GPS Jamming Rises 55% in a Week in the Middle East Gulf

At a Glance

• More than 1,650 vessels experienced GPS and AIS interference across the Middle East Gulf on March 7, up 55% from a week ago.
• Ships are falsely positioned across the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, stretching from Kuwait to Muscat, Oman, adding to already critical navigation and compliance risks.
• Windward identified at least 30 jamming clusters across Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Iran, both on land and at sea.
• Persistent electronic interference increases collision risk, false compliance alerts, and operational uncertainty in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.
• Ships are no longer at anchor off the Middle East bunkering hub of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan after the March 4 attack on fuel oil tanks.

GPS Jamming Expands Across the Gulf

GPS jamming affected more than 1,650 ships in the Middle East Gulf on March 7, up 55% from the previous week, erroneously placing vessels across land and sea in Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

Electronic interference with ships’ Automatic Identification Systems was already endemic in the region before the launch of Operation Epic Fury. Nearly 1,100 ships were impacted within 24 hours after the U.S. attacked Iran on February 28. That number has now risen to more than 1,650.

Windward has identified at least 30 clusters where ships’ AIS are being jammed, including across the Gulf of Oman, and areas on land and sea within the Middle East Gulf, especially near areas where port and facility infrastructure has been attacked or near military areas. 

A week ago, clusters were mainly crop circle-like patterns, but have since evolved into zig-zag type lines, with ships’ signals thrown across multiple locations within a 24-hour period. There was mass AIS interference at the bunkering hub of Fujairah, from where ships have since dispersed after fuel tanks were attacked on March 3, and amid warnings that congested areas carry greater risks of attack.

GPS jamming is concentrating ships’ AIS into clusters of several hundred vessels off the Gulf of Oman.

Major Bunkering Hub of Fujairah Shuts Down

Vessels are avoiding the bunkering hub of Fujairah, the world’s second-largest after Singapore, in the wake of attacks on tank storage areas in the region on March 3.

Bunker suppliers have declared force majeure or suspended deliveries, and vessels are generally avoiding the port due to heightened security risks. There is now an unprecedented near-absence of tonnage at anchor at Khor Fakkan and Fujairah.

Attacks on Vessels and Energy Infrastructure 

So far, 14 tankers and an oil rig have been attacked or hit by missiles or drones, with the Joint Maritime Information Center confirming 11 events. Eleven crew members have been killed, including eight on Mussafeh 2. The latest report, from March 7, claiming a Malta-flagged tanker called Prima was hit, attributed to the IRGC, has not yet been verified.

Affected vessels include: 

• Skylight (IMO 9330020).
• Mkd Vyom (IMO 9284386).
• Sea La Donna (IMO 9380532). 
• Hercules Star (IMO 9916135).
• Stena Imperative (IMO 9666077).
• Athe Nova (IMO 9188116). 
• Ocean Electra (IMO 9402782).
• Safeen Prestige (IMO 9593517) and Mussafah 2 (IMO 9522051), the tug supporting.
• Pelagia (IMO 9402940).
• Sonagal Namibe (9325049).
• MSC Grace (IMO 9987366).
• Golden Oak (IMO unidentified).
• Libra Trader (IMO 9562673).
• Prima (IMO unidentified, IRGC claim not verified).

Port infrastructure targeted:

• Oil Rig Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia. 
• Ras Tanura refinery.
• Bapco refinery.
• Ras Laffan gas complex.
• Duqm port fuel tanks.
• Fuel storage tankers at Fujairah Oil Industry Zone.

Russian Oil Price Cap Breach Creates Market Pressure

Soaring oil prices have seen Russia’s oil price cap breached across the board for crude and refined products, presenting fresh challenges for Russia, as well as the Greek-owned tankers that undertake about a quarter of all shipments.

The oil price cap of $100/barrel for Russian refined products was surpassed as wholesale diesel and gasoil prices in Europe surged 54% compared with the previous week, closing at over $1158/tonne on March 6. That is equivalent to $155 per barrel. Europe’s wholesale prices of diesel and jet fuel are measured as a premium against this marker. 

The stratospheric price gains mean that new sales of Russian oil are no longer price cap-compliant, based on global assessments from the world’s price reporting agencies.

Wholesale EU jet fuel prices are up ~70% from a week ago as tankers remain stranded in the Middle East and are unable to load middle distillates from export refineries in the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia that supply gasoil, diesel, and jet fuel to Europe and Asia. 

The EU27 and the UK are short of diesel, and after banning Russian imports three years ago, the region relies heavily on Middle East Gulf refineries and the U.S. for middle distillates.

Greek shipowners shipped 50% of Russia’s refined products (mostly diesel) in January and 16% of all Russian crude, based on analysis using data from Windward and Vortexa. 

As oil prices have spiked, the cost of Urals, the Russian grade loaded from Baltic and Black Sea ports, has reportedly risen from $40/bbl to $70/bbl, exceeding both the UK & EU cap of $44.10/bbl and the U.S. cap of $60/bbl. 

Private Greek owners have long kept their presence in this market, but will now likely be pushed out in the coming weeks.

This presents policy and market dilemmas. Russian refined products are primarily shipped to South American and African countries, relying on a mix of sanctioned, dark fleet tonnage, Asian ships, and Greek-owned tankers. Who will step in to replace those EU-owned tankers that did 50% of the business is unclear. 

Medium-range charter rates are already surging, setting fresh records daily. Rates to ship from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean exceeded $108,000 per day according to weekend shipbroker reports, while rates to northwest Europe from the U.S. Gulf were over $110,000 per day.

There are some 75 MR tankers stranded in the Middle East Gulf out of a total trading fleet of about 2,500.

While higher crude prices will benefit Putin, the Kremlin faces reduced availability and record-high freight costs as Asian buyers scramble for replacement crude.

With diesel prices rising sharply, the Indian market is largely closed to the EU after a ban on refined products derived from Russian crude took effect in January as part of the 18th sanctions package. This will further constrain supply options. 

The Trickle of Hormuz Transits  

At least 18 vessels that have been tracked undertaking Hormuz transits from March 2 with their AIS on. Traffic has plunged to a trickle from the daily average of about 138 ships, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center.

Two vessels (Safeen Prestige and Mussafah 2) were attacked in the Strait; the latter was a tug providing services to the containership after it was struck. Eight seafarers on the tug were killed.

17% (3/18) of vessels were sanctioned, operating through UAE fronts (2 vessels) or Iranian entities (1 vessel). All 3 transited during the peak crisis (Mar 2-7), with one vessel  – the U.S.-sanctioned, falsely flagged Blooming Dale (12,000 dwt) – sailing through the Strait to Bandar Abbas, Iran.

Windward analysis categorized the vessels that continued transiting the Strait during the conflict according to compliance risk levels:

• 3 sanctioned vessels (17%) were classified as compliance level 3.
• 5 high-risk vessels (28%) were classified as compliance level 2.
• 2 medium-risk vessels (11%) wereclassified as compliance level 1.
• 8 low-risk vessels (44%) were classified as compliance level 0.

44% of vessels carried elevated compliance risk (levels 2-3), indicating these were not typical risk-averse commercial operators. The sanctioned and high-risk vessels had nothing to lose, while the low-risk vessels served regional energy necessity.

One low-risk vessel, Liberian-flagged Al Watan (IMO 9615030), is a handymax bulk carrier operated by ADNOC Logistics & Services (UAE national oil company).

Two were Chinese-owned, including the low-risk vessel, KSL Hengyang, which broadcast “CHINA OWNER&CREW” via AIS, to emphasise its Chinese ownership and lack of Western affiliation.

Who Continued Through the Strait

Cohort 1: Shadow Fleet (3 Sanctioned, 17%)

These vessels had little to lose, as they were already operating under sanctions.

• They were already blacklisted and cut off from Western finance and insurance.
• Two operated through UAE front companies, while one was tied directly to Iranian ownership.

Cohort 2: High-Risk Iran Program Participants (5 High-Risk, 28%)

These vessels remain committed to Iran-connected trade and appear to have calculated that the IRGC would allow passage.

• They were not yet sanctioned but had already been flagged for compliance violations.
• Four were UAE-operated, and one was Marshall Islands-operated.
• They were likely serving Iranian crude and product distribution networks.

Cohort 3: Regional Energy Necessity (2 Medium-Risk & 5 Low-Risk, 39%)

These were regional operators with critical energy infrastructure dependencies.

Key Vessels:

• AL WATAN (ADNOC L&S) is operated by the UAE national oil company and could not realistically halt service. 
• PUFFIN TWO made 47 Jebel Ali port calls between February and March, indicating its role as a critical UAE-Gulf feeder.
• SSF LEO and SSF VALENCE, both managed by GFS Ship Management (UAE), appear to be serving as regional container feeders. 
• VICTORIA is operated by a Turkish company serving the UAE through Mina Saqr.
• SINO OCEAN and KSL HENGYANG are Chinese-operated vessels that may have received preferential passage.

Westbound Dark Transit

Five vessels transited westbound through the Strait within the first three days of the crisis with their AIS off.

These vessels were already in transit or committed to transit when Operation Epic Fury struck on February 28. They appear to represent vessels caught mid-voyage. Most were established operators, including a private Greek company and Chinese state-linked owners, with existing cargo commitments.