4 thousand barrels of ESPO blend crude at Port Kozmino on March 14 and discharged at Petron Bataan Refinery in the Philippines on March 25. This appears to be the first Russian crude shipment to the Philippines since the start of the Ukraine war.

The shipment has reportedly been framed in the context of OFAC General License 134, but that waiver applies to cargo already on the water through March 12, whereas this cargo was loaded on March 14. On that basis, the shipment appears to fall outside the waiver window, suggesting that Russia is operating within an increasingly constrained and improvised export environment.

At the same time, Ust-Luga has sustained five UAV attacks in seven days, with the most recent attack resulting in a fire, raising concerns about the continuity of Russian export flows from the Baltic.

Global Oil Market Stress Test

Three major oil export hubs are now under direct or escalating pressure.

The Strait of Hormuz has moved approximately 21 million barrels per day over the past year, with China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore absorbing the vast majority of flows. Ust-Luga has averaged approximately 1.15 million barrels per day,  with approximately 803 thousand barrels per day moved to Asia, primarily India, Singapore, and China, while around 175 thousand barrels per day went to Europe. Yanbu is currently exporting approximately 7 million barrels per day through Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which is now operating at full capacity.

If all three hubs were simultaneously disrupted, combined export losses could reach approximately 27.15 million barrels per day, representing nearly $3 billion per day in oil value potentially removed from export flows.

In that scenario, rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope would add 10 to 14 sailing days and approximately $1.8 million to $2.0 million per tanker voyage, creating an estimated $10 billion to $14 billion per year in added cost across the global economy.

Under that worst-case scenario, Brent crude could move rapidly from above $100 per barrel to $150 to $200 per barrel, while IEA strategic reserves would likely cover only 40 to 50 days of partial compensation. The likely effects would include acute stress across aviation, shipping, fertilizers, food production, and manufacturing, aggressive competition for remaining accessible barrels, accelerated energy diversification, and a much lower threshold for direct military intervention to reopen major corridors.

The scale of potential disruption reflects a system now exposed across multiple critical nodes rather than a single corridor.

Jet Fuel Market Disruption

Jet fuel remains one of the most exposed segments in the current environment.

Approximately 18 million barrels per day have been disrupted west of Hormuz. The March 19 strikes on Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla refineries continue to affect roughly 10% of global seaborne jet fuel exports.

The number of LR1 and LR2 tankers carrying jet fuel dropped from 78 on March 20 to 22 by March 28, while global demand remains approximately 7.9 million barrels per day.

Europe remains particularly exposed, with France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium among the largest importers of Kuwaiti jet fuel.

Because jet fuel cannot be stored long-term without degradation, supply constraints are increasingly translating into availability risk, not just price pressure. This creates a growing risk of direct operational disruption for global airlines, not just higher fuel costs.

Port Operations Disruptions

Port activity on March 29 reflects continued pressure and operational strain.

Inside the Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE:

• 4 transshipment rollovers (no change from the previous day, +40% versus the 7-day average).
• 6 transshipment-delay cases (+20% from the previous day, -4.55% versus the 7-day average).

Port Khalid, Sharjah, UAE:

• 2 port-of-destination changes (0-baseline from the previous day, +180% versus the 7-day average).

Shuwaikh, Kuwait:

• 4 transshipment rollovers (+100% from the previous day, +1300% versus the 7-day average).
• 4 transshipment-delay cases (0-baseline from the previous day, +1300% versus the 7-day average).

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 2 transshipment rollovers (0-baseline from the previous day, +133.33% versus the 7-day average).
• 4 port-of-destination changes (+100% from the previous day, +460% versus the 7-day average).

These patterns indicate that while major Gulf ports remain active, operational friction continues to build through delays, rollover pressure, and destination changes, especially in secondary routing hubs.

Outlook

The global oil market is now exposed to simultaneous pressure across Hormuz, Yanbu, and Ust-Luga.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to normal commercial navigation, with selective transit continuing under Iranian control. Iranian exports remain active, supported by ongoing loading at Kharg Island and continued refined product flows.

Russian exports continue at scale, but infrastructure disruption and compliance pressure are increasing. Yanbu has become the primary active export corridor, concentrating risk into a single alternative route.

Jet fuel remains one of the most acute vulnerabilities, while port disruption reflects sustained system-wide strain.

If these three hubs were disrupted simultaneously, the resulting impact would extend beyond maritime operations into a broader global supply shock.

The system remains active, but under increasing pressure across multiple critical points.