April 30, 2026: Iran War Maritime Intelligence Daily

At a Glance

• Transit through Hormuz increased to 20 crossings, with expanded use of both Northern and Southern Corridors.
• Dark activity surged to 170 events, the highest level in recent days.
• Gulf vessel presence rose to 902, indicating renewed system movement.
• Dark transits continue through the Larak chokepoint, maintaining a steady baseline of non-cooperative activity.
• Bandar Abbas anchorage remains constrained, with vessels holding position under enforcement pressure.
• Kharg activity reflects mixed loading and drift, signaling controlled export throughput.
• GPS jamming and IUU fishing activity are adding new layers of operational risk across the region.

Operational Overview 

Maritime activity across the Strait of Hormuz increased on April 29, with higher transit volumes and broader corridor usage, while deceptive shipping practices continued to expand across the Gulf.

Transit flows rose to their highest level in recent days, with a notable return to the Southern Corridor alongside sustained outbound movement. At the same time, dark activity surged, indicating that increased volume is being matched by intensified evasion.

Across adjacent areas, dark vessel movement persists through key chokepoints, while anchorage patterns near Bandar Abbas and Kharg Island reflect continued operational caution and constrained export dynamics.

The system is showing a clear split in behavior. Movement through the Strait is becoming more active and visible, while concealment, disruption, and non-cooperative activity are expanding across the wider region.

Transit Expands Across Both Corridors

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz increased to 20 crossings on April 29, including 6 inbound and 14 outbound movements.

All outbound vessels transmitted AIS, while inbound activity included two dark transits.

Traffic split across both corridors, with 13 vessels routing through the Northern Corridor and 7 through the Southern Corridor, marking the highest Southern Corridor usage observed in recent days.

Inbound traffic included two bulk carriers flagged to Panama and China, alongside four cargo vessels, with two flagged to India and two to Comoros.

Outbound traffic included two tankers flagged to Curaçao and Palau, two bulk carriers flagged to Iran and Panama, and ten cargo vessels with four flagged to Iran, three to Comoros, and three to India.

The expansion of Southern Corridor usage reflects adaptive routing behavior, as operators adjust to evolving enforcement conditions and risk exposure.

Gulf Activity Rises Alongside Deception

Total vessel presence across the Gulf increased to 902 vessels, indicating a continued rebuild in overall activity.

Panama remained the dominant flag state with 137 vessels, followed by Iran (103), Comoros (91), the UAE (75), the Marshall Islands (71), and Liberia (67).

Fleet composition included 144 bulk carriers, 135 product tankers, 75 crude tankers, 63 container ships, 38 LNG and LPG carriers, and 33 chemical tankers.

At the same time, dark activity events increased to 170, marking the highest level in recent days.

This parallel increase in both vessel count and dark behavior indicates that higher movement is being accompanied by a greater reliance on concealment and deceptive shipping practices, rather than a shift toward transparency.

Dark Movement and Anchorage Constraints Around Larak and Bandar Abbas

Dark vessel activity and anchorage patterns around Larak Island and Bandar Abbas together highlight how movement and containment are interacting under enforcement pressure.

On April 29, three large dark vessels, including one VLCC, were observed transiting the Larak Island chokepoint, with two inbound and one outbound, all exceeding 200 meters in length. The pace of these dark transits has remained steady over the past two weeks, indicating a consistent baseline of non-cooperative movement through this critical corridor.

At the same time, vessel presence in the Bandar Abbas and Shahid Rajai area has stabilized at approximately 70 vessels, down from pre-blockade levels of around 90. Daily volumes of high-risk vessels, including sanctioned and falsely flagged ships, continue to range between 20 and 25.

Most vessels remain at anchor rather than committing to transit, reflecting sustained reluctance to move outward under current conditions.

Taken together, this pattern shows a system where dark movement through the chokepoint continues at a controlled rate, while a larger portion of the fleet remains staged behind it. This reinforces a shift from fluid transit toward managed release, with vessels balancing the need to move against the risks of exposure and enforcement.

Kharag Activity Reflects Controlled Throughput

EO imagery identified three dark tankers drifting at Kharg anchorage.

At the same time, two tankers were observed at berth at the T-jetty, including one VLCC and one oil products tanker.

This combination of active loading and idle dark vessels reinforces a pattern of constrained export operations, where throughput continues but at a controlled and uneven pace.

GPS Jamming Expands Beyond the Strait

GPS jamming incidents are increasing outside the Strait of Hormuz, particularly near the Khor Fakkan area.

This indicates a widening scope of electronic interference across key maritime approaches, adding an additional layer of navigational and operational risk for vessels transiting the region.

IUU Fishing Activity Expands in Oman’s Waters

Over the past 12 months, 43 Chinese fishing vessels conducted 3,611 fishing operations, 338 dark activity events, and four port visits within Oman’s EEZ, alongside just four port visits. This indicates sustained offshore operations with minimal port reliance. 33 vessels operated directly within coastal zones, with activity concentrated around Duqm and Ras Madrakah.

Twelve vessels were assessed as high risk for illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, with two linked to suspected forced labor indicators. This concentration of high-risk activity within both EEZ and nearshore waters signals persistent non-compliant operations at scale.

The most active vessels belong to a major Chinese fishing fleet linked to a large state-owned group. This operator has a documented history of IUU violations across multiple regions, including fishing in protected zones, disabling AIS to evade detection, and operating under false flag identities. 

Past enforcement cases include the seizure of FU YUAN YU 831 by Indonesian authorities, while it was carrying 35 tons of illicit catch and protected species. The same operator has previously established overseas fishing bases through joint venture structures that have been associated with long-term stock depletion in coastal ecosystems.

Operations in Oman are supported by a network of five supply tankers operating under flags of convenience, including Comoros, Gabon, Sierra Leone, and Honduras. These vessels conducted 132 ship-to-ship transfers, enabling continuous offshore activity without the need for port calls. At least three of these support vessels are already linked to IUU activity. This offshore resupply model is a known evasion tactic in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea and remains largely unmonitored by regional enforcement bodies.

This pattern reflects more than localized illegal fishing. Chinese distant water fleets have previously driven severe stock depletion across regions such as Mauritania, Guinea, and Senegal through sustained industrial-scale activity in waters designated for local communities. With more than 3,600 fishing operations recorded inside Oman’s EEZ within a single year, including significant activity in coastal zones reserved for artisanal fishing, similar pressure dynamics may be developing.

The emergence of joint venture structures with local entities further increases exposure. Comparable models in other regions have been used to gain access to restricted waters under local cover, enabling prolonged and non-transparent operations. The appearance of similar patterns in Oman warrants close monitoring as part of the broader maritime risk environment.

Outlook

Transit through the Strait is increasing, with broader corridor usage and sustained outbound movement signaling a partial recovery in activity.

At the same time, the rise in dark activity shows that increased movement is not translating into greater transparency. Instead, operators are scaling both visible transit and concealed operations in parallel.

Chokepoint monitoring confirms that non-cooperative movement remains embedded in the system, while anchorage patterns near Bandar Abbas and Kharg Island indicate continued caution and constrained export dynamics.

The addition of GPS interference and expanding IUU fishing activity further complicates the operating environment, extending risk beyond traditional shipping and enforcement frameworks.

Overall, the system is becoming more active but not more stable. Movement is increasing, but so is complexity, with enforcement pressure, evasion strategies, and layered risks continuing to shape maritime behavior across the region.