

# Maritime Intelligence Operations Center

## Intelligence Analysis

April 12, 2026



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## EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF: HUI YUAN APPREHENSION ANALYSIS

<b>Report Date</b>	12 April 2026	<b>Incident Date</b>	12 April 2026, 06:00 UTC
<b>Report Type</b>	Vessel Apprehension Analysis	<b>Classification</b>	UNCLASSIFIED
<b>Distribution</b>	Customer Maritime Security Brief	<b>Confidence Level</b>	HIGH

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 12 April 2026 at 06:00 UTC, Swedish Coast Guard vessel KBV 499 intercepted and detained the Panama-flagged bulk carrier HUI YUAN (IMO 9285550) approximately 19.1 nautical miles southeast of Ystad, Sweden, on suspicion of environmental crimes involving the discharge of coal residues into the Baltic Sea. The vessel was en route from Ust-Luga, Russia to Las Palmas, Spain, and exhibited evasive maneuvers including extreme speed fluctuations and sharp course changes consistent with attempts to avoid detection or interception.

HUI YUAN carries Windward Compliance Risk Level 2 (High) under the RUSSIA\_GENERAL program and has extensive Russian port call history (5 calls in the past 6 months). This detention represents Sweden's intensified enforcement posture against Russian-origin cargo vessels operating in Baltic waters, marking the second environmental crime detention in nine days following the April 3 detention of the shadow fleet tanker Flora 1.

#### KEY ASSESSMENT

*HUI YUAN's operational profile - Chinese operator, flag of convenience, identity change history, Russian port dependence, dark activity periods, and evasive maritime behavior - aligns with regional enforcement priorities targeting vessels engaged in sanctions circumvention and environmental non-compliance.*

### VESSEL PROFILE

Parameter	Details
Vessel Name	HUI YUAN
IMO Number	9285550
MMSI	352003260
Callsign	3E7431
Flag State	Panama
Vessel Type	Bulk Carrier
Build Year	2004



Deadweight Tonnage	77,598 DWT
Gross Tonnage	40,916 GT
Registered Owner	Hui Yuan Ltd. (Marshall Islands)
Operator	Dia Yuan International (China)
Beneficial Owner	Dia Yuan International (China)
Manager	Dia Yuan International (China)
Ownership Since	7 December 2023

SHIP: HUI YUAN  
 IMO: 9295550  
 Class: Cargo  
 DWT: 77,598 tons  
 IIC: Class A

STATUS: Bulk Carrier  
 Max. Draft: 14.122 m  
 Beneficial owner: Phos Investing Ltd. (7)

FLAG: Panama  
 Length: 235 m  
 P&I Club: West of England  
 Registered owner: Hui Yuan Ltd. (1)

Call sign: 3M7423  
 Year of build: 2014  
 Classification society: Korean Register (1)

## COMPLIANCE & RISK PROFILE

Risk Category	Assessment
Windward Compliance Risk	Level 2 (High) - RUSSIA_GENERAL program (since 26 January 2026)
Sanctions Status	NOT SANCTIONED
Smuggling Risk	Moderate (0.951 score)
IUU Risk	Not elevated
MAV Risk	Not elevated

**COMPLIANCE SCORE - HIGH RISK** ⓘ Since 29 Mar 2026

**SANCTIONS & SCREENING INDICATORS**

**COMPLIANCE BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS**

Identity      ID & location manipulation      Flag hopping

Behavioral      **Port call** 5      Ship-to-ship activity      Dark activity      Loitering      Suspicious cargo

### Compliance Activities (Past 6 Months)

- 5 Russian port calls flagged as compliance activities
  - 4x Vostochny port calls (26-30 January 2026) - MEDIUM1 risk
  - 1x Ust-Luga port call (29 March - 2 April 2026) - HIGH1 risk
  - Total exposure: ~150 hours in Russian ports

### Dark Activity (Past 12 Months)

- 7 dark periods totaling ~103 hours (DPRK program, LOW1 risk)



- Longest dark period: 37.5 hours during Ust-Luga port call (31 March - 2 April 2026)

## IDENTITY CHANGE HISTORY

Date	Name	Flag	Owner
2004–2012	CEMTEX PIONEER	Panama	Original owner
2012–2019	NS ZHOUSHAN	Panama	New Sealand Marine Co Ltd
2019–2021	PAN ELDORADO	Panama	New Sealand Marine Co Ltd
2021–2023	PAN ELDORADO	Panama	Pan Ocean Co. Ltd. (South Korea)
Dec 2023–Present	HUI YUAN	Panama	Hui Yuan Ltd. / Dia Yuan International (China)

*Assessment: Five MMSI changes and five callsign changes in conjunction with three name changes suggest potential efforts to obscure vessel history and avoid detection systems.*

## INCIDENT TIMELINE - 1–12 APRIL 2026

### Departure Phase (1–2 April)

- 29 March – 2 April: Berthed at Ust-Luga, Russia (85.7 hours)
- 31 March – 2 April: AIS dark period (37.5 hours) during port call
- 2 April 07:12 UTC: Departed Ust-Luga

### Transit Anomaly Phase (2–10 April)

- 2–10 April: Extended 8-day anchorage/maneuvering near Estonian waters
- Multiple navigational status changes suggest operational delays or awaiting instructions
- Reason for delay unclear from available data

### Westbound Transit Phase (10–11 April)

- 10 April: Commenced westbound transit through Baltic Sea at 10–11 knots
- 11 April 20:08–20:48 UTC: Rapid acceleration from 11.5 to 24.5 knots (unusual for laden bulk carrier, possible evasive action)

### Detection & Interception Phase (12 April)

- 12 April 01:19 UTC: Sharp 133° course change with speed spike to 31 knots (maximum recorded) followed by immediate deceleration - consistent with detection response or evasive maneuver
- 12 April ~05:00 UTC (estimated): Swedish law enforcement aircraft detects vessel



- 12 April 06:00 UTC: Swedish Coast Guard vessel KBV 499 intercepts HUI YUAN at position 14.26553°E, 55.21953°N (19.1 NM southeast of Ystad, Sweden)
- Vessel detained and escorted into Swedish territorial waters
- As of report time: Vessel drifting under Coast Guard supervision while preliminary investigations ongoing



## BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

### Evasive Indicators

Indicator	Detail	Assessment
Extreme speed variance	31-knot spike from a bulk carrier rated for 12-14 knots	Full emergency power application
Abrupt course deviation	133° turn coupled with speed spike	Active evasion attempt
AIS dark period	37.5-hour blackout during Ust-Luga port call	Deliberate AIS Shut Down

### Operational Pattern

- Extensive Russian port engagement (5 calls, 150 hours in 6 months)
- Regular Chinese port rotation (Lianyungang, Taicang, Xiamen, Nanjing, Dalian)
- 45+ vessel-to-vessel meetings recorded (October 2025 – April 2026), including:
  - Extensive STS operations with Russian support vessels (REYD-series tugs, RT GENOVA, ASHANTI, KHABAROVSK) near Vostochny



- Bunkering operations in Singapore Strait and Indonesia

*Assessment: Behavioral pattern consistent with vessels engaged in Russian-origin cargo transport with deceptive shipping practices to avoid detection and enforcement scrutiny.*

## ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME CONTEXT

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Alleged Offense: Discharge of coal residues into the Baltic Sea in violation of MARPOL Annex V (Garbage) and potentially Annex II (Noxious Liquid Substances) depending on coal cargo form.

### Swedish Enforcement Context

- This detention is the second environmental crime enforcement action against Russia-origin vessels since 3 April 2026
- First incident: EU-sanctioned tanker Flora 1 (Cameroon flag) detained 3 April off Ystad for suspected oil spill east of Gotland during Operation Klöver. Vessel released 5–6 April after investigators could not prove environmental crime.
- Swedish Coast Guard has intensified operations targeting Russian-linked vessels for sanctions evasion and environmental violations

### Baltic Sea Environmental Protection

- Baltic Sea designated as MARPOL Special Area under Annex V (zero-discharge regime for garbage)
- Sweden has jurisdiction to enforce environmental standards in territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
- Detection method: Swedish law enforcement aircraft surveillance followed by surface vessel interception

## OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) VALIDATION

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### Source 1 - Open Source

Maritime security analyst Jason Wernert's LinkedIn post on 12 April 2026 references a separate incident involving a Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Hui Yuan (IMO 9574178, different vessel) boarded by Swedish Navy forces on 11 April 2026 for suspected cable sabotage near Bornholm, not environmental crimes. This vessel was detained ~20NM off southern Sweden and impounded in Karlskrona naval base for suspected involvement in cutting the Estlink-2 electricity cable. (Source: Reuters, SVT Nyheter, Lloyd's List per LinkedIn synthesis)

### Source 2 - Ambrey Intelligence

Intelligence confirms Panama-flagged bulk carrier detained by Swedish law enforcement ~19.1NM SE of Ystad on suspicion of environmental crimes (coal residue discharge). Vessel was en route from Ust-Luga, Russia to Las Palmas, Spain. Speed and course alterations observed at 05:50 UTC on 12 April. Swedish-flagged law enforcement vessel observed tailing and escorting



the vessel into territorial waters. Initial detection by Swedish law enforcement aircraft. Second vessel detained on environmental crime suspicions since 3 April involving Russia-origin vessels.

*Assessment: Ambrey intelligence aligns with Windward data. The Flora 1 incident (3 April) establishes enforcement precedent.*

## GEOPOLITICAL & OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

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### Swedish Maritime Enforcement Posture

- Sweden has adopted an aggressive interdiction strategy targeting Russian-linked maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea
- Environmental enforcement serves dual function: legitimate pollution control and pressure mechanism against Russia's export economy
- Pattern indicates coordinated monitoring (air surveillance + surface interdiction) of Russia-origin cargo vessels

### Russian Port Dependency

- Ust-Luga is Russia's primary Baltic port for coal exports and general cargo
- Vessels departing Ust-Luga face heightened scrutiny from Baltic/Nordic coastal states
- HUI YUAN's Ust-Luga origin and alleged coal cargo discharge aligns with enforcement targeting of Russian coal trade

### Shadow Fleet Context

- European coastal states (Sweden, France, Belgium) intensified operations against Russian-linked shadow fleet vessels in early 2026
- Aging vessels (~18 years average) vulnerable to detention for environmental violations due to lack of credible insurance and maintenance standards
- HUI YUAN (22 years old, built 2004) fits age profile of targeted vessels

## WATCHLIST RECOMMENDATIONS - SIMILAR VESSELS

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Based on HUI YUAN's operational profile, the following three bulk carriers are recommended for enhanced monitoring due to similar risk indicators: Russian port activity, Windward Compliance Risk Level 2, flags of convenience, identity changes, and European trading routes.

### 1. MANTA HATICE (IMO 9338565)

Parameter	Details
Flag	Marshall Islands
Type	Bulk Carrier (19,816 GT, 31,931 DWT)
Owner/Operator	Manta Denizcilik (Turkey)



Windward Compliance Risk	Level 2 (High) - RUSSIA_GENERAL (since 15 Sept 2025)
Russian Port Calls	Novorossiysk (15-16 Sept 2025)
Last Position	West Africa (Cameroon, 27 March 2026)
Identity Changes	2018: ANNECY → MANTA HATICE
Risk Indicators	Moderate smuggling risk (0.951), Baltic/North Sea/Mediterranean routes
Operational Pattern	Regular European port calls with Russian-origin cargo, transiting Baltic Sea and North Sea routes

## 2. SEAJoy II (IMO 9870874)

Parameter	Details
Flag	Malta
Type	Bulk Carrier (35,061 GT, 61,331 DWT)
Owner/Operator	Almond Investment Sa (Marshall Islands) / Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd (Greece)
Windward Compliance Risk	Level 2 (High) - RUSSIA_GENERAL (since 29 Sept 2025)
Russian Port Calls	Ust-Luga (29 Sept - 3 Oct 2025), St. Petersburg (21-24 March 2026)
Last Position	Currently dark (last position 10 April 2026, West Africa)
Identity Changes	2024-2026: HEINRICH HEINE → WAVE → SEAJoy II (repeated name flipping)
Risk Indicators	Multiple identity changes, dark activity, recent ownership change (Sept 2025), moderate smuggling risk
Operational Pattern	Baltic Sea operations, European routes (Netherlands, Ireland, UK), recent dark activity

**▲ PRIORITY ALERT: SEAJoy II went dark on 10 April 2026 - same timeframe as HUI YUAN detention. Recommend immediate tracking.**

## 3. TRAPEZITZA (IMO 9968499)

Parameter	Details
Flag	Malta
Type	Bulk Carrier (29,173 GT, 45,189 DWT)
Owner/Operator	Trapezitza Navigation Ltd. (Malta) / Navigation Maritime Bulgare Ad (Bulgaria)
Windward Compliance Risk	Level 2 (High) - RUSSIA_GENERAL (since 4 June 2025)
Russian Port Calls	Ust-Luga (4 June & 12-17 June 2025), currently at Ust-Luga (arrived 12 April 2026)
Last Position	Ust-Luga, Russia (12 April 2026)
Identity Changes	Recent ownership change (July 2025), new vessel (built 2024)



Risk Indicators	Dark activity periods (June 2025, April 2026), active Russian trade
Operational Pattern	Regular Ust-Luga calls, Baltic Sea routes, European destinations (Ireland, UK, Finland)

**▲ PRIORITY ALERT: TRAPEZITZA is currently at Ust-Luga (as of 12 April 2026) - same port as HUI YUAN's departure. Recommend monitoring for similar evasive behavior upon departure.**

## ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

### Key Judgments

#	Judgment	Confidence
1	Enforcement Precedent: HUI YUAN's detention establishes a sustained enforcement campaign by Swedish authorities targeting Russian-origin cargo vessels for environmental violations in Baltic waters. Flora 1 (3 April) followed by HUI YUAN (12 April) indicates systematic surveillance posture.	HIGH
2	Evasive Behavior Confirms Intent: HUI YUAN's 31-knot speed spike and 133° course deviation at 01:19 UTC - five hours before interception - indicates crew awareness of detection/pursuit. Bulk carriers do not execute emergency power maneuvers without external threat perception.	HIGH
3	Russian Port Origin as Enforcement Trigger: Both Flora 1 and HUI YUAN originated from Russian ports. Swedish authorities are prioritizing vessels departing Russian ports for environmental inspection, leveraging MARPOL enforcement to disrupt Russian export flows.	HIGH
4	AIS Manipulation Pattern: HUI YUAN's 37.5-hour dark period during Ust-Luga port call aligns with deceptive shipping practices employed by vessels seeking to obscure cargo operations.	HIGH
5	Chinese Operator Sanctions Circumvention Profile: Dia Yuan International's acquisition of HUI YUAN in December 2023, coupled with immediate Russian port engagement, suggests vessel repositioning to support Russian trade amid Western sanctions.	MEDIUM
6	Environmental Crime as Legal Leverage: Coal residue discharge allegations provide Swedish authorities with jurisdictional basis for detention, vessel search, cargo inspection, and crew interrogation - broader investigative access than sanctions enforcement alone would permit.	HIGH

## OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

### 1. Enhanced Monitoring - Ust-Luga Departures

Prioritize surveillance of bulk carriers departing Ust-Luga, Russia, particularly those with:

- Flags of convenience (Panama, Marshall Islands, Malta, Liberia)
- Chinese, Turkish, or opaque beneficial ownership
- Windward Compliance Risk Level 2 or 3
- Identity change history or dark activity periods

### 2. Immediate Watchlist Addition

Add SEAJAY II (IMO 9870874) and TRAPEZITZA (IMO 9968499) to active monitoring - both vessels exhibit HUI YUAN's risk profile and are currently in high-alert status.



### 3. AIS Gap Analysis

Configure monitoring systems to flag vessels with dark periods exceeding 12 hours in Russian ports, as this behavior correlates with cargo concealment and evasive intent.

**Report Prepared By: Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC)**

Data Sources: Windward AI Maritime Intelligence Platform, Ambrey Intelligence, open-source reporting  
Confidence Assessment: High (converging multi-source intelligence with verified Windward vessel data)

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