March 26, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily

At a Glance

• Strait of Hormuz transit remains constrained but is scaling, with five AIS-visible crossings and additional semi-dark movements.
• Transit is increasingly governed through a controlled northern corridor near Larak Island rather than open navigation lanes.
• Iran is formalizing a selective-access system prioritizing outbound energy flows and inbound essential goods.
• Gulf vessel presence remains high, with 664 AIS-transmitting vessels despite restricted transit conditions.
• Salalah is emerging as a structural rerouting hub, supported by sustained destination changes and land-bridge logistics.
• Iranian oil exports remain active, but are increasingly supported by floating storage drawdown.
• China’s LPG sourcing is shifting toward Iran as U.S. tariffs and UAE disruptions constrain alternative supply.
• Port disruptions across Oman and the UAE confirm large-scale rerouting pressure.
• Russian oil flows remain elevated and globally distributed despite infrastructure strain.
• A new Black Sea strike highlights expanding kinetic risk beyond the Gulf.
• The threat environment remains multi-theater, spanning Hormuz, the Black Sea, and Bab el-Mandeb.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained but is now scaling under a more structured and formalized Iranian control model. Transit is no longer frozen, but it is not returning to open commercial conditions. Instead, vessel movement is being filtered through controlled routing patterns and selective access.

On March 25, five AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the Strait, while additional vessels moved semi-dark or without AIS. Standard commercial lanes remained empty, reinforcing that open navigation has not resumed. At the same time, vessel presence across the Gulf remains substantial, indicating that operations continue under constraint rather than collapse.

Iran’s control model is becoming more explicit. Routing patterns, cargo prioritization, and messaging to the UN and IMO all align with a system in which “non-hostile” vessels are permitted transit under coordination. This reflects a shift from navigational freedom to conditional access.

Beyond the Strait, the system is adjusting. Trade flows are being rerouted, supply chains are adapting structurally, and second-order impacts are expanding across energy, commodities, and logistics networks.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic and Controlled Transit

Transit activity through Hormuz remains limited but is gradually increasing under managed conditions.

On March 25, two AIS-transmitting vessels exited the Gulf, compared with one the previous day, while three entered, unchanged. All five transits were only partially visible, with AIS signals not consistently transmitted across the full voyage, indicating continued semi-dark behavior.

Additional vessel activity reinforces this pattern. One cargo vessel above 50 meters entered the Gulf without AIS while hugging the Omani coast, while at least 13 vessels above 180 meters were positioned north of Larak Island, likely awaiting sequencing for controlled transit. As of 02:05 GMT on March 25, standard commercial lanes remained empty.

This operating picture suggests that transit is not reopening in a conventional sense, but expanding incrementally through a managed corridor. Over a 24-hour period ending Thursday midday GMT, Windward tracked nine internationally trading vessels transiting this corridor, including six bulk carriers, several carrying agricultural cargo westbound into Iran.

Additional movements included two U.S.-sanctioned LPG carriers exporting Iranian energy and a Chinese-owned product tanker. These flows reinforce a clear pattern: inbound shipments of food and essential goods are being prioritized, while outbound energy exports continue under controlled conditions.

Routing continues to avoid standard navigation channels, with vessels instead moving through Iranian territorial waters along the coastline. Since first emerging roughly 12 days ago, this corridor has expanded rapidly, both in volume and cargo diversity. Iran-flagged vessels continue to transit with minimal disruption, often without AIS, and traffic to and from Bandar Abbas remains largely unaffected.

Gulf Vessel Presence Overview

Despite constrained transit, vessel presence across the Arabian Gulf remains high, with 664 vessels, including 376 cargo vessels and 288 tankers.

Breakdown by vessel subclass:

• Crude oil tankers: 76 vessels.
• LNG and LPG carriers: 37 vessels.
• Oil products tankers: 77 vessels.
• Container vessels: 34 vessels.
• Bulk carriers: 157 vessels.
• Other vessel types: 283 vessels.

Top flag registries (excluding Gulf states):

• Marshall Islands: 109 vessels.
• Greece: 91 vessels.
• China: 90 vessels.
• Singapore: 80 vessels.
• Liberia: 55 vessels.
• Hong Kong: 55 vessels.
• Japan: 43 vessels.
• India: 42 vessels.
• Panama: 35 vessels.
• South Korea: 27 vessels.

Top flag regions:

• Iran: 21 vessels.
• Gulf flags: 93 vessels.
• Non-Gulf flags: 550 vessels.

Top company locations by vessel presence:

• Marshall Islands: 116 vessels.
• Greece: 84 vessels.
• China: 82 vessels.
• Liberia: 56 vessels.
• Singapore: 49 vessels.

This distribution confirms continued international participation in Gulf operations, even as access is increasingly constrained and politically filtered.

Salalah Port Rerouting Signal

Salalah is emerging as the clearest indicator of structural rerouting outside the Gulf.

Its strategic importance lies in its location outside both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb risk zones, combined with established land transport links into Gulf markets. Cargo can be discharged in Salalah and moved inland to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain within four to five days.

Since Hormuz effectively closed, carriers have increasingly amended vessel destinations mid-voyage, replacing ports such as Jebel Ali, Dammam, and Hamad with Salalah. Destination-change data shows sustained growth, rising from 55 observations in early March to 71 by the week of March 19, despite a five-day disruption caused by a drone strike on the port’s fuel storage.

The rerouting signal is visible in destination-change data:

• Week of March 5: 55 observations, +3,567% versus the 4-week average.
• Week of March 12: 68 observations.
• Week of March 19: 71 observations.

The cost impact is already visible. Shanghai-Gulf spot rates rose 72% in a single week, from about $1,327 to $2,287 per TEU, while China-Salalah rates rose 28% independently, indicating rerouting demand rather than Omani import demand. By mid-March, Middle East freight rates had tripled from pre-conflict levels.

Taken together, Salalah is no longer just a relief valve. It is becoming a structural workaround for Gulf cargoes under sustained Hormuz disruption.

Iranian Oil Export Activity

Iranian oil exports remain active, but the system supporting them is evolving.

Floating storage currently stands at approximately 182.8 million barrels, including 165 million barrels of crude, 11.4 million barrels of clean products, and 6.4 million barrels of dirty products.

Recent activity confirms continued export operations. An OFAC-sanctioned, Iran-flagged tanker reported loaded approximately 370.3 thousand barrels of South Pars condensate at Assaluyeh before going dark and departing for Nanjing, China. SAR imagery confirmed at least seven vessels in the area, including three at active terminals.

At Kharg Island, one VLCC was observed loading on March 25, marking the sixth vessel loading there over the past seven days. 

These signals confirm that export activity remains ongoing despite constraints, supported by existing infrastructure and storage.

China LPG Dependence and Iranian LPG Flows

China’s LPG supply chain is shifting toward Iran.

As of March 25, four LPG tankers carrying approximately 2.1 million barrels of butane and propane were en route to China from Iran. By contrast, only one UAE-origin LPG tanker, carrying around 270 thousand barrels, was in transit.

This reflects broader structural changes. U.S. tariffs disrupted a major supply channel, while Iranian strikes on UAE production facilities reduced output. As a result, Iran has become the most reliable remaining supplier.

Two of the four vessels currently en route to China are Chinese-owned, reinforcing the depth of this shift. These cargoes have also transited Hormuz with relative ease, suggesting that LPG shipments aligned with Iranian exports are being prioritized within the controlled transit system.

Port Operations Disruptions

Port data confirms sustained rerouting pressure across the region.

Inside the Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE:

• 22 transshipment rollovers (+46.67% from the previous week, −31.78% versus the 4-week average).
• 47 transshipment-delay cases (+193.75% from the previous week, −19.66% versus the 4-week average).
• 83 port-of-destination changes (+53.7% from the previous week, +147.76% versus the 4-week average).

Khalifa Port, UAE:

• 11 transshipment rollovers (−35.29% from the previous week, +29.41% versus the 4-week average).
• 11 transshipment-delay cases (0-baseline from the previous week, +33.33% versus the 4-week average).
• 42 port-of-destination changes (+20% from the previous week, +229.41% versus the 4-week average).

Ad Dammam, Saudi Arabia:

• 29 transshipment-delay cases (+383.33% from the previous week, +127.45% versus the 4-week average).
• 75 port-of-destination changes (−2.6% from the previous week, +203.03% versus the 4-week average).

Outside the Gulf

Fujairah, UAE:

• 13 port-of-destination changes (+333.33% from the previous week, +766.67% versus the 4-week average).

Khor Fakkan, UAE:

• 108 port-of-destination changes (+3.85% from the previous week, +131.02% versus the 4-week average).

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 14 transshipment rollovers (−33.33% from the previous week, +21.74% versus the 4-week average).
• 18 transshipment-delay cases (−25% from the previous week, −4% versus the 4-week average).

Salalah, Oman:

• 132 transshipment rollovers (−23.7% from the previous week, +73.11% versus the 4-week average).
• 126 transshipment-delay cases (−48.15% from the previous week, −21.74% versus the 4-week average).
• 71 port-of-destination changes (+4.4% from the previous week, +120% versus the 4-week average).

Sohar, Oman:

• 51 port-of-destination changes (+750% from the previous week, +1940% versus the 4-week average).

Rerouting is no longer episodic. It is being absorbed into port systems at scale.

Russian Oil Flows

Russian oil on water now totals approximately 251.27 million barrels, including:

• Crude and condensate: ~152.36 million barrels.
• Clean petroleum products: ~64.87 million barrels.
• Dirty petroleum products: ~34.04 million barrels.

Top destinations by share of flows:

• India: 28% (~70.29 million barrels).
• China: 27% (~67.87 million barrels).
• Singapore: 8.8% (~22.2 million barrels).
• Turkey: 6.2% (~15.29 million barrels).

Arrivals on March 25:

• India: 1.32 million barrels.
• China: 0.94 million barrels.
• Philippines: 0.77 million barrels.
• Morocco: 0.64 million barrels.
• Syria: 0.65 million barrels.
• Turkey: 0.62 million barrels.
• Ghana: 0.03 million barrels.

These flows confirm that Russian oil exports remain highly active and globally distributed despite the growing operational strain on specific export routes.

Black Sea Security Incident

A new strike highlights expanding risk beyond the Gulf.

The sanctioned tanker ALTURA (IMO 9292199), a Sierra Leone-flagged Suezmax sanctioned by the EU and UK, carrying approximately 1 million barrels of crude, was struck near the Bosphorus by a suspected naval drone. The attack targeted the engine room. No injuries were reported, but the vessel was broadcasting “Not Under Command” as of 00:30 UTC on March 26.

This reinforces the spread of kinetic risk into Russian-linked export routes outside the Gulf.

Military and Security Environment

The security environment remains elevated and increasingly interconnected.

Houthi messaging indicates readiness to reopen a Red Sea front, raising the risk of renewed disruption at Bab el-Mandeb just as Gulf cargoes are being rerouted through Oman. At the same time, Hormuz transit is gradually increasing, but only under controlled conditions, with most voyages remaining partially visible.

Outlook

Transit through Hormuz is expanding, but only within a controlled system defined by selective access and managed routing. Standard commercial lanes remain unused, while northern corridors handle approved cargo flows.

Iranian exports continue, supported by storage and infrastructure, while China’s dependence on Iranian LPG is increasing. Rerouting behavior has become structural, with Salalah and other regional hubs absorbing displaced flows.

At the same time, risk is expanding beyond the Gulf. Russian oil flows remain high, and Black Sea incidents are increasing.

The system is not stabilizing. It is adapting under constraint, with maritime access, routing, and risk increasingly shaped by state control rather than open navigation.