Iran War at Sea: How the Conflict Is Disrupting Global Trade and Energy

At a Glance

• Strait of Hormuz transits have collapsed 94.2% since February 28, falling from a pre-war average of 120 daily transits to just 6.9, with satellite imagery confirming an 84.4% reduction in large vessels physically present in the corridor.
• Arabian Gulf port calls have fallen 47.3% in 14 days, with AIS-transmitting vessels calling Gulf ports dropping from 1,065 to 261.
• Crude exports west of Hormuz have fallen 87%, from 20.1 million barrels per day at the start of the war to 2.7 million barrels per day for the week ending March 15.
• Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG export hub, was struck on March 18, and Qatar confirmed a full halt to gas production on March 19.
• Fujairah is functionally offline as a bunkering hub after repeated drone strikes, sending bunker prices to historic highs and forcing suppliers into force majeure.
• Saudi Arabia has shifted exports toward Yanbu, with 57 VLCCs now underway to the port and crude departures there reaching roughly 5 million barrels per day, a 12-month high.
• Container shipping in the Gulf is no longer operating as a flowing network but as a holding pattern, with 119 container vessels still transmitting inside the Arabian Gulf, including 17 mainline ULCVs.
• Iran is sustaining selective maritime movement through a permission-based model, while also using Kooh Mobarak and the Goreh-Jask pipeline as a strategic export backdoor.

The New Operating Reality

Operation Epic Fury began on February 28 and has since pushed the global maritime system into a new phase of sustained disruption. The disruption is no longer limited to isolated vessel attacks or temporary route changes. It now spans chokepoints, oil exports, LNG, bunkering, container rotations, port systems, and sanctions-linked oil flows.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the clearest measure of that shift. Before February 28, it averaged 120 transits per day in both directions. Since the start of the war, that number has fallen to just 6.9. This is not based solely on AIS data — Remote Sensing Intelligence confirms an 84.4% reduction in large vessels physically present in the corridor, from 96 vessels on January 17 at 07:02 UTC to 15 on March 13 at the same hour.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most consequential energy chokepoints, carrying roughly 20% of global energy flows, including petroleum liquids and LNG. What has emerged since the start of the conflict is not a corridor under stress, but a tightly constrained system in which most of the global fleet has physically vacated the area, while the marginal volume still moving is increasingly dark, selective, and politically conditioned.

The Arabian Gulf Operational Overview

The Arabian Gulf is still active, but it is no longer operating normally. As of March 19, Windward identified 1,290 foreign-flagged cargo and tanker vessels inside the Gulf. Activity is now heavily concentrated along the western coast, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia serving as the primary hubs, while operators pull away from the Iranian coastline and prioritize more secure GCC infrastructure.

The current fleet composition highlights which registries, operators, and vessel types continue to maintain a presence in the Gulf under these conditions.

Flag registries:

• Panama: 379 vessels.
• Marshall Islands: 259 vessels.
• Liberia: 251 vessels.
• Comoros: 217 vessels.
• Singapore: 96 vessels.

Ownership and management by country:

• China: 480 vessels.
• Singapore: 474 vessels.
• Greece: 431 vessels.
• Marshall Islands: 329 vessels.
• Japan: 323 vessels.

Vessel subclasses:

• Bulk carriers: 415 vessels.
• General cargo: 341 vessels.
• Crude oil tankers: 283 vessels.
• Oil products tankers: 226 vessels.
• Container vessels: 119 vessels.
• LNG tankers: 51 vessels.

International shipping remains active in the Gulf, but under reduced mobility, elevated risk, and increasing reliance on western Gulf corridors.

Gulf Commercial Operations

Before the war, Gulf commercial activity was expanding. From January to February 2026, Arabian Gulf port calls grew 8.2% month over month. Operation Epic Fury reversed that trajectory almost immediately.

In the first 14 days of the war, Gulf port call frequency collapsed 47.3%. AIS-transmitting vessels calling Arabian Gulf ports fell from 1,065 to 261. 

UAE activity remains dominant, but even there, total port calls dropped from 680 to 157, with Port Rashid still leading the reduced network. Iranian activity has nearly vanished, especially in Assaluyeh, while Saudi ports and strategic sites such as Umm Qasr and the Barakah plant now account for a larger share of what remains.

Anchoring behavior tells the same story. Since the start of the Iran conflict, anchoring duration has fallen 78.6% compared to the February baseline. Even against the January to February month-over-month comparison, anchoring was already down 42%, but the war accelerated that decline into operational suppression. Vessels are no longer using anchorage as a stable staging area. They are repositioning tactically, minimizing exposure, and shifting away from earlier concentrations such as Ras Laffan, toward Port Rashid and Sharjah.

The number of unique anchoring vessels transmitting AIS has dropped from 497 to 418. At the same time, UAE anchoring events rose from 212 to 302, while Iranian activity fell nearly 40% from 171 to 106. 

The result is a Gulf logistics picture that is more concentrated, constrained, and defensive.

GPS Jamming Disrupts Maritime Visibility

The operational picture is further complicated by persistent GPS jamming. Since the start of the conflict, vessel transmissions across the Gulf have been repeatedly distorted. Current disruption is causing AIS signals from the northern Gulf to appear in the southern Gulf, especially near the UAE, creating a misleading picture of vessel location and movement.

Some anomalous peaks in port call data during late February and mid-March were not real increases in activity, but artificial inflation caused by jamming. In practice, AIS in the Gulf can no longer be treated as sufficient on its own. Windward data showed more than 1,100 vessels affected by GPS and AIS jamming on the first day of the conflict, with 44 jamming clusters and 92 denial areas by March 1. 

As a result, SAR and EO corroboration are now necessary to build an accurate picture of vessel location and activity. 

The Strait of Hormuz Operational Overview 

The Strait of Hormuz is no longer functioning as either a fully open route or a formally closed one — it is operating as a selective system.

The early phase of the war triggered a near-instantaneous paralysis of traffic through the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoint. Traffic fell from a daily average of 120 transits in both directions prior to the conflict to a daily average of just 6.9 transits, representing a 94.2% collapse in active maritime traffic. 

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirms that vessels are not merely going dark, but that the corridor has been physically vacated. 

In the past 72 hours, the blockade has shifted from a total blockade to a permission-based system, where a specific subset of vessels has successfully navigated the strait by abandoning international shipping lanes in favor of Iranian territorial waters. Windward tracked at least five eastbound bulk carriers exiting the Gulf between March 15 and 16, hugging Iranian coastlines, rather than using the standard international navigation corridor. In nearly all of those cases, the vessels had previously called at Imam Khomeini Port. Two LPG carriers also successfully transited on March 13. 

This pattern points to a permission-based system, designed to allow allies and supporters to transit while the strait remains effectively closed to the global fleet. 

The Oil Market Has Split in Two

Operation Epic Fury has fundamentally restructured the maritime energy trade. The result is a split system: a paralysed conventional Gulf export network on one side, and a narrower but resilient Iranian corridor on the other.

For the seven days ending March 15, crude and condensate loadings from Middle East export ports collapsed 62% week on week to 4.6 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia saw a drop of 3.7 million barrels per day, the UAE 3.0 million barrels per day, and Bahrain recorded no exports at all. For cargoes west of Hormuz, the collapse was even steeper: just 2.7 million barrels per day for the week ending March 15 versus nearly 20.1 million barrels per day for the week ending March 1, an 87% fall.

Across the broader period from February 1 to mid-March, crude and condensate exports fell from 514.23 million barrels to 167.08 million barrels, a 67.5% decline. Clean petroleum products dropped from 182.50 million barrels to 69.27 million barrels. Dirty petroleum products collapsed 75.1%, from 24.84 million barrels to 6.18 million barrels, effectively halting the regional bunkering industry.

Most of the remaining shipments are trapped inside the Middle East Gulf. With the exception of two cargoes bound for India and tankers laden with Iranian oil, none have exited Hormuz in the past two weeks.

Global Oil Flows Collapse

The conflict has fundamentally disrupted maritime energy trade, creating a split between a near-paralyzed conventional export system and a smaller but resilient corridor for Iranian flows. Brent crude rose from $78 to over $110 per barrel, reflecting a sustained geopolitical risk premium tied to disrupted Gulf supply.

Crude and condensate loadings from Middle East export ports fell 62% week-on-week to 4.6 million barrels per day for the period ending March 15. The largest declines were recorded in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Bahrain reported no exports. This aligns with the International Energy Agency’s estimates of a 10 million barrel-per-day production cut across Gulf producers.

The disruption is more severe for shipments west of Hormuz, where loadings dropped from 20.1 million barrels per day at the start of the war to 2.7 million barrels per day by March 15, an 87% collapse. Most shipments remain trapped inside the Gulf, with almost no vessels exiting the Strait aside from limited cargoes and Iranian-linked flows.

Across all product types, exports have sharply declined from February to mid-March, with crude and condensates down 67.5%, clean petroleum products down 62%, and dirty petroleum products down 75.1%.

Iranian Oil Flows Remain Active

Iran has not been immune to the disruption, but it has remained the most consistent exporter through the Strait. Post-event crude exports to China reached 18.18 million barrels, down from 56.33 million barrels in the equivalent pre-war period, but still materially higher than flows from other Gulf producers, which have largely dropped to near zero on the same route.

Kharg Island continues to operate despite targeted U.S. strikes on March 14. Since March 1, the terminal has exported 18.36 million barrels of crude, including 6.35 million barrels across five shipments since March 15. Remote Sensing Intelligence from March 17 confirms two VLCCs and one Aframax berthed at the terminal, alongside a queue of nine additional large vessels waiting offshore, indicating sustained loading activity and backlog demand.

Iran has also reduced its reliance on Hormuz by operationalizing the Goreh-Jask pipeline and the Kooh Mobarak terminal as an alternative export route. The terminal has already loaded 2.01 million barrels of crude. One confirmed shipment involved the sanctioned VLCC DORE, which departed on March 8 following a 15-day AIS blackout. SAR imagery verified the vessel’s presence at the terminal prior to departure, and it is currently en route to Dalian carrying approximately 1.77 million barrels of crude.

These patterns indicate that while the broader Gulf export system is constrained, Iranian oil flows continue through controlled and alternative routes, supported by dedicated infrastructure and adapted operating methods.

Saudi Arabian Exports Shift to the Red Sea

Saudi Arabia is responding differently. Rather than sustaining Gulf exports through selective transit, it is re-routing flows across the peninsula.

Saudi Aramco is using the 1,200-kilometer East-West Pipeline, or Petroline, to move crude westward to Yanbu for Red Sea export. As of March 18, 57 VLCCs were underway to King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu. Over the previous 12 months, only 18 VLCCs had called the port, and just 7 of those were foreign-flagged.

This is not a marginal adjustment. March 2026 is already showing a 12-month high in crude exports from Yanbu, at approximately 5 million barrels per day. 

Electro-optical imagery from March 14 showed 15 tankers above 240 meters berthed at the port and another 20 drifting or anchored offshore. 98% of the VLCCs underway to Yanbu are ballast, indicating that vessels are positioning to load crude via Red Sea export routes. 

The top destinations of the crude product originating from the port of Yanbu are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, China, South Korea, and Japan. Meanwhile, China, Taiwan, and South Korea are the main origins of VLCCs heading to Yanbu, reflecting Asia’s continued dependence on Middle East Gulf crude. 

Saudi Arabia is clearly preserving part of its export capacity through this pivot, maintaining approximately 5 million barrels per day. However, the strain is evident. Berth pressure, anchorage buildup, and the concentration of tonnage point to a system operating under constraint rather than a fully scaled alternative.

Russian Oil Flows and Activity

The war has also altered Russian oil-on-water dynamics. After U.S. sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil last October, Russian cargoes at sea rose sharply, with distressed barrels peaking at 173 million barrels at the end of January, well above the three-year average of 109 million barrels.

That trend has now started to reverse after the U.S. Treasury issued License 134, allowing Russian crude and petroleum products already on the water to complete delivery. The measure is designed to add barrels back into the market and reduce oil prices. 

This shift shows that disruption is no longer confined to the Gulf but is influencing sanctions enforcement, oil flows, and market dynamics on a global scale. 

LPG Market Disruption

LPG exports west of Hormuz have also collapsed sharply. For the week ending March 15, exports of propane and butane from Middle East ports west of the Strait were just 131,000 barrels per day, slightly below 10% of the seasonal average of 1.2 million barrels per day.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran recorded no loadings last week. Most remaining shipments came from the UAE at 86,000 barrels per day. This is globally significant. The Middle East Gulf suppliers west of Hormuz exported just over 1.2 million barrels per day of LPG, including ammonia, in 2025, against global exports of 6.4 million barrels per day, underscoring the region’s importance to global supply.

Ras Laffan Strike Disrupts Global LNG Supply

Iran’s campaign against Qatari infrastructure began on March 1 with drone strikes against state facilities, including a QatarEnergy site at Ras Laffan and the Mesaieed power plant. Qatar intercepted additional waves on March 9 and March 15. But on the evening of March 18, one Iranian missile broke through defenses and struck the Ras Laffan complex, the world’s largest LNG export hub, after four others were intercepted. Fires broke out, and QatarEnergy described the damage as extensive. By March 19, authorities confirmed a full halt to gas production.

This has immediate and potentially long-lasting consequences. Ras Laffan is the center of Qatar’s LNG system, and recovery could take significant time if infrastructure damage proves deep. The impact also extends into fertilizers. The Qatar Fertiliser Company operates the world’s largest single-site urea export facility in the same industrial complex. Qatar accounts for roughly 14% to 15% of global urea exports, and a sustained interruption now puts annual output of 5.6 million tonnes of urea and 3.8 million tonnes of ammonia at risk.

The market has already reacted. Urea prices are up 34.96% in recent days and 59.79% year on year. 

European natural gas futures have surged around 25% to above €68 per MWh.

Fujairah Bunkering Market Faces Disruptions

Fujairah, the world’s third-largest crude storage hub and one of the most important bunkering locations outside Hormuz, has suffered repeated drone-related fires on March 3, March 9, March 13–14, and March 16. Storage infrastructure was damaged, loading operations were suspended, and Vopak temporarily halted vessel loading. Multiple suppliers, including Mediterranean Eastern Enterprise and Pearl Marine, declared force majeure.

The result has been one of the most severe bunker price shocks ever recorded. HSFO 380 rose from around $452 per metric ton pre-crisis to $735 by March 11, a 62% increase. VLSFO rose from around $548 to above $1,000, a 60% increase. MGO LS rose from around $815 to $1,230, and briefly exceeded $1,300 per metric ton, the highest level recorded since MABUX began tracking in 2001.

This is no longer a local port problem. Fujairah is functionally offline, Singapore and Rotterdam are trying to absorb displaced demand, and every additional week of Hormuz disruption tightens global marine fuel supply chains. Brokers are already reporting freezes in deals across market segments.

Container Shipping Faces Severe Disruption

Container shipping inside the Gulf is now operating as a holding pattern rather than a functioning network.

As of March 18, Windward identified 119 container vessels actively transmitting inside the Arabian Gulf. That includes 17 ULCVs above 100,000 DWT and 17 feeder vessels below 10,000 DWT. Broader industry estimates place around 138 vessels sheltering in the Gulf by early March, with the delta explained by exits and non-transmitting vessels.

Vessel distribution by location:

• UAE coast (Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port, Sharjah anchorage): 69 vessels (58%).
• Hormuz and Bandar Abbas cluster: 18 vessels (15%), predominantly Iranian-operated or IRISL-linked.
• Mid-Gulf: 11 vessels.
• Northwestern Gulf (Kuwait, Umm Qasr): 4 vessels.
• Qatari waters: 5 vessels.

Vessel distribution by flag:

• Panama: 20 vessels.
• Liberia: 16 vessels.
• Iran: 13 vessels.
• Singapore: 11 vessels.
• Comoros: 10 vessels.
• Marshall Islands: 9 vessels.

Vessel distribution by operator:

• MSC: 15 vessels.
• CMA CGM: 12 vessels.
• Maersk: 4 vessels.
• Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management: 4 vessels.
• COSCO: 3 vessels.
• Hapag-Lloyd: 3 vessels.

The operational impact is global. More than 270,000 TEU of cargo, valued at roughly $10 billion, is stranded or constrained. But the bigger issue is rotation. Vessels that cannot leave Hormuz cannot complete voyages, and Cape rerouting adds 10 to 15 days per round trip. That amplifies effective capacity withdrawal far beyond the raw stranded TEU number.

Rates are already moving. The Drewry World Container Index rose from $1,958 per FEU on February 26 to $2,123 by March 12. Shanghai to Jebel Ali climbed from around $1,800 to above $4,000 per FEU. Shanghai to Rotterdam rose 19% to $2,443. Shanghai to Genoa rose 10% to $3,120. Air freight has also surged, with South Asia to North America up 58% and Europe to the Middle East up 55%.

Port Operation Expands Across the Region

Port disruption remains uneven, with extreme spikes in transshipment delays and rollovers concentrated in alternative hubs such as Salalah and Karachi, while Gulf ports show mixed signals between decline and localized surges. Between March 11 and March 17, the following was observed.

Inside the Gulf

Jebel Ali, UAE:

• 16 port-of-loading delays (-60.98% WoW, -72.17% vs 4-week avg).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (-71.43% WoW, -80% vs 4-week avg).
• 41 transshipment delays (-50% WoW, -34.14% vs 4-week avg).
• 43 transshipment rollovers (+38.71% WoW, +42.15% vs 4-week avg).

Khalifa Port, UAE:

• 12 transshipment delays (-82.35% WoW, -40% vs 4-week avg).
• 18 transshipment rollovers (+5.88% WoW, +260% vs 4-week avg).

Khor Fakkan, UAE:

• 14 transshipment delays (0-baseline WoW, +166.67% vs 4-week avg).

Jubail, Saudi Arabia:

• 12 transshipment rollovers (0-baseline WoW, +2,300% vs 4-week avg).

Hamad, Qatar:

• 4 port-of-loading delays (+300% WoW -46.67% vs 4-week avg).
• 2 transshipment rollovers (0-baseline WoW, +14.29% vs 4-week avg).
• 5 transshipment delays (+150% WoW, +100% vs 4-week avg).

Shuwaikh, Kuwait:

• 2 port-of-loading delays (-60% WoW, -75% vs 4-week avg).
• 2 port-of-loading rollovers (-33.33% WoW, +100% vs 4-week avg).
• 4 transshipment delays (0-baseline WoW, -46.67% vs 4-week avg).
• 2 transshipment rollovers (no-change WoW, -63.64% vs 4-week avg).

Outside the Gulf

Karachi, Pakistan:

• 8 port-of-loading delays (-50% WoW, -20% vs 4-week avg).
• 12 port-of-loading rollovers (+33.33% WoW, +242.86% vs 4-week avg).
• 28 transshipment delays (+115.38% WoW, +64.71% vs 4-week avg).
• 20 transshipment rollovers (+100% WoW, +150% vs 4-week avg).

Salalah, Oman:

• 30 port-of-loading delays (-6.25% WoW, -55.72% vs 4-week avg).
• 8 port-of-loading rollovers (+166.67% WoW, +68.42% vs 4-week avg).
• 317 transshipment delays (+190.83% WoW, +191.49% vs 4-week avg).
• 180 transshipment rollovers (+350% WoW, +341.72% vs 4-week avg).

These are not isolated operational anomalies. They show a regional system under strain, with congestion shifting into the very ports operators are relying on as alternatives.

Maritime Security Risk Overview

From a military standpoint, the operating environment remains dangerous even after severe attrition to Iran’s navy. CENTCOM has declared Iran’s navy combat ineffective and reported the destruction of more than 43 Iranian naval vessels, including the drone carrier IRIS Shahid Bagheri, both Bayandor-class corvettes, a Jamaran-class corvette, one Kilo-class submarine, a Fateh-class submarine likely rendered inoperable, multiple Ghadir-class midget submarines, and 16 IRGC mine-laying small craft.

But combat ineffectiveness is not the same as being irrelevant. The IRGC retains a significantly small-boat and mine-laying capability, continues to strike high-value infrastructure, and has not slowed operational tempo. On March 17, Wave 58 of Operation True Promise-4 targeted U.S. bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as 5th Fleet ships. Strategic assets hit or threatened by the IRGC now include Ras Laffan, Yanbu, Fujairah, and Jebel Ali.

At least 20 documented commercial vessels have been struck in the Gulf and surrounding area since the war began. 

Meanwhile, efforts to assemble a Hormuz escort coalition remain weak. France has declined, the EU has not expanded Operation Aspides, Japan and South Korea have made no commitment, NATO has no mission, and only the UK and some European states are still working through options or discussions.

Outlook

The maritime impacts of Operation Epic Fury are no longer limited to a chokepoint crisis. They now span every layer of the system: commercial operations, energy exports, gas supply, bunkering, liner rotations, port performance, and naval risk.

Hormuz is not functioning as an open waterway. It is a selectively permeable corridor in which the global fleet is largely frozen, while approved or aligned vessels still move through dark or tightly managed channels. Iran has shown that it can sustain part of its export system through Kharg and Kooh Mobarak. Saudi Arabia has shown that it can preserve part of its export capacity through Yanbu, but only under visible logistical strain. Qatar’s LNG system has entered a far more serious phase of disruption, and Fujairah’s impairment has broken bunker market stability.

The global maritime system is adapting, but adaptation is not normalization. Cape diversions, transshipment stress, suspended bookings, war risk surcharges, bunker price spikes, and energy corridor substitution are all signs of a system operating under constraint, not recovering from it.

The key insight now is that the Gulf is no longer operating under a single rule set. Movement is selective. Visibility is degraded. Infrastructure is targetable. And the consequences are no longer regional. They are global.