Maritime Defense Weekly: Offshore Enforcement and Baltic Exposure

Week in Focus

• U.S. enforcement expanded in the Indian Ocean, boarding Aquila II and Veronica III, making the ninth dark fleet tanker interdiction and the second Indian Ocean boarding in five days.
• Baltic chokepoints remain active for sanctioned flows, with 292 EU-listed tankers transiting Danish waters in 2025.
• Cameroon began purging shadow fleet vessels after rapid registry growth driven by aging Russian-linked tonnage.
• A Baltic subsea power cable failure renewed infrastructure vulnerability concerns, even without confirmed sabotage.
• The U.S. Maritime Action Plan reframed shipbuilding as national security infrastructure, hinging on funding and execution.
• Treasury reopened upstream Venezuelan energy licensing, signaling continued leverage through controlled energy flows.

Sanctions Enforcement Moves Further Offshore

The United States intercepted and boarded Aquila II (IMO 9281152) in the Indian Ocean, nearly 1,000 nautical miles from where it fled a Venezuelan quarantine zone in January.

The 22-year-old Suezmax had falsely broadcast under the Panamanian flag and has a history of extended dark activity and AIS spoofing. U.S. forces conducted a right-of-visit boarding under INDOPACOM authority without incident.

This marks the ninth Venezuelan-linked tanker seized since December 2025, and the most geographically distant interdiction to date. The previous record was the Bella 1 boarding south of Iceland.

Days later, the U.S. Department of War reported the boarding of its ninth dark fleet tanker, Veronica III (IMO 9326055), a sanctioned VLCC falsely flagged with Panama. The right-of-visit interdiction in INDOPACOM marked the second Indian Ocean boarding in five days.

Tracked from the Caribbean after defying a U.S. quarantine on Venezuela, Veronica III had sailed dark for more than 100 consecutive days and previously spoofed its position off Lomé, West Africa. The 20-year-old VLCC had loaded approximately 1.8 million barrels at Jose Terminal in October and was sanctioned in December 2024 as part of a broader Iran-linked designation package.

The boarding occurred roughly 500 nautical miles from Aquila II. Roughly a dozen tankers reportedly attempted to evade the blockade.

Denmark Highlights Baltic Shadow Fleet Exposure

New Danish Maritime Authority data shows 292 voyages by EU-sanctioned tankers in Danish waters in 2025.

The Øresund, Great Belt, and Skagerrak remain critical gateways for Russian crude exports. Nearly 600 tankers are banned from EU ports and services, yet sanctioned flows continue through chokepoints.

While monitoring has increased, no sanctioned vessel has yet been seized solely on sanctions grounds in the English Channel despite 9,584 Russian-linked tanker voyages since 2022.

Baltic enforcement remains constrained by legal thresholds, not traffic volume.

Cameroon Begins Shadow Fleet Flag Purge

Cameroon’s registry expanded by 126% in the past year, becoming Africa’s third-largest flag, largely due to Russian-linked tonnage. The average vessel age is 32.7 years.

Under international pressure, including from the EU, Cameroon has now suspended new international registrations and begun moves to deregister vessels linked to shadow fleet activity.

Baltic Subsea Infrastructure Risk Resurfaces

The 250-kilometer SwePol HVDC power cable between Poland and Sweden unexpectedly went offline this week. Approximately 240 kilometers of the line run under the Baltic Sea.

Energy flows dropped to zero before 8 p.m. Wednesday. Authorities report no evidence of deliberate damage, and repairs are underway.

The failure occurs against a backdrop of repeated undersea infrastructure incidents since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including anchor-drag damage between Finland and Estonia and the Nord Stream pipeline explosions.

U.S. Maritime Action Plan Targets Industrial Reconstitution

The White House released a Maritime Action Plan that formally links commercial shipbuilding to national and economic security, acknowledging that less than one percent of new commercial ships are currently built in the United States.

Key structural elements include:

• Domestic shipbuilding is treated as a security requirement, with expanded Federal financing authorities, multiyear and multivessel procurement, and capital investment incentives designed to restore sustained production capacity.
• A Maritime Security Trust Fund and a proposed universal fee on foreign-built vessels calling at U.S. ports are intended to create a long-term funding mechanism for industrial revitalization.
• Designation of Maritime Prosperity Zones to attract domestic and allied capital into shipbuilding and maritime industrial communities.
• Alignment of fleet composition with national security, including strengthened cargo preference requirements and support for a Strategic Commercial Fleet of U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged vessels trading internationally.
• Procurement reform to reduce industrial volatility, including streamlined contracting, greater use of commercial standards, and clearer long-term demand signals.
• Integration of autonomous maritime systems into industrial planning, alongside regulatory updates addressing certification, cybersecurity, and operational standards.
• Expanded focus on Arctic access and infrastructure, including icebreaking capacity, communications, and maritime domain awareness.

The Plan positions shipbuilding, fleet composition, financing tools, workforce pipelines, and regulatory reform as components of a coordinated industrial framework rather than isolated policy measures.

Execution remains contingent on funding mechanisms, Congressional action, workforce availability, and the ability to translate multiyear policy commitments into sustained industrial output.

Venezuelan Energy Sector Reopening

The U.S. Treasury announced general licenses permitting exploration and production support in Venezuela.

The move allows U.S. goods and services to re-enter upstream energy operations, though joint ventures remain restricted.