March 11, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily

At a Glance

• Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained heavily suppressed on March 10, with only two outbound crossings recorded and no inbound movements observed.
• Remote Sensing Intelligence shows vessel presence inside the Strait exceeds AIS-visible traffic, suggesting that limited movement continues under partially visible or dark conditions.
• Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck on March 11, reinforcing the continued kinetic threat to ships operating in and around the Strait.
• Chinese crew and ownership messaging continues to appear in AIS broadcasts, suggesting some vessels may be signaling neutrality while attempting transit.
• Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remained below trend, Suez Canal crossings declined further, and Cape of Good Hope rerouting stayed elevated as route redistribution continued.
• Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export pivot is accelerating, with 27 VLCCs now heading toward Yanbu as Gulf export dependency shifts westward.
• Port disruptions are spreading through Gulf and near-Gulf logistics networks, while dry bulk, metals, fertilizer, and crude supply chains are tightening simultaneously.

Operational Overview 

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained heavily suppressed on March 10, with only two outbound crossings recorded and no inbound movements observed. While this represents a slight increase from the previous day, volumes remain far below normal operating levels and continue to reflect a severely disrupted commercial shipping environment.

At the same time, AIS-confirmed crossings do not reflect the full level of vessel activity inside the Strait. Remote Sensing Intelligence from March 10 detected eight dark vessels inside Hormuz. This indicates that limited transit continues to occur under highly constrained and partially visible conditions. Reports that Iran has begun preparations to deploy naval mines in the Strait further increase the risk that Hormuz could become temporarily closed to commercial shipping.

The maritime threat environment worsened further on March 11. Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck in and around the Strait and adjacent waters, including the Mayuree Naree, ONE Majesty, and Star Gwyneth, while a UKMTO advisory confirmed another projectile strike north of Oman. These incidents reinforce that vessels willing to enter the area continue to face direct kinetic risk. Emerging behavioral patterns also suggest vessels may be using AIS destination broadcasts referencing Chinese ownership or crew to signal neutrality while attempting transit through the Strait.

Beyond the chokepoint itself, the disruption is accelerating wider trade and supply-chain shifts. Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb remains below trend, Suez Canal crossings declined further, and Cape of Good Hope transits remain elevated as global route redistribution continues.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia is rapidly scaling its Red Sea export pivot through Yanbu, with 27 VLCCs heading toward the terminal as Gulf export dependency shifts westward. Port exceptions are rising across the Gulf region, and the disruption is spreading into dry bulk commodities and global industrial supply chains. Additional dark or low-visibility maritime activity has also been detected near both the Strait of Hormuz and Cuban energy infrastructure.

The crisis is now influencing far more than tanker traffic, affecting naval posture, commodity markets, and global trade routes across multiple theaters.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remained severely constrained on March 10.

A total of two crossings were recorded, both outbound, representing a 100% increase compared with the previous day but still remaining below the seven-day average of 3.29 crossings.

Observed vessel subclasses included one bulk carrier and one vessel classified as Other / Unknown. Flag distribution included one Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and one Madagascar-flagged vessel.

Recorded Transits

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirms that there are eight dark vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on March 10

While this confirms that limited passage continues, the broader collapse in movement remains severe. Roughly 66 commercial vessels were recorded transiting Hormuz over a nine-day period, representing only a fraction of normal traffic volumes.

A large dark vessel approximately 330 meters long, possibly a VLCC, was also detected near the Iranian side of the Strait in imagery dated March 8 at 07:02 UTC, suggesting additional unreported or low-visibility vessel movement may be occurring inside the waterway.

Hormuz Remote Sensing Intelligence

Remote Sensing Intelligence from March 10 at 14:16 UTC detected eight large vessels within the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that vessel presence inside the waterway may be higher than AIS-confirmed crossings alone suggest. Their direction of travel and confirmation of full transit could not be determined.

Possible classifications include large tankers such as VLCCs, Suezmaxes, Aframax/Panamax tankers, MR tankers, and small coastal tankers. They could also include large cargo vessels such as VLOCs, ultra-large container vessels, Capesize bulk carriers, Post-Panamax bulkers, Kamsarmaxes, Seawaymaxes, Supramax/Ultramax bulkers, Handysize bulkers, or feeder container ships.

The imagery indicates that AIS-visible activity may represent only a portion of vessel presence inside the Strait, with possible dark or low-visibility movement occurring alongside the limited confirmed crossings.

Chinese Crew Signaling Patterns

Windward monitoring identified 23 vessels currently broadcasting AIS destination strings referencing Chinese ownership or crew presence while operating in the Gulf region.

The most common broadcast patterns include variations such as “CHINESE VSL AND CREW,” “CHINA OWNER AND CREW,” and “CHINA OWNER&CREW.” Other variations include “CHINAOWNERALLCHINESE,” “CHINESE SHIP OWNERS,” and “CHINESE COMPANY.”

Bulk carriers represent the largest share of this group, with 10 vessels, followed by five container vessels, three general cargo vessels, two vehicle carriers, one LPG tanker, one heavy load carrier, and one unspecified vessel. Flag distribution was led by Panama with nine vessels, followed by Hong Kong, Liberia, China, and the Marshall Islands.

On March 11, one bulk carrier broadcasting “CHINA CREW” successfully transited the Strait inbound. A second bulk carrier using the same broadcast pattern approached the Strait but subsequently aborted entry and conducted a U-turn.

The pattern suggests the possibility of an informal access filter, where vessels signaling Chinese ownership or crew may be attempting to indicate neutrality or avoid targeting in the current conflict environment.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal Traffic

Bab el-Mandeb

Transit activity through Bab el-Mandeb remained unchanged on March 10.

A total of 16 crossings were recorded, including seven inbound and nine outbound movements, remaining below the seven-day average of 20.57 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included four container vessels, two crude oil tankers, and two oil/chemical tankers. Flag distribution included Hong Kong with three vessels, Oman with two vessels, and Equatorial Guinea with one vessel.

Suez Canal 

Transit activity through the Suez Canal declined further on March 10.

A total of 27 crossings were recorded, including 10 inbound and 17 outbound movements, representing a 32.5% decrease compared with the previous day and remaining below the seven-day average of 35.29 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included eight bulk carriers, three container vessels, and three general cargo vessels. Flag distribution was led by Liberia with six vessels, Panama with five vessels, and Russia with two vessels.

Cape of Good Hope Diversion

Transit activity around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated on March 10.

A total of 80 crossings were recorded, including 35 eastbound and 45 westbound movements, broadly consistent with the seven-day average of 82.57 crossings.

Vessel subclasses included 31 bulk carriers, 16 container vessels, and six oil/chemicals tankers. Flag distribution was led by Panama with 13 vessels, Liberia with 12 vessels, and the Marshall Islands with nine vessels.

Sustained traffic volumes around the Cape confirm that rerouting around Africa remains a primary alternative for vessels avoiding Middle East transit routes.

Attacks and Incidents

Multiple commercial vessels were reportedly struck in and around the Strait of Hormuz on day 12 of the conflict.

The most severe incident involved the Thai-flagged Mayuree Naree, which was struck by Iranian projectiles approximately 11 nautical miles north of Oman, causing a severe stern engine-room fire and forcing the 23 Thai crew members to abandon ship.

AIS data shows that the vessel exhibited extensive dark activity in the nine days preceding the attack, including anomalous speed reports of 81–101 knots, behavior consistent with AIS spoofing or signal manipulation. The vessel had departed Khalifa Port, UAE, and was sailing toward Kandla, India, when it was hit. The strike occurred shortly after the vessel exited port, suggesting a possible exit-targeting pattern in which vessels are permitted to load or discharge in Gulf ports but are struck during vulnerable outbound transit windows.

The Japan-flagged container ship ONE Majesty also sustained damage in a separate attack approximately 25 nautical miles northwest of Ras Al Khaimah, with the vessel’s master reporting a 10-centimeter hull breach. The vessel remained seaworthy and proceeded under its own power to safe anchorage, with all crew reported safe.

The Marshall Islands-flagged Kamsarmax bulk carrier Star Gwyneth was struck by an Iranian projectile approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Dubai, sustaining a two-meter hull breach in the forward cargo hold and damage to a ballast tank. The vessel subsequently anchored to assess structural integrity. No injuries were reported.

The vessel had departed Iranian waters nine days earlier, following a 12-day port call at Imam Khomeini, Iran’s primary bulk export terminal. This suggests a growing compliance risk in which vessels with recent Iranian trade exposure may face heightened targeting during the conflict.

A UKMTO advisory issued March 11 reported that a cargo vessel was struck by an unknown projectile 11 nautical miles north of Oman, resulting in a fire onboard. A follow-up update stated that the fire had been extinguished and no environmental damage had been reported.

Across the broader conflict period, at least 10 oil tankers have been struck or targeted in or near the Strait between March 1 and March 10.

Iranian Mining Threat

U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran has begun preparations to lay naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, according to multiple reports citing senior officials.

Initial deployment may involve several dozen mines, though Iran is estimated to possess an inventory of roughly 2,000 devices and retains significant minelaying capability despite recent strikes.

Even limited mining could render the Strait unsafe for commercial shipping for days or weeks, as clearance operations would require specialized mine countermeasure vessels and extensive surveying.

Markets reacted quickly to the reports, with oil prices rising roughly $10 per barrel following news of the potential escalation.

Naval mines can be deployed not only by dedicated vessels but also by small craft or submersibles, complicating detection and interdiction along the Gulf’s complex coastline. While the Strait would be the primary target, adjacent sea lanes, anchorages, and energy terminals could also face elevated risk if mining expands.

Mining is generally considered a last-resort escalation option, as it would likely disrupt Iran’s own shipping and shadow fleet exports moving crude through the Strait to China.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational exceptions increased across several Gulf and regional ports on March 10.

In-Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE

• 11 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+26.23% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+100.0% vs 7-day average).
• 6 transshipment rollovers (+20.0% vs 7-day average).
• 17 transshipment-delay cases (+12.26% vs 7-day average).

Dammam, Saudi Arabia

• 6 transshipment-delay cases (+35.48% vs 7-day average).

Hamad, Qatar

• 4 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+154.55% vs 7-day average).

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan

• 7 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+390.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+100.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 transshipment rollovers (+75.0% vs 7-day average).
• 5 transshipment-delay cases (+250.0% vs 7-day average).

Salalah, Oman

• 26 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+600.0% vs 7-day average).
• 12 transshipment rollovers (+58.49% vs 7-day average).
• 18 transshipment-delay cases (-36.68% vs 7-day average).

Sohar, Oman

• 2 port-of-loading late-departure cases (+250.0% vs 7-day average).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (+600.0% vs 7-day average).
• 4 transshipment-delay cases (+833.33% vs 7-day average).

The exception pattern indicates widening operational strain across Gulf and near-Gulf logistics networks.

Wet Cargo Analysis

Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to pivot crude export routes away from Hormuz-dependent infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has shifted significant volumes onto the Petroline (East–West Pipeline), allowing crude to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely and move directly from eastern production areas to Red Sea export terminals.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly curtailed approximately 2.0–2.5 million barrels per day of offshore production, including output from the Safaniya, Marjan, Zuluf, and Abu Safa fields, representing roughly 20% of national output.

Saudi Arabia has pivoted onshore Arab Light volumes onto the 7 million b/d Petroline, pushing Yanbu exports to approximately 2.47 million b/d, a 330% increase compared with pre-crisis levels.

That shift is now visible in fleet behavior. Twenty-seven VLCCs are currently heading toward Yanbu, compared with 18 vessels for Jeddah and three each for Jizan, Duba, and Rabigh. This concentration indicates that Yanbu is now serving as the primary outlet for Petroline-delivered crude and the central node of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea export workaround.

Remote Sensing Intelligence imagery from March 4 detected four crude tankers simultaneously at Yanbu, more than double the pre-crisis single-day peak, suggesting that Red Sea export terminals are operating at or near maximum berth capacity.

The urgency of the shift is also visible in route choice. Imagery shows the Yanbu-bound convoy moving across the Arabian Sea, through the Gulf of Aden, and toward Bab el-Mandeb, underscoring the scale of the diversion and the growing dependence on Red Sea routing.

Freight rates reflect the same stress. Some charterers have reportedly paid roughly $460,000 per day to secure VLCCs loading at Red Sea terminals for Asia, among the highest rates recorded for this route. Ownership data also shows a concentrated profile within the Yanbu-bound fleet: 46% are owned by Saudi state-owned Bahri, 32% by Chinese state-owned COSCO, and the remainder by independent owners. This suggests that Saudi and Chinese-linked fleets are carrying much of the burden of the Red Sea export workaround.

However, the rerouting also pushes a large number of tankers through the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb, increasing exposure if the conflict expands toward Houthi-controlled areas. This is particularly relevant given the historical pattern of lower Houthi threat toward Chinese-affiliated shipping relative to Western-linked tonnage.

Dry Bulk and Commodity Trade Impact

Windward data indicates that bulk carrier transits through Hormuz have dropped by 44% since Operation Epic Fury, while broader dry bulk activity is estimated to be down roughly 91% compared with pre-crisis levels.

Approximately 280 bulk carriers are currently stranded or trapped within the Gulf region.

The disruption has halted exports from a region responsible for roughly 18% of global seaborne iron ore pellet exports and nearly 10% of global primary aluminum production.

Aluminum prices have already reached record highs on the London Metal Exchange, while fertilizer exports from Iran and other Gulf producers are tightening global agricultural supply chains.

Iraqi Export Disruption

Iraqi southern Gulf export terminals are experiencing severe operational paralysis.

Through January and the first three weeks of February, Iraqi crude departures maintained a relatively stable cadence of 22–26 million barrels per week across 24–32 cargo liftings. The week of February 23 reached 28.4 million barrels, likely reflecting accelerated loading as the threat environment escalated.

The collapse that followed has been immediate and severe. Iraqi southern Gulf terminals have recorded zero crude departures on three of the first ten days of March, highlighting the extent to which export operations have been disrupted.

Destination data now shows a two-tier impact across customer markets. Tier 1 reflects complete supply severance: South Korea and Greece have received zero Iraqi crude barrels in March, representing a full interruption of deliveries. Tier 2 reflects severe reduction: India and China, Iraq’s largest customers, have experienced 80–93% declines compared with January baselines.

U.S.-bound cargoes have shown somewhat greater resilience, declining from 8 million barrels to 5.6 million and then 3.3 million, likely reflecting VLCCs that had already departed before the crisis escalated.

Iraq appears to be the most acutely affected Gulf producer, with production and export capacity constrained by terminal paralysis and the inability to safely move crude through the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia Back Door

Potential alternative Iranian export pathways may be emerging through the north.

Following the onset of Operation Epic Fury and the threatened closure of the Strait of Hormuz, multiple Russian tankers operating without AIS have been detected near Iranian ports in the Caspian Sea.

These non-transmitting vessels may indicate growing use of the northern Caspian corridor to move oil and bypass blocked southern maritime chokepoints.

Additional reporting also suggests that Russian shadow fleet operations in other theaters may be becoming more physically hardened. Crew manifest reporting tied to Baltic sanctions trade indicates that vessels carrying sanctioned Russian oil have, in some cases, sailed with supernumerary personnel linked to Russian security organizations.

The activity indicates that Russia-linked oil logistics networks may be adapting both operationally and physically to heightened enforcement and chokepoint disruption.

M/V TRUST and Russia Shadow Fleet Activity

Russian shadow fleet activity continues to exploit reduced maritime visibility during the Gulf crisis.

Windward reported on March 8 that the sanctioned M/V TRUST carried out a high-probability semi-dark ship-to-ship transfer in Omani territorial waters involving approximately 325,000 barrels of Russian crude originally loaded at Ust-Luga.

At an estimated oil price of around $90 per barrel on March 10, the cargo would have carried an approximate value of $29.3 million.

According to our assessment, the tanker switched off its AIS during a prolonged stationary meeting with another vessel, while the counterpart vessel remained anonymous. This created a semi-dark rather than fully dark event, complicating monitoring while still leaving partial evidence of the transfer.

The timing of the operation coincided with heightened military escalation in the Gulf following Operation Epic Fury, suggesting that the vessel may have exploited the wider conflict environment and reduced scrutiny to conduct the transfer.

The case reinforces the presence of operational blind spots that allow illicit maritime activity to continue even during major regional disruption.

Dark Activity Near Cuban Energy Infrastructure 

Vortexa data shows an absence of any tracked calls into Cuba, while the SEA HORSE (IMO 9262584), a Russia-linked vessel believed to be spoofing or calling dark, had been sailing openly toward the island until February 25. Based on timing, the vessel may already have arrived, but no confirmed match has been identified in imagery.

SAR imagery from March 9 shows a dark vessel approximately 270 meters long positioned at the crude terminal in Matanzas port. This vessel is larger than the SEA HORSE, making it an unlikely direct match.

Additional imagery also shows two dark vessels at southern berths, each measuring approximately 200 meters. These are likely tankers, although berth function could not be fully verified.

The imagery indicates that dark tanker activity may be continuing near Cuban oil infrastructure even though tracked calls remain absent in Vortexa data.

Outlook

The March 11 operating picture shows a maritime environment in which suppressed Hormuz traffic, expanding kinetic risk, adaptive vessel signaling, and widening supply-chain disruption are all interacting at once.

AIS-confirmed crossings remain extremely limited, but remote sensing intelligence indicates that vessel presence inside the Strait exceeds visible maritime traffic, suggesting that partial, dark, or low-visibility movement continues under highly constrained conditions. At the same time, the attack pattern is widening, and preparations for possible Iranian mine deployment raise the risk of a more severe escalation that could temporarily close the Strait to commercial shipping.

Beyond Hormuz, route redistribution remains active rather than temporary. Cape of Good Hope diversions remain elevated, Suez traffic has weakened, and Gulf producers are accelerating export pivots toward alternative infrastructure. Port disruptions are spreading across regional logistics networks, while dry bulk, fertilizer, metals, and crude supply chains are all tightening simultaneously.

Taken together, the crisis is no longer affecting only tanker movements through Hormuz. It is now shaping naval posture, commodity markets, industrial supply chains, and global maritime trade routes across multiple theaters.